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CIS Armed Forces Spokesman Calls For CIS Peacemaking Force

LD2005182993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1730 GMT 20 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Nikishov]

[Text] Moscow May 20 TASS—The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) must have an effective peacemaking force to eliminate conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, Major General Valentin Terentiyev, representative of the headquarters of the CIS Armed Forces, told an international round-table meeting that ended in the Russian Academy of Management on Thursday [20 May].

The meeting dealt with the peacemaking capability of the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the CIS in view of the conflict situations on the territory of ex-Soviet republics.

Despite a number of decisions taken at the level of the heads of state of CIS countries, only Russian troops are actually involved in peacemaking operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union, the general said.

The development of peacemaking activities within the CIS is being hampered by a complex bureaucratic mechanism for decision-making on such operations, and the lack of funds. Apart from Russia, the most active peacemaking efforts are being manifested by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia, Terentiyev said.

"The causes of conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union will not, apparently, be eliminated soon," said Sergey Rogov, president of the Centre for National Security and International Relations, who presided over the round-table meeting.

Besides, in Russia itself, it is necessary to resolve conflicts between subjects of the federation. However, there are no effective conflict-settling mechanisms either in the CIS, CSCE, or even at the U.N., Rogov pointed out.

Commentary Rejects Shaposhnikov Unified Force Idea

MK2005103093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 19 May 93 (Signed to Press 18 May) p A10

[Commentary by military observer Aleksandr Zhilin under the rubric "Strategy": "Russia vs. Shaposhnikov"]

[Text] A regular session of the CIS states Council of Defense Ministers has discussed the question of unified armed forces. Marshal Shaposhnikov's proposals were approved by five out of the six participants. The meeting's outcome was predetermined, however, by Russia. Its representative, Boris Gromov, categorically turned down all the fundamental views of the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces. The start of the Joint Armed Forces reform was once more delayed for an indefinite period.

Meanwhile, shortly before the meeting there seemed to have been plenty of grounds for optimism. An opponent of forcing decisions, Shaposhnikov had waited until the military in the former Soviet republics came to the independent conclusion: Solving defense matters jointly takes less effort and money. Illusions of sovereign military might had vanished. Declarations of complete and final independence came and were replaced by totally different discussions. The defense minister of a southern republic said in a fit of rage during one such meeting recently: "What SS-20 are you talking about when I do not have the money to buy a Xerox machine for my army with...." What specifically did the Joint Armed Forces commander in chief propose to the participants in the May meeting?

One of the main documents is a draft agreement on the CIS Joint Armed Forces. Under the plan, new unified forces are to be formed stage by stage. The first stage is 1993 to 1994. It was proposed that over the course of two years, combined-arms formations that could serve simultaneously as a covering force and a mobile force in armed conflicts on a limited scale along the external borders of the CIS member countries be formed.

The second stage is 1995 to 1996—the final formation of the Joint Armed Forces with the inclusion of various armed services and the creation of a command and control structure.

An important detail: The inclusion of republics' units and formations with the Joint Armed Forces is of a rather token nature. In peacetime, these formations are to be subordinated to their national Defense Ministries. And they are only committed to action under the Joint Armed Forces' flag in case of military necessity. Is this not a guarantee against joint troops being used by the top brass for their own political ends?

In addition, their creation requires no new appreciable outlays: This is not a question of military development but simply a partial restructuring of the functioning armed forces.

The Joint Armed Forces command and control system proposed by the commander in chief also looked quite democratic. The supreme military and political body is to be a collective security council comprised of heads of state, heads of government, an executive secretary, the chairman of the Council of Defense Ministers, and the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the CIS states. It was suggested that the Joint Armed Forces high command remain a working body. In line with this concept, the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces should remain in command of the strategic forces.

The outcome of the discussion is: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are in favor, Russia is categorically against. The reasons?

The creation of the Joint Armed Forces, in Gromov's opinion, may draw a negative reaction from NATO and former USSR Warsaw Pact allies. Besides, Russia is against subordination of the strategic forces to the Joint Armed Forces commander in chief, and in favor of their national-state affiliation.

But didn't NATO members state that they would prefer to deal with a unified, organized structure rather than with numerous military agencies with unclear doctrines? Does the Joint Armed Forces bar the road to cooperation with the states of West Europe?

And what may be the most important objection: Russia's obstinacy in matters of nuclear armaments could tip Kazakhstan's position closer to that of Ukraine's. At any rate, this prospect was discussed privately during the meeting. This is only understandable: CIS partners cannot let their security depend on the political situation in Russia. Should communists and national- patriots come to power in the Kremlin tomorrow, in whose hands would the USSR nuclear potential end up? And in what manner would they use it?

On the other hand, Russia itself is losing out both militarily and politically by throwing out the Shaposhnikov plan. What are the Joint Armed Forces structures to Russia? In addition to everything else, they are channels for the delivery of weapons, combat materiel, and spare parts to former Union republics, plus new orders for the defense industries and the scientists who serve it. In the meantime, potential competitors have already begun stirring: Foreign firms are studying the demand for weapons and are ready to offer their services.

Another example: A unified strategy within the framework of the Joint Armed Forces would make Russia the exclusive owner of the system of military training for national armies.

Nonetheless Russia would not support the Shaposhnikov plan. Is this decision final? The CIS heads of state will again be discussing military questions on 16 July. The outcome, as before, depends on Russia's position.

Grachev Meets Baltic Leaders on Troop Withdrawal

Notes Problems With Latvia, Estonia

PM2105090593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 May 93 pp 1, 3

[Sergey Knyazkov report: "Compromises Can Be Found: Russian Federation Defense Minister's Visit to Lithuanian Republic"]

[Text] As already reported by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the official visit of Russian Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev to the Lithuanian Republic began on 18 May. In Vilnius the Russian Federation defense minister met with President Algirdas Brazauskas.

The main question for us remains the problem of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuanian territory within the timetable laid down, that is to say by 31 August this year, Pavel Grachev said after the conversation. Under Lithuania's previous leadership the basic political document on withdrawal was not signed because the style of certain passages in the draft written by the Lithuanian side was disrespectful toward Russia. Then, in September 1992, a simple protocol on the timetable for withdrawing the troops from Lithuanian territory was signed. I asked President Algirdas Brazauskas, the Russian Federation defense minister noted, to reach agreement with Boris Yeltsin on this question in order to find a way to conclude an all-embracing basic political document in the very near future to serve as the basis for the unhindered withdrawal of our troops from the republic's territory.

The question of the joint utilization of military plants on Lithuanian territory was also discussed. It was stated that the Lithuanian side is ready to go along with this and proposes that joint ventures be set up on the basis of the plants. This also suits Russia.

The next question concerned possible Lithuanian help in constructing housing for servicemen in Russia. The army general stressed that the Lithuanian side has already had successful results with housing construction in Kaliningrad Oblast; the main issue now has to do solely with finance.

The most complex problem concerns the sale of real estate. However, in the minister's opinion, this falls within the competence of the government delegations—whatever they decide will apply.

The timetable for the Russian troops' withdrawal was not revised, but it was stressed that difficulties could arise in meeting it—connected primarily with the supply of rolling stock and the removal of a large quantity of supplies. However, here, too, Pavel Grachev stressed, compromises satisfying both sides will be found. He also noted with satisfaction that on the political plane there is clearly a desire and great willingness on the part of the Lithuanian Republic's president and military leadership to cooperate with Russia.

The Russian defense minister went on to hold a conversation with Latvian military department chief Jundzis Talavs. Pavel Grachev set out the Russian Defense Ministry position on questions of vital importance to it concerning the withdrawal of troops from Latvian territory, particularly social questions. The question of the documents that the two countries need to sign for the withdrawal to be effected was also raised. "Unless such documents are signed in the very near future, the problem of withdrawing troops from Latvian and Estonian territory will persist," Grachev stated.

After the meeting the Russian defense minister left for Kaunas. He knows the city well, having served there four years as chief of staff of the 7th Airborne Division. His

meeting with city Mayor Arimantas Rackauskas was therefore cordial, as was his conversation with officers of the airborne division.

In Kaunas the defense minister also listened to the commanders of all the units and commands stationed in Lithuania. At this time a telephone call came in from President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow. The defense minister described the progress of the talks with Lithuania's political and miliary leadership. The president's telephone call showed that Boris Yeltsin does keep Russian-Lithuanian contacts in his field of vision and pays attention to the problem of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries.

After returning to Vilnius, Pavel Grachev met with Estonian Defense Minister Hain Rebas on 18 May. During a brief conversation the two sides confirmed their readiness to discuss existing problems in Russian-Estonian relations. However, as at the meeting with the Latvian defense minister, Pavel Grachev stressed that before discussing a specific timetable for the withdrawal of Russian troops it is essential to conclude a basic political treaty on this question, signed by the presidents of Russia and Estonia. The information that the United States, Denmark, and Norway are ready to allocate resources for the construction of housing for Russian troops withdrawn from Estonia was received with satisfaction. If the money really is forthcoming, Russia will be able to withdraw its troops from the republic by the end of 1993, Pavel Grachev stressed.

The first day of Army General Grachev's visit to Lithuania ended with a meeting with National Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius. Its results became known on 19 May during a conversation between Pavel Grachev, Lithuanian Seimas Chairman Ceslovas Jursenas, and members of the Seimas National Security Committee, which our correspondent attended. The Russian Federation defense minister reported that it had been possible during the talks with Audrius Butkevicius to resolve all questions of interest to the two sides (and there were almost 20 of them) at defense department level. A number of the questions, above all those concerning reciprocal settlements on real estate, require intergovernmental agreements, and they have been referred to the state delegations conducting the Russian-Lithuanian talks in Vilnius.

On 19 May the Russian defense minister also met with Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius. Pavel Grachev and Audrius Butkevicius then held a news conference at which the Russian defense minister summed up the results of the visit to Lithuania.

Pavel Grachev left for Moscow that evening.

'Stalemate' Seen in Talks

PM2005150393 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 93 p 1

[Correspondent Vladimir Zarovskiy report: "Divide Up, Not Build Up"]

[Text] We originally assumed that Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's visit to Lithuania would take place without excesses and misunderstandings. The Russian Army is moving out. Leaving behind everything it has built up....

Six points could be listed for discussion: social security for pensioners and former Soviet Army servicemen who have stayed behind to live in Lithuania; the right to use military repair bases, leading in some cases to the establishment of joint Russian-Lithuanian firms; the sale of equipment to Lithuania; the construction of housing in certain areas by Lithuanian specialists for the troops that are being withdrawn; the sale of real estate left by the Army; and, of course, the timetable for troop withdrawal. As regards the final point, according to a statement by P. Grachev, the troops will leave Lithuania on schedule—before 31 August this year.

The situation regarding property is more complicated. "This is not my sphere of competence; it should be resolved by the state delegations that have started to discuss this problem." But here a stalemate prevails: The Lithuanian side is attempting to bring up the issue of "compensation for damage done to the economy and people of Lithuania by former Soviet troops transferred to Russian jurisdiction last year." The Russian side, however, has reportedly not had time to study Lithuania's proposals on payment for military transit from Germany to Russia across its territory. And a political treaty on withdrawing the Army has basically not been concluded yet, which means that nobody can give any guarantees.

The opposition leader, former Supreme Council Chairman V. Landsbergis, has his own interpretation of what is happening: "Russia is becoming aggressive toward its neighbors and is apt to look for excuses to intervene in the affairs of neighboring states."

According to him, exercises held in April were intended to teach the Army how to seize the Baltic states within two days.

'Realism' Seen Promoting CIS Integration Trends

PM1905093593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 18 May 93 p 2

[Pavel Shinkarenko article: "Commonwealth Pulls Itself Out of Its 'Nosedive.' This Is How the Moscow Summit Conference of Participants in the Council of Heads of State of CIS Member Countries Could Be Described"]

[Text] The session of the Council of Heads of State held on 14 May in Moscow was awaited with particular impatience. At the previous meeting in Minsk on the eve of the Russian referendum, most of the leaders had unequivocally supported deepening the integration of the former USSR republics, primarily in the economic sphere. The heads of government then elaborated the basic documents in the Belarusian capital on 28 April. But, nonetheless, the most difficult work still lay ahead:

The young states' top officials would have to give the green light to accelerated movement along the integration route.

To Build by Destroying?

The paradox is that the integration for which Russia and the other Commonwealth states are striving is not uncharted territory for the various partners. Division of labor, deep specialization, and production sharing all existed before. It is quite another matter that they were built not on a natural market basis but as a product of "political expediency." The result was a national economic complex that took no account of the national conditions and peculiarities of the regions. Following the breakup of the USSR and the declarations of independence by the former union republics, the single economic area turned into a tattered blanket. A legal vacuum arose in the sphere of interstate relations that has still not been filled today. Instead of one, there were now 15 decision-making centers, each "charged" with centrifugal political aspirations which in many cases were of a very extremist nature. Power structures were influenced by fear of the center and separatism, and in some countries interethnic conflicts broke out.

For a number of years, particularly during 1992, a reduction in trading, economic, and cooperation ties has taken place. Russia's actual trade turnover with Commonwealth countries is currently about 70 percent in relation to agreements concluded. Ukraine has stopped sending grain, foodstuffs, and rolled ferrous metal into the CIS market; Kazakhstan has stopped sending coal, metal, and tractors; Central Asia has stopped sending cotton.... Decreased deliveries of fuel and energy resources from Russia have had a particularly noticeable impact on all the young states. In 1992 the export volumes of these products compared with 1991 were as follows: Oil—45 percent, diesel fuel—69 percent, fuel oil—46 percent, and coal—81 percent. And although supplies of natural gas increased by 15 percent, they were unable to satisfy the hunger for energy. The volume of consumer goods was almost halved.

Timid attempts to restore the former barter system and establish a single mechanism of economic cooperation have come up against a wall of mistrust. If these attempts originated in Moscow, accusations about the Kremlin's imperial aspirations and Russia's desire to once again become the "big brother" would immediately have started to fly. Ideas about a customs and currency union, a single ruble zone, and the establishment of coordinating organs never got past first base, so to speak. In 1992 only the Collective Security Treaty got the go-ahead. And even then only six countries resolved to take this step.

With the depressing results for 1992 in hand, the leaders of the independent states realized by the start of 1993 that only by pooling their efforts could they expect to avert disaster.

Reclusiveness Is Harmful

Experience has proven the politicians wrong. It has shown that genuine independence has little in common with political and economic reclusiveness— especially when we are talking about states that have shared a common fate for decades or even centuries. The year 1992 provided another argument: A divorce policy did not receive nationwide support in any state.

It would seem that the governments of all the countries have actually been working shoulder to shoulder: During the past year more than 270 joint cooperation agreements have been signed. But here is the unfortunate thing: The agreements reached over the negotiating table have not been fulfilled. Experience has shown that there has been a single reason for this—the states have been unable to coordinate on the principal components of a mechanism for implementing joint decisions. Moreover, the Commonwealth did not even have a charter of its own which would have determined an organizational structure and procedure for the functioning of the new economic community.

It seems that the two top-level meetings in Minsk on 22 January and 16 April helped to overcome this obstacle. It was back in January that the group of countries that are striving most systematically to deepen mutual economic ties was defined. The CIS Charter was adopted in Minsk, and problems associated with the establishment of an Interstate Bank and a Consultative Coordinating Committee have basically been resolved. Speaking about the results of this meeting, Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the most active supporter of deepening integration within the CIS, said with relief: "I am pleased with the present session."

This was followed by Boris Yeltsin's address to the leaders of the independent states in which he set out the Russian program for mutual economic cooperation. And then a new meeting was held in Moscow.

The Russian delegation's work got easier when, following the Russian referendum, a fundamentally new political situation arose. The country's citizens confirmed their confidence in the president and the government and supported the policy of profound transformations. "I regard the people's trust as a direct assignment to proceed along the path of democracy and reforms," Boris Yeltsin said in this connection.

The Goal Is Economic Union

The extraordinary meeting of heads of state in Moscow's President Hotel fulfilled the task set for the CIS participants by the whole course of economic development. "We were able to take major steps toward strengthening the Commonwealth," Boris Yeltsin said of the conference results. "The charter organs have been defined and a number of basic issues resolved regarding the phased creation of an economic union."

Of course, a declaration about economic union is not actually an economic union. But there is firm agreement that during the course of 1993 a total of 25 documents forming a strong legal base for the new association, which is already worthy of attention, will be adopted. They define a specific program for gradual integration which signifies a real shift from fragmentation to coordinated joint action and the establishment of a common market for the free movement of goods, capital, and services. On the other hand, an economic union can only function as a full-fledged unit under conditions of a uniform economic area with a coordinated strategy of reforms, coordination of domestic policy, and major interlocking of national economic mechanisms.

This means that movement toward economic union is impossible without a number of complex and at times painful political and socioeconomic problems. That is why, for example, Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov believes that this sort of union is currently inadvisable. "We are not ready for it in a conceptual sense," he stated. Ukrainian leader Leonid Kravchuk protests against the term used. "We support economic integration," he says. "But the people are allergic to the word 'union.' We need to find another word without rejecting the principle of integration."

Nevertheless a major step has been taken in the direction of mutual cooperation. The drafts of the main documents should be ready by 1 July so that they can be discussed and signed at the next summit meeting in Yerevan on 16 July.

Needless to say, joining the new economic community will be voluntary. Moreover, Boris Yeltsin stressed at the final news conference, "everyone is free to stop wherever he thinks it necessary to do so." This formula is apparently most suitable. It enabled all the participants in the meeting to support the declaration on establishing an economic union.

The establishment of a CIS executive secretariat also demonstrated the sincere desire to move along the integrationist path. Ivan Korotchenya has been approved as its director, and also as director of the Consultative Coordinating Committee which operates at the deputy prime minister level. Aleksandr Shokhin represents Russian interests on this committee. Along the same lines, the earlier election of Belarusian Justice Minister Leonid Dashuk as chairman of the CIS Economic Court was approved...

And so the CIS seems to have begun to pull itself out of its protracted "nosedive." Political and economic realism are taking the place of uncertainty and reclusiveness.

Belarus Arms Deliveries Seen Perpetuating Tajik Conflict

MK2005091093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 21, 23 May 93 (Signed to Press 18 May) p A12

[Oleg Panfilov report: "Brothers In Arms"]

[Text] The Belarusian newspaper ZVEZDA on 13 May published an article entitled "Belarusian Arms to Tajikistan as Present or Loan." It comments on a statement by Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich about arms sales to Tajikistan. It also refers to the following pronouncement by Gennadiy Danilov, head of administration of the Belarusian Council of Ministers: "Belarus does not sell arms to countries where hostilities are under way. As an exception, we provided assistance only to Tajikistan."

The newspaper reports for the first time, quoting INTERFAX, about information obtained from Abdumalik Abdullodzhanov, Tajikistan head of government: "Belarus, along with Russia and Uzbekistan, is the main arms supplier." The division of labor is carried out this way: Russia supplies armored hardware and tanks, and Belarus provides weapons and munitions. Moreover, ZVEZDA elaborates, by the end of May a Belarusian delegation is to visit Dushanbe to sign a number of intergovernmental agreements, including an agreement on military assistance.

The article drew an immediate response. On that same day, 13 May, Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich told journalists that his country would never sell arms to Tajikistan. He later expanded on his statement, speaking with a Russian television correspondent: "I'm going to reveal a small secret to you—all documents on arms sales must be considered by the Security Council. I, as Security Council chairman, have not signed any documents on the sale of weapons to Tajikistan." (This pronouncement by Shushkevich confirms that there are difficulties in relations between the leader of Belarus and the chairman of the Belarusian Government. Observers believe that old differences between Shushkevich and Kebich have become a source of some inconsistency in their actions).

The article in ZVEZDA is important because it sheds light on previously little-known relations between CIS members. It quotes, for the first time, Tajikistan Prime Minister Abdullodzhanov as describing the military cooperation with Uzbekistan and Russia as going beyond sending in a few battalions as part of the "peacekeeping" forces.

The stepped-up activity of the armed opposition in Tajikistan prompts the republic's government to look for "brothers in arms," and also for a cheap market capable of supplying the newly created republic Army with modern armored vehicles and weapons. So far, however, it is only the units of the 201st division and special-purpose units of the Tajikistan National Security Committee that are able to put up resistance to the opposition

groups that break through the border with Afghanistan. An order calling up young men for military service caused an exodus of the Russian-speaking population, especially families that have draft-age sons. There are incidents of desertions from the Uzbek Army battalion, including officers who do not return from brief leaves of absence.

At the same time, the Tajikistan leadership has launched an information campaign on the storage of weapons in Tajikistan by the opposition. The press department of the Iranian Embassy has already denied reports carried by Ostankino Television about deliveries of arms and munitions to southern Tajikistan by Iranian planes. The Tajik Foreign Ministry asked third countries to exert pressure on the Afghan authorities so as to stop the flow of military assistance to the Tajik opposition.

To all appearances, neither Tajik diplomats nor international organizations see any prospects of political settlement of the Tajik conflict, or they simply do not attempt to take on this task. The Tajik authorities appear to consider the escalation of military confrontation as the only possible way out; they are aided in this by their partners from CIS countries that supply weapons to Tajikistan. Meanwhile, given the aforementioned circumstances it looks somewhat strange if Russia declares its support for the Tajik authorities citing the wish to ensure the security of the Russian-speaking population. In any event, the policy adopted by the republic resulted in reducing the local Russian-speaking community, which formerly included over 400,000 people, to less than 70,000.

Georgian Espionage, Terrorist Ring Uncovered in Ukraine

MK2005130093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 May 93 p 3

[Unattributed report under the rubric "NEGA Reports"]

[Text] Abkhazia's Security Service reports that it has uncovered close contacts between the information-intelligence service of Georgia and the Security Service of Ukraine.

This was announced by Gennadiy Berulava, acting chairman of Abkhazia's Security Service. He said that a network of secret agents and secret addresses of Georgia's special services had been uncovered on the territory of Ukraine. They recruited agents and infiltrated them into Abkhazia to gather necessary information and conduct subversive activities.

Abkhazia's Security Service rendered harmless a subversive group in Gudauta led by Murtaz Gelenidze. The group was preparing terrorist acts on the territory controlled by Abkhaz troops. They had planned a terrorist act at the Gudauta military airfield of Bombora, which serves Russian airborne troops, as well as attempts on the lives of Russian servicemen.

Kozyrev: 'Complete Understanding' in Talks With Christopher

LD2005175593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1525 GMT 20 May 93

[ITAR-TASS correspondents Aleksandr Korolev and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Washington, 20 May—As always, there is "complete understanding on all the principle political issues of peaceful settlement, and very close positions on specific distinct aspects of the problem" between Russia and the United States, said Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, following completion of the first round of talks with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

The leader of the Russian foreign political department arrived in Washington early this morning for consultations with the U.S. Administration regarding regulation of the Yugoslav crisis and an exchange of views on Russia's initiative on step-by-step implementation of the Vance-Owen plan.

Over the next few hours, we will continue working on "preparing a specific joint action program" regarding means of regulation in Bosnia. Consultations on this issue will also be held "with our friends and partners," in particular with the UN Security Council, the minister said. He also expressed certainty that these consultations would lead to positive results.

Christopher's Push for 'Consultations' on Bosnia Viewed

PM2005130993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 May 93 First Edition p 3

[Aleksandr Shalnev report under general heading: "Moscow and Belgrade See No Alternative to Vance-Owen Plan"]

[Text] Washington—The United States confirmed officially Tuesday that it accepts neither the idea of "gradual implementation" of the Vance-Owen plan nor the convening of a special UN Security Council session at foreign minister level to examine the question of what to do now with this plan, rejected by the Bosnian Serbs.

According to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who was addressing the House Foreign Affairs Committee, he was "somewhat surprised" that Andrey Kozyrev, his Russian colleague, had advanced the idea of a "gradual" approach and the proposal to convene the Security Council. In the present situation, when "the plan has been rejected so decisively in the referendum," the secretary of state continued, "it would be unwise and premature to convene a meeting or talk about its gradual implementation.... Kozyrev would like to implement the plan through the will of one of the sides. I will tell the Russian minister this when we meet in Washington Thursday."

From the secretary of state's viewpoint it is possible to implement the plan only by the use of force, and it follows from Christopher's statements that Washington is certainly not prepared to use force right now. What Washington is prepared to do is just to continue consultations with its European allies and with Russia, only not within the framework of any forums but primarily on a bilateral basis.

Also on Tuesday the chairman of the Security Council—this month it is Yuliy Vorontsov, Russia's permanent representative at the United Nations—issued a statement saying that, under conditions when intensive consultations are taking place among the foreign ministers of a number of Council member countries, "it does not seem possible to determine accurately a date for convening a Security Council session at ministerial level. The date of the session will be decided later, with due regard for the results of the consultations."

Incidentally, by the end of Tuesday it was not at all clear whether Kozyrev, who is arriving in Washington from Rome Thursday, intends to go to New York and nonetheless chair a Security Council session, but at a lower level. In this connection attention must be drawn to the fact that our minister's previous idea of organizing a Security Council session actually in Bosnia did not meet with his colleagues' support either.

Meanwhile, it is becoming increasingly clear that the United States, having now almost totally turned its back on the Vance-Owen plan, about which it was not particularly enthusiastic before anyway, is reckoning on focusing chief attention on other measures in its consultations with European allies and with Russia, particularly on lifting the long-standing embargo on arms deliveries to the Bosnian Muslims.

It is characteristic that Christopher's speech on Capitol Hill no longer once mentioned an idea which people in Washington liked to repeat just a few days ago—the idea of U.S. leadership in settling the Yugoslav problems. On the contrary, the secretary of state has now repeated several times that the events in and around Bosnia are primarily a European problem and concern.

Incidentally, Christopher was asked for his reaction to the proposals that Gorbachev and Kissinger should now set about settling the crisis. While not denying, as he put it, the "outstanding abilities" of both politicians, the secretary of state emphasized, however: "The problem is not the qualities of those who are conducting the talks but the sides' readiness" to support the plan.

U.S. 'U-Turn' on Bosnia Puts Russia's Policy 'Back at Square One'

PM2005132393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 May 93 First Edition p 1

[Vladimir Kuznechevskiy commentary: "Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Remains Face to Face With the Yugoslavia Crisis"]

[Text] A crushing blow was dealt to the plan for a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina 18 May. Moreover, it came from where it was least expected.

At a UN Security Council sitting, U.S. Representative Albright announced quite unexpectedly for everyone that the United States prefers not to be hasty in implementing the Vance-Owen Plan. This mild, diplomatic phraseology means in fact that Washington is refusing to discuss even the possibility of applying the peace plan.

It is difficult to evaluate the force of the blow. For a long time, indeed, the United States has been twisting the arms of Serbia, its European allies, and above all Russia, striving to get the plan accepted. And suddenly it turns out that it is Washington that does not need this plan.

The first indications of such a U-turn in U.S. diplomacy appeared as far back as a week ago when Yuliy Vorontsov, current chairman of the UN Security Council and representative of Russia, proposed a sitting of foreign ministers of the organ's member-countries to discuss the situation in Bosnia. Without waiting for the conference to start, several Moscow newspapers rushed to proclaim all but a victory for Russian diplomacy. So it was that ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI ran an article under the headline "Russia Seizes the Initiative." Meanwhile, having perused the draft resolution proposed by Russia, the United States at first revealed a restrained reaction to the idea, and then refused outright to participate. Yesterday it was learned that no sitting will be held on this question, and then came the aforementioned statement by the U.S. representative at the UN Security Council.

We will not begin to embark on an analysis of the reasons why the U.S. President has lost interest in settling the Yugoslav crisis so suddenly, or why he has to all intents and purposes acknowledged the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Serbs and the Croats. We will merely note that only Bill Clinton's inexperience in international affairs can explain his simplistic approach to choosing methods for a peaceful settlement—bomb the Serbs, and everything there will sort itself out.

The following question must concern the Russian public to a great extent: What, then, should our foreign policy department do now in this situation? Its leadership faithfully and devotedly took its cue from Washington's tough anti-Serb policy, quickly and obediently agreeing to all forms of pressure on Serbia, which included possible military measures! And now, following the Americans' break with the Vance-Owen Plan, Russian foreign policy in the Balkans has been left hanging.

As far back as 5 May, Boris Yeltsin promised U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher that, if the Vance-Owen Plan were supported, Russia would be prepared to send peacekeeping forces to Bosnia. And if the plan were rejected by the Serbs, then Moscow would join the United States in preparing new, tougher measures. But now, when the main guarantor of implementing the plan to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina has declared its own lack of interest in its immediate implementation, Russian foreign policy in respect of the Yugoslav crisis has ended up back at square one.

Could it be at least that Smolensk Square and the Kremlin will now remember Russia's own interests in the Balkans, and the historical traditions of Russian diplomacy in this region? Better late than never.

West Accused of 'Double Standards' in Bosnia

PM2005140593 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 May 93 p 5

[Ye. Popov report: "Firm 'Noes' and 'Yeses.' Bosnian Referendum Rejects Vance-Owen Plan, Says 'Yes' to Creation of Bosnian Serb State"]

[Text] With unconcealed irritation the Western media (and the Russian "democratic" media with them) has been referring to the Serbian Republic in Bosnia as "self-proclaimed." The same title has long been given to the Bosnian Serb parliament, and Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic are referred to as "self-styled" by the democratic hacks. But the 15-17 May referendum has sorted everything out: The people can in no way be considered "self-styled" or "so-called." Contrary to the sarcastic comment from Lord Owen—one of the creators of the "peace plan"—that "a serious referendum is impossible" in a war-torn country, more than 80 percent of citizens turned out to vote. And the curious nature of another statement by "Iron David" (that there would not even be enough ballot boxes) could be judged by all the TV viewers who saw the reports from Bosnia.

Incidentally, you could not help noticing that one of the two ballot boxes featured an expressive symbol—the traditional Serbian coat of arms. Two questions in the referendum were organically linked: A firm "no" to the plan to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into 10 semi-autonomous areas to all intents and purposes predetermined a "yes" answer to the creation of a Bosnian Serb state.

A BBC radio report from one electoral district cited the kind of typical rebuke directed against Western journalists, who have been conducting an anti-Serb propaganda campaign for many months now—"How can you say such things about us?!" The reporter ironically stated that the Serbs think that "the whole world is against them." And he complained about the "siege mentality" that is gripping people.

But since there is a siege, should we be surprised if people adopt a mentality to suit the circumstances? Moreover, the Serbs have a very well-honed sense of history.

It is hard not to agree with those analysts who believe that the severe U.S. pressure and the threats of bombing raids against Serbian positions in the event the Vance-Owen plan is rejected in the referendum merely acted to

strengthen the determination to answer "no" to the first question and "yes" to the second.

As German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated during his meeting with Kozyrev in Berlin, "The outcome of the Bosnian referendum on the Vance-Owen Plan is of no great importance." The very same assessment—word for word—was given by French Foreign Ministry spokesman Richard Dyuke [surname as transliterated]. Lord Owen even went so far as to call the expression of the people's will a "farce." He was completely shaken out of intellectual balance by the resolute statement from General Mladic, commander in chief of the Bosnian Serb forces, to the effect that, in the event of foreign intervention, he was personally prepared to bomb certain Western capitals—specifically, London. His lordship considered this a "terrorist and barbaric threat"—but, strangely enough, for some reason he described similar actions against the Serbs as "sanctions which need to be applied"!

What cynical double standards! They are not even being concealed, as has usually been the case. London's THE TIMES recently featured a noteworthy essay, lauding... neocolonialism, which—if the author is to be believed—is back in fashion in geopolitics! It turns out to be the case that certain states are positively incapable of running themselves, and there is nothing for the international community to do but abandon its "cissiness" (termed "American" in the essay for some reason) and promulgate the slogan "Forward to the Victory of Neocolonialism!"

The only catch is that unaware peoples could categorically reject this slogan—as, for instance, the Bosnian Serbs did in their referendum, whose results the United States and the West still wish to ignore.

We can assume then that the Bosnian referendum will also help the leaders of the new Yugoslavia to determine a balanced policy, after having been forced for entirely objective reasons to make concessions to a certain extent in response to the pressure from the United States and its allies. It has been reported that, in the heat of argument, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic even issued an emotional rebuke to the Serbian leaders when they insisted on holding the referendum: He said that it was reminiscent of a daring poker player prepared to stake everything on a single hand. Yet the question arises as to just what the result would be if voters in Serbia, Montenegro, Serbian Krajina, and Slavonia answered similar questions in exactly the same way. Indeed, would there be any substantial difference between those answers and the results obtained in Bosnia? Probably the most important historical lesson which the Serbs have learned in the many centuries of their fight for freedom and independence is to be found in the very apt folk saying "samo sloga Srbina spasava!"—"only consensus will save the Serbs!"

NATO Said Planning Force To Counter Serb Rejection of Peace Plan

PM2105102193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 May 93 p 3

[Yevgeniy Fadeyev report: "Is the Plan Dead? NATO Thinks Not"]

[Text] Belgrade, 20 May—The results of the referendum of almost 1 million Bosnian Serbs on the Vance-Owen Plan were officially announced today. Some 96 percent of citizens said "no" to it. The Serbian Republic parliament has stated that the international plan elaborated overseas is dead, but that it is prepared to continue peace talks on an equal footing...

Well, if it's dead, it's dead. The document will be revived—so stated its authors and the "support" group (the United States, NATO, and so forth). How will this be done? In the usual way for the masters of the new world order—by force. This was discussed by D. Owen and T. Stoltenberg, cochairmen of the conference on the former Yugoslavia, and U.S. General J. Shalikashvili, commander in chief, NATO Forces Europe. The subject of the meeting was as follows—NATO's role in carrying out the peace plan for the former Yugoslav Republic. It was stated for the press' benefit that it is not a question of how to impose peace but of how to preserve it, U.S. Admiral Boorda stated. And the NATO secretary general gallantly reported that the alliance is ready to implement the Vance-Owen Plan right now.

The words of General R. Mladic, commander of the Serbian Republic Army, come to mind: "Whatever we may decide, the West will continue to implement its infernal plan anyway."

NATO is ready... There are more than 400 subunit servicemen in Bosnia collecting information and determining potential targets. Phase one of the peacekeeping action is planned as follows—a landing of marines in Adriatic ports. Of the 23 Western ships in the Adriatic there are now eight—one French, one Dutch, one Turkish, one Greek, one Spanish, one German, and two Italian—lying 30 km off the Montenegrin resort of Budva (the territorial border is 22 km off the Yugoslav coast).

...Who is it who decided there in Bosnia that the Vance-Owen Plan was dead?

Kozyrev Visit to Belgrade Viewed

PM2005130993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 May 93 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Maksim Yusin report: "Moscow and Belgrade See No Alternative to Vance-Owen Plan, But Washington Unexpectedly Rejects It"]

[Text] Split-Belgrade-Rome—On 18 May, after a break of a year, Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev arrived in the Balkans, which he has repeatedly proclaimed a priority

area of Russian diplomacy. The visit was very brief (approximately 10 hours) but crammed full.

In the Croatian city of Split, Kozyrev met in the morning with F. Tudjman, president of Croatia; A. Izetbegovic, president of Bosnia and Herzegovina; D. Owen and T. Stoltenberg, cochairmen of the Coordinating Committee of the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia; and also with the command of the UN "blue helmets" stationed in Bosnia. After this the Russian minister flew to Belgrade, where he held talks with the presidents of Yugoslavia, Montenegro, and Serbia—D. Cosic, M. Bulatovic, and S. Milosevic.

"Everyone we met stated their support for the Vance-Owen plan. Nobody sees any alternative to it today. Therefore, in the talks with the leaders of Croatia, Bosnia, and Yugoslavia we discussed not so much the plan itself but rather the mechanism for implementing it," one member of the Russian delegation belonging to the minister's immediate entourage said. Kozyrev's visit has confirmed that the Bosnian Serbs, who have rejected the peace plan, have ended up totally isolated. The Belgrade leaders declared their readiness to continue pressuring their compatriots in Bosnia and to comply strictly with the sanctions introduced against them.

The idea of stationing international observers along the Serbian-Bosnian border, however, still elicits a guarded attitude in Belgrade. Kozyrev tried to persuade Milosevic that it is a question not of foreign military contingents, but of a few hundred monitors who would keep track of the way Yugoslavia is complying with the sanctions which it has announced itself in respect of the Bosnian Serbs. Despite all the Russian minister's arguments, the Serbian president did not give a definitive reply, saying that he needed time to make an additional study of this question.

In the opinion of Russian diplomats in Belgrade, Milosevic fears the reaction of extremist forces in his own republic, which accuse him of betraying Serbia's national interests. "The Bosnian Serbs' referendum has created serious moral and political problems for Milosevic," one of the participants in the talks on the Russian side believes. "For the first time in history, the Serb people have been split. It was a very painful decision for the Serbian president to introduce sanctions against the Serbian Republic in Bosnia, which only yesterday was supported unconditionally by Belgrade. Therefore he is in no hurry to announce new steps which might be perceived as an encroachment upon Yugoslavia's sovereignty."

At the same time Croatian President Tudjman greeted the idea of stationing observers on the Croatian-Bosnian border with no particular objections. This was somewhat unexpected: According to the data of UN experts, Zagreb was recently giving considerable military aid to its compatriots in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to some reports, Croatian servicemen operating in the neighboring republic have even stopped cutting the "Croatian Army" badge off their sleeve. Tudjman denies, however, that his regular forces are involved in the Bosnian conflict.

Kozyrev gave the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims a detailed exposition of the Russian idea for the "progressive implementation" of the Vance-Owen plan. Its thrust is to start implementing this plan in one or several Bosnian provinces without waiting for all the sides to sign it: to set up a local administration, to test the mechanism of international verification of compliance with the rights of ethnic minorities, and to try to organize on a federal level the work of a coordinating organ which would include representatives of all three ethnic groups. In Kozyrev's opinion, the successful implementation of the peace plan, even on the scale of a single province, would convince skeptics of its efficacy. Despite certain objections (particularly from the Muslims), the reaction to Moscow's proposals was "positive on the whole," according to members of the delegation.

The chief task now, in the opinion of Russian diplomats, is for the UN Security Council to adopt the Vance-Owen plan. It had been planned that this would happen 21 May, when the Council was to have met in New York at the level of foreign ministers. But U.S. Secretary of State W. Christopher unexpectedly declared that his participation is in doubt. Nevertheless, Kozyrev's entourage believes that the secretary of state's refusal is not final, and the session will still take place within the next few days, if not 21 May.

Late in the evening of 18 May, the head of Russian diplomacy arrived in Rome. Wednesday afternoon he will discuss the situation in the former Yugoslavia with the foreign ministers of France, Britain, Italy, and Spain.

Shumeyko Heads Delegation to Cuba

LD2005185093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1817 GMT 20 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Sereda]

[Text] Havana May 20 TASS—A Russian Government delegation, led by Vladimir Shumeyko, first deputy prime minister, arrived in Cuba on Thursday for a working visit.

At Havana's Jose Marti international airport, the delegation were met by Lionel Soto, Cuban deputy prime minister.

In a talk with journalists at the airport, Shumeyko touched upon the results of his visit to the United States, admitting that people there, naturally, took interest in the purpose of his subsequent visit to Cuba.

"I told them quite frankly that Cuba and Russia are interested in mutually beneficial economic relations. We do not intend to make political statements but, together with my counterpart, Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Lionel Soto, will do our best to find such solutions which

would make it possible to put to put the enterprises, built here with Soviet assistance, to good use, with benefit to the economies of Cuba and Russia.

Says Economic Accords 'Not Working'

LD2005215993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1740 GMT 20 May 93

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Sereda]

[Excerpt] Havana, 20 May—[passage omitted] Touching on the bilateral economic agreements signed as a result of the Russian-Cuban talks held in Moscow in November last year, Vladimir Shumeyko, first deputy prime minister, said that unfortunately they are not working completely for either the Russian or the Cuban sides, and so it will be necessary to raise this subject during the present working visit.

At the moment when a particular document is signed, he explained, specific conditions exist, which with time begin to change. We must follow up these points and work out, on the basis of mutual accord, the necessary changes with benefit for both sides.

German Economics Minister Arrives in Moscow

LD2005132593 Berlin ADN in German 1238 GMT 20 May 93

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—German Economic Affairs Minister Guenter Rexrodt arrived in Moscow this afternoon for a 24-hour working visit. Rexrodt hopes to discuss issues of industrial cooperation, particularly with companies in eastern Germany, as well as cooperation in the spheres of energy and raw materials. In addition, Rexrodt hopes to gather information on the progress and prospects of Russian economic reform following the national referendum held on 25 April.

A meeting with Oleg Lobov, deputy prime minister and economics minister, is scheduled for soon after Rexrodt's arrival. Tomorrow Rexrodt will meet Oleg Soskovets, deputy prime minister responsible for industry. Rexrodt will hold a press conference after his talks.

Begins Talks

LD2005154693 Berlin ADN in German 1405 GMT 20 May 93

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—Germany will continue to support the Russian reforms, Federal Economics Minister Guenter Rexrodt says. In particular, help will be given with the restructuring of the economy, the minister said today at the start of his talks with Oleg Lobov, Russia deputy prime minister and economics minister, and Foreign Economic Relations Minister Sergey Glazyev in Moscow.

Lobov drew attention to the difficult period Russia is currently undergoing. Industrial production has dropped by 30 to 40 percent, but it nonetheless proved possible to halt the decline during the last four months. He underlined his country's interest in close cooperation with the Federal Republic. He said they could work more closely in the fields of computer technology, oil processing, and conversion. However, the bilateral cooperation agreements will have to be made concrete. Lobov expressed his disappointment with the tough import restrictions placed on Russian goods on the German and EC markets. In his view, these are more stringent than during the cold war period.

This evening, Rexrodt intended to meet Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. For Friday, a meeting is planned with Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, who is responsible for industrial affairs. The German minister will speak to the press after his talks.

Meets Chernomyrdin

LD2005183693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1750 GMT 20 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow May 20 TASS—Germany will grant an additional credit of 30 million Deutsche marks to Russia for the purchase of baby foods and other foodstuffs, medicines and medical equipment. An understanding to this effect was reached during a meeting between Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and German Economics Minister Guenter Rexrodt, here on Thursday night.

During talks, which continued for more than 90 minutes, Chernomyrdin informed the German minister about the course of economic reforms in Russia and took interest in Germany's experience in fostering market relations on the territory of the former East Germany.

Rexrodt, who arrived here on Thursday for a two-day working visit, had talks with First Vice-Premier Oleg Lobov, on Thursday afternoon. On Friday he will meet with Oleg Soskovets.

Yeltsin Addresses Message to World Forum of Young Leaders

LD2105104293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1015 GMT 21 May 93

[By unidentified ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin has addressed a message to the organisational committee of the World Forum of Young Leaders.

"I welcome everybody who is taking part in the work of the World Forum of Young Leaders. I am very glad that you have again gathered in Russia," Yeltsin's message says. "It is symbolic that young leaders, many of whom, I am sure, will very soon assume key positions in their respective states, have gathered precisely in our country, which is going through radical changes and is thoroughly

revising the fundamental values of its life. I think that your visit to Russia at this crucial moment of its history will be useful to you.

"Young people feel particularly keenly the imperfection of our world. They are, first and foremost, bearers of the creative energy of progress. Your most important task is to find optimal forms of its implementation, both for the good of the peoples of your own states and for the entire human race. You must excel in this your predecessors—the leaders of my generation. Even if only for the fact that in our young days we did not have leaders of my generation. Even if only for the fact that in our young days we did not have even a hundredth part of the opportunities to communicate with each other, which you now possess.

"At the same time, I hope that in your search for the solution of global problems, now confronting the world community, you will not forget that each one of them, in the final analysis, is always a problem of one concrete man.

"I am glad that after the first congress, which took place last year, you are not wasting your time in vain. The current forum may lay the beginning for extensive and serious joint endeavours. I have no doubt that they will be extensively backed throughout the world. After all, this form of cooperation gives us one more real chance to make the ongoing positive changes on our planet irreversible.

"I sincerely wish success to the forum and to the efforts exerted by your movement."

Yeltsin Requests Elchibey's Clemency for Russian POW's

MK2005090093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 19 May 93 (Signed to Print 18 May) p A4

[Unattributed POSTFACTUM report under the rubric "War": "Will Death Sentence for Russian Soldiers Be Reviewed?"]

[Excerpts] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has sent a personal message to Azerbaijan President Abulfaz Elchibey asking him to show clemency in regard to the Russian citizens taken prisoner in Karabakh, POSTFACTUM news agency reports. [passage omitted]

As has become known from confidential sources, President Boris Yeltsin personally approached President Abulfaz Elchibey even before the trial to appeal for leniency for the Russian soldiers but received a negative reply. People in Azerbaijan well remember the story of serviceman Vladimir Lukin, who was charged with the murder of three unarmed persons. He had been sentenced to be shot, but, on President Yeltsin's personal request, was turned over to Russian authorities. In Moscow Lukin received a hero's welcome, while in Baku the mothers of the dead were demanding an explanation from President Elchibey. It is considered in Azerbaijan that the public mood, in the wake of the heavy casualties from the latest offensive by the Armenians in Kelbadzharskiy Rayon and the published facts of Russian troops siding with the enemy, is not going to forgive the Azerbaijan president if he mitigates the sentence. Even so, suspension of the execution of the sentence is not ruled out. In this situation, enviable sangfroid is being demonstrated by the Russian Defense Ministry, which has not reacted in any way to charges that it is providing mercenaries for the war in Karabakh. As a matter of fact, the Russian defense minister, speaking in Turkey, made it clear that the military has its own point of view of the conflict in Karabakh, which differs from the Security Council resolution; he accused both warring sides of escalating the conflict.

Academy of Sciences Appeals for Soldiers' Release

LD2005142793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1356 GMT 20 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow May 20 TASS—The state and law institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences today appealed to Azeri President Abulfaz Elchibey to "display mercy and humanism and pardon former servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces Yaroslav Yevstigneyev, Vladislav Kudinov, Mikhail Listovoy, Konstantin Tukish and Andrey Filippov sentenced to death by the Azeri court.

"As jurists, we are by no means trying to whitewash their participation in the war against the Azeri people. We do not doubt the legality of the indictment against them. In accordance with U.N. principles, we condemn mercenariness and express profound regret that our Russian citizens were involved in such a grave crime," says the appeal, signed by academician Boris Topornin, the institute's director.

Nevertheless, the institute urges the Azeri president to display mercy. The servicemen sentenced to death are, after all, very young people with neither fully shaped political, nor social views and convictions. They were plunged into the abyss of one of the gravest and bloodiest conflicts, which has already claimed the lives of thousands upon thousands of innocent people. The world is completely overwhelmed by cruelty, violence and bloodshed. "And maybe a decision on the fate of these young Russian lads, envisaging not death but mercy, to which we are all urged by religion (both Islam and Christianity) will lay at least a symbolic beginning for the tiny spark of hope that unnecessary future bloodshed will be finally stopped," the appeal says.

Rounding off their letter, the scientists urge President Elchibey to "think about the unfortunate mothers of these lads, about their tearful and sorrowful eyes, and their daily and nightly supplications to save their sons. And you, only you, can now save them".

Western 'Dual Standards' in Baltics Criticized

MK2005094093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 21, 23 May 93 (Signed to Press 18 May) p A7

[Sergey Krylov report: "Why Was It That Kozyrev Did Not Come to Brussels"]

[Text] What caused the Russian foreign minister to refuse to address a session of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg 14 May was an event that, frankly speaking, was not the most spectacular among international developments: on that day Estonia was admitted to the Council of Europe. There are hundreds of international organizations. Recalling how many countries each of them has is simply impossible, and, after all, it is the goings-on in Abkhazia, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslavia, or simply beyond our own doorstep that concern us most. Has anyone other than specialists noticed that Lithuania joined the council several days ago? So why is it that the theme "Estonia-Council of Europe" has been present throughout the whole year in nearly all the meetings of Russian diplomats, parliamentarians, and lawyers with their European counterparts?

The reason is that membership in the Council of Europe is a kind of a "trademark" confirming that the state belongs to European civilization, that it fully respects human rights, and that its citizens—regardless of their nationality—are given equal opportunities. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided virtually unanimously that Estonia is entirely worthy of such a "mark." But have the participants of the meeting in Strasbourg taken into account all the relevant considerations?

Formerly, and particularly at present, one could hear a lot of talk that Russia allegedly feels hurt. The majority of the East European countries, and now the states of the former USSR, are joining, albeit at a varying pace, the institutions of the European Community. Russia, however, is not particularly welcome there, including at the Council of Europe. Wasn't it Russia that was the first to recognize t[illegible] independence of the Baltic states; isn't Russia genuinely striving to help the former Union republics to acquire all the trappings of statehood, including membership in international organizations? But reducing all this to pure sentiment would be a deliberate simplification. Politics are guided by calculations, and not by emotions. So, a certain calculation is evident in Estonia's admittance to the Council of Europe.

Although the Europeans like to say that their continent spreads from the Atlantic to the Urals, and now nearly to Vancouver, the reality is somewhat different: Europe is seen as stretching only from Brest [France] to Brest [Belarus]. Here, the same political line can be traced that emerged in the second half of the 1980's when the Balts were told over and over that they should again set their sights on the West, which would be happy to embrace them as its family members. They promised them the moon and went to great lengths to describe all the conceivable advantages. They kept forgetting to add, however, that, aside from rights, the new relatives should assume responsibilities, including the need to respect conventional norms of humanitarian conduct.

As long as a year ago, Russia was, in a most serious fashion, drawing the attention of various bodies of the Council of Europe to the fact that Estonia pursued a state policy of discrimination against the non-native population, that nearly one-third of its citizens—half a million of the Russian speakers—were in effect assigned by the laws adopted there to the category of foreigners and, hence, do not have the right to vote, to be elected, to participate in the conduct of state affairs, or to hold offices in state institutions.

Since then, the Estonian authorities have tried to improve the situation somewhat by legislative means, but no substantial changes ensued. The fact that CSCE missions that have visited Tallinn have produced on the whole positive opinions as to whether Estonia's national legislation is in line with European standards does not affect the way the legislation is applied. The laws and declarations per se make little difference—Stalin's constitution was also considered progressive. What is important is how they are interpreted.

What will happen next? Those in Estonia who wish to do so may now complain about oppression not only in local, but also in European courts. This, however, is unlikely to change anything either for the petitioners or for the authorities. The most chauvinistically minded groups in Estonia, on the contrary, will definitely exploit the fact that the Council of Europe has allegedly "blessed" their actions and will only intensify the oppression of the non-native population, as they try to create a mono-ethnic state when in fact a multiethnic society exists. A response is bound to follow, along with an upsurge in intolerance and militant nationalism. Calm is unlikely to settle in, though. This is as far as the internal situation is concerned.

As for the international situation, the Council of Europe, by giving Estonia full membership, has taken on some part of the responsibility for what is going on in that country. The Council reckoned that "the glass is already half full." I wish this were true. If it proves to be "half empty," the irritant in Russian-Estonian relations will continue to affect the situation in the Baltics, the domestic situation in Russia itself, and the complex mix of forces at play in Europe.

So there is something to think about for everyone—the Balts, Moscow, and the West if it takes the developments in the Baltics to heart so much. For Russian-speakers make up nearly half the population in Estonia's other neighbor, Latvia, and Riga, too, is eager to join Europe. Dual standards are unacceptable in any approach to human rights. This is precisely what the Russian diplomats reminded their partners.

Polish Vice Premier Notes 'No Rapprochement' on Debts

PM2105095193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 May 93 First Edition p 2

[Irina Demchenko report: "Russia's and Poland's Mutual Monetary Claims Could End in 'Zero Option'"]

[Text] Henryk Goryszewski, vice premier of the Polish Government, who has been holding talks in Moscow with Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin, with Aleksandr Shokhin, his deputy, and with certain other members of the government, has granted IZVESTIYA an interview. Goryszewski's talks in Moscow were connected with the preparations for Boris Yeltsin's visit to Poland.

One of the most important unresolved problems encumbering our relations with Poland (and not only with Poland, incidentally) is the problem of mutual debts stemming from the time of the Soviet Union. In the course of mutual transactions various currency exchange rates were used for deals of various kinds in the countries of the former socialist camp—which complicates calculations.

According to Henryk Goryszewski, both the present states—Russia and Poland—believe that a balance of billions of dollars must be in their favor, and they both possess documents confirming transactions. The situation is also complicated by the fact that certain enterprises, which Poland constructed or manned in the former Soviet Union and for which settlement has not yet been made with it, are now in other states—Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan. In addition, there is the particular question of the share in the property of the former CEMA, which Poland values at $50 million. Today the income from operating the unique CEMA building in downtown Moscow goes to City Hall, which is housed in it. In the Polish side's opinion, this is totally unfounded. Goryszewski proposed organizing a joint venture to operate this building and to take account of the economic interests of all the states which invested funds in its construction and equipment, and he made it perfectly clear that his country has no intention of tolerating the nationalization of CEMA property. Bear in mind that, under the charter of the former CEMA, in the event of the organization's liquidation the building was to be redeemed by the Russian side at residual cost.

The Polish vice premier pointed out that, despite an intensive exchange of opinions and documents, there has as yet been no rapprochement of positions on questions of mutual claims—which does not, however, remove them from the agenda. It is possible, he believes, that Presidents Yeltsin and Walesa will adopt a political decision in this regard, announcing a "zero option" for a certain date: Until such-and-such a day nobody owes anybody.

Russian Naval Flag Hoisted on Several Black Sea Navy Ships

LD2105100193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0939 GMT 21 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—The Russian naval St. Andrew flag was hoisted today on 22 ships of the Black Sea Navy's Logistics Support Brigade. In this way, the Navy's press centre reports, the sailors are endeavouring to draw the attention of the Russian and Ukrainian presidents to problems linked with the status of the fleet and of its servicemen.

The brigade includes large ships with crews numbering up to 200 men. The sailors are protesting against the steps of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry and Naval Command to unilaterally alter the subordination of warships. They are also dissatisfied with the allowances they get in accordance with Ukrainian tariffs, which are far below the Russian level and place Black Sea Navy men, in their opinion, on the verge of poverty.

ITAR-TASS has learned from trustworthy sources that the Black Sea Fleet today received Order No.103 of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry, dated May 20, directed against the crews of the 171th Division of logistics support ships of the Black Sea Navy. It says, in particular, that several ships hoisted St. Andrew flags on orders received from the division's commander on May 18. "Thereby", the document says, "they have acquired the status of foreign ships." The chief of the Ukrainian General Staff was ordered to "draw up and agree with the Russian General Staff organisational measures to withdraw from Ukraine warships and other vessels of the Black Sea Navy, which have hoisted St. Andrew's flags". The chief of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry's financial department was ordered to stop paying allowances to the crews of these ships.

As earlier reported, servicemen of the 171th Division were provoked to raise St. Andrew flags by the fact that one of their firefighting boats, attached to the unit, was hijacked by the Ukrainians, who hoisted their state flag on its mast.

Commentary Views Differences With Ukraine

PM2005131593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 20 May 93 p 1

[Igor Sukhanov "Commentary": "Concessions To Resolve Impasses. Russian Federation Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin Flies to Kiev Today To Meet With Ukrainian Colleague Leonid Kuchma"]

[Text] The government heads are expected to examine and, possibly, signed 12 draft bilateral agreements.

The documents will reflect the sides' concerted stance on the prices of gas imported by Ukraine from Russia, cooperation in the transport sphere, the procedure for

paying the former USSR's foreign debt, the trade setup, and also cooperation in developing Surgut oil and gas deposits.

They are also expected to discuss the situation regarding the implementation of treaties on mutual supplies of various types of products. In this connection, the premiers will most likely propose the elaboration of a special intergovernmental mechanism for monitoring the implementation of accords on mutual supplies and to give immediate assistance to partner enterprises if necessary.

You might think that the upcoming meeting's purely economic agenda precludes the discussion of political and military matters. But, as senior officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry and State Committee for Economic Cooperation with the Commonwealth Member States stressed in conversation with a ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent on the eve of the visit, good-neighborly and mutually advantageous relations are impossible without the settlement of the entire range of issues.

The main subjects of the constant political friction between Russia and Ukraine are well known. They are, as ever, the disputes over nuclear weapons and over the Black Sea Fleet.

The talks about nuclear weapons have essentially reached an impasse. Kiev is in no hurry to implement earlier international commitments on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of the republic to Russia.

The country's leaders say their stance is due to an alleged Russian military threat. But, in fact, Ukraine is using the nuclear trump card to squeeze some financial compensation out of Western countries for the abandonment of nuclear weapons. The amount is increasing rapidly. It already stands at $2.8 billion. (Although, according to U.S. experts, it should be no more than $175 million).

The Russian state delegation, headed by special envoy Yuriy Dubinin, would appear to have made every possible concession. Ukraine has been granted firm security guarantees. To dispel once and for all Kiev's suspicion that the nuclear weapons that are being withdrawn might be used against Ukraine, Russia will not merely dismantle the weapons, but will hand over their nuclear "filling" to Ukraine so that it can be used as fuel for nuclear power stations.

But Kiev is remaining true to its position. The country's leaders are constantly talking about the right to own nuclear weapons. And there is no prospect that even the first step—removal of flight assignments from all delivery vehicles—will be taken in the immediate future.

A similar situation exists regarding the Black Sea Fleet. Despite accords at the highest level, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry is pulling out all stops to win the Black Sea Fleet seamen over to its side.

So it would be difficult to describe the political background to the talks between the two governments' leaders as auspicious. Moreover, according to information from Kiev, the position of premier L. Kuchma and his government is very shaky. It appears that a situation similar to the Russian situation is brewing in Ukraine: Parliamentary deputies are beginning to look for the causes of the political and economic crisis in the executive authority's activities.

Certainly, in this situation, the upcoming talks with Viktor Chernomyrdin are a good opportunity for Leonid Kuchma to do something to put his own house in order by regulating economic relations with Russia. The imbalance is having an increasing impact on the deterioration of the situation in the country.

But the Russian delegation intends to conduct a dialogue with the Ukrainian partners entirely on the basis of mutual respect and precise observance of mutual advantage. This position of Russia's will require certain concessions on the Ukrainian side's part. And, clearly, not only on economic matters.

Talks With Moldova on Russian Troop Withdrawal End

LD1905212193 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2000 GMT 19 May 93

[Text] The fifth round of Russian-Moldovan talks ended today. The main theme of the discussion was the draft agreement on the status and procedure for the withdrawal of Russian military formations from Moldovan territory. A number of its articles were agreed. Outline confirmation was given to the draft of an intergovernmental agreement on questions on reciprocal legal help on matters connected with the temporary stay of Russian troops on the territory of the republic.

Japanese Press 'Assertions' Deemed 'Utter Fable'

LD2005092093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0842 GMT 20 May 93

[Text] Moscow May 20 TASS—Russia's foreign intelligence service had no part in drafting the document "Ideals of Russia's foreign policy", a sensational discovery of Japanese reporters, and doubts very much if such a document exists. Tatyana Samolis, press secretary of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, told this to ITAR-TASS in connection with the fact that the Japanese press had circulated a document which had allegedly been drafted by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service jointly with the Chief Intelligence Agency of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. It is asserted that the document contains provisions attesting to a radical change of Russia's foreign policy with regard to Japan.

Samolis dismissed as utter fable the assertions of the Japanese press that the cancellation of Boris Yeltsin's visit had also been connected with recommendations of

the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Russian Security Ministry and Defence Ministry. She said it is for Russia's political leadership and not its special services to decide on the timeframe of the Russian president's visit to Japan. "The reasons why the trip was postponed the first time and the second are well-known in Japan. The timeframe for the visit is now being established. Late May as the time for the visit has not been officially agreed upon but only considered as a possibility," she said.

The Foreign Security Service protects Russia's national interests wherever they exist, Samolis said. "The Asia-Pacific region is not an exception. The Foreign Intelligence Service is doing this with the use of its possibilities which special services do not usually divulge".

Iranian Majles Committee Human Rights Role Viewed

NC2105111393 Moscow Radio Moscow in Persian 1330 GMT 20 May 93

[Vladimir Pronin commentary]

[Text] Respectable listeners, something has happened in Iran's domestic political life. Its significance should not be assessed yet. A special human rights committee has been formed next to the Majles. According to a HAM-SHAHRI report, Iran's former UN Representative Sa'id Raja'i-Khorasani will head the committee. Members of parliament and renowned political figures who are not members of parliament have been included in the committee. Our commentator Vladimir Pronin writes:

Had this incident taken place at another time and in another country, it would not have attracted so much attention. But the issue here is Iran, which has recently been a topic of discussion for everyone on the human rights issue. The committee ushers a new and extremely unexpected element onto the scene of Iranian politics. After all, there has never been such a committee in Iran.

Human rights in Iran formed the topic of a special discussion by the third committee of the UN General Assembly last December. Based on a report by Ecuadoran diplomat Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, the envoy of the UN Human Rights Committee to Iran, a resolution reprimanding Iran was issued and the UN General Assembly was advised to call on the Iranian Government to decrease the number of executions and eliminate capital punishment from its legal system.

We reported the reaction by Tehran officials to the UN diplomat's report. Majles Speaker Nateq-Nuri described it as spiteful, saying it aimed to justify the West's intervention in Iran's domestic affairs on the feigned pretext of human rights violations. Ayatollah Yazdi, Iran's highest-ranking legislative official, believes human rights are not an issue in Iran; the issue is the West not understanding the realities of Islam. He thinks the West's nervous assessment of human rights in Iran can be explained within this context. In a recent news conference in Tehran, Ayatollah Yazdi said Iran respects human rights, but emphasizes a particular understanding of this issue. He called on legislative officials everywhere to draw a clear line between legal and political issues and to prevent legal issues from being sacrificed for political.

The formation of the Majles Human Rights Committee, which—according to reports—is not linked with government organizations and will be run by voluntary donations, should be seen as Iran making a concession and silently accepting the unfavorable human rights situation in Iran, contrary to Ayatollah Yazdi's overt statement.

This is probably not the only issue. The world conference on human rights will convene in the Vienna soon and it is likely that human rights in Iran will again be discussed. It seems that by allowing the formation of the new committee on the eve of the Vienna conference, the Iranian officials want to participate in the conference with a new look. But the future will show if the parliamentary human rights committee will become a true power the opinions of which Iranian leaders will heed or if it will turn into a mere organization formed because of fleeting considerations.

Ministry Warned Against 'Kowtowing' to U.S. in Middle East

MK2105095093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No 18, 21 May 93 (signed to press 20 May) p 2

[Mikhail Lantsman report: "Who Will Go to Golan Heights? So Far it is Only Israelis Who Ponder This"]

[Excerpts] Coverage of Arab-Israeli peace talks has long disappeared from the front pages of the world press. The ninth round of the talks that has just ended in Washington is not an exception. The fact of direct contacts per se between the "perpetual" enemies has ceased to be a sensation, and the possibility of compromise was not predicted by anyone, with the possible exception of officials from the U.S. Administration. At the same time, the role of Russia as a supervisor of the Middle East settlement went largely unnoticed even in the domestic mass media. Meanwhile, your SEGODNYA correspondent was told at the Middle East Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry that Russia is fulfilling its cosponsorship obligations in good faith. The Russian delegation at the Washington talks was headed by Viktor Gogitidze, first deputy chief of the Foreign Ministry Middle East Department. Russian diplomats have pinned great hopes on the commencement of work in five working groups in Rome, Tokyo, Oslo, Geneva, and Washington on questions of economic development, allocation of water resources, arms control, the settlement of the refugee problem, and so forth. [passage omitted]

How are the prospects of unilateral [U.S.] supervision assessed in Russia? The Russian Foreign Ministry unequivocally rejects any behind-the-scenes maneuvering of this kind. The legislators apparently deem it to be premature to delve into the heart of the matter at this stage. According to Iona Andronov, deputy chairman of

parliament's International Affairs Committee, the committee has not held a single hearing on the Middle East. Members of the opposition, however, expressed a fairly definite view on the subject. Mikhail Astafyev, leader of the National Salvation Front [NSF], told your SEGODNYA correspondent that the NSF is categorically against committing Russian troops to a Middle East settlement. At the same time, Mr. Astafyev warned the United States against applying dual standards in its approach to the parties to the conflict. The NSF will not tolerate the Russian Foreign Ministry's kowtowing to the Americans. Viktor Alksnis, former leader of the "Union" faction at the USSR Supreme Soviet, believes that such a decision would definitely harm Russia's strategic interests. The United States, in his view, is actively creating a staging area in the Gulf region, and the possible deployment of its troops on the Golan Heights should be viewed in this context. According to Viktor Alksnis, the joint participation of Russian and U.S. Armed Forces would be an optimum solution.

Of course, the opinions of the opposition members, who are not burdened with authority, may be simply dismissed. The opposition, however, has already proved its ability to exploit "weak points" in the Russian Foreign Ministry's policies for its own benefit both on the Balkan crisis and on the START II treaty.

ANC Official Interviewed Before Departure for Moscow

LD2005203393 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1400 GMT 20 May 93

[Report by correspondent Vadim Lobachenko, including recorded remarks from interview by ANC representative Thabo Mbeki; Mbeki speaks in English with superimposed Russian translation; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The official delegation of the African National Congress [ANC]—the main opposition force in South Africa—begins its Moscow visit today.

[Lobachenko] The present successful development of relations between Russia and South Africa is being actively supported not only by President Frederik de Klerk's government but also by the ANC, the most influential opposition organization in South Africa. According to the latest public opinion poll, the ANC, led by Nelson Mandela, and affiliated parties may get more than half of the electorate's votes at the forthcoming multiracial general elections in South Africa. The Ostankino Television and Radio Company correspondent asked members of the ANC National Executive Committee Thabo Mbeki and Joe Modise to comment on the purpose of their visit to Russia in the departure lounge of the Ian Smith international airport in Johannesburg.

[Mbeki] We believe it is important that relations between the ANC and the Russian Government are as close and as friendly as possible. The ANC has long established historic connections with the Russian people. At the time when South Africa is moving toward a full scale democracy we should aim for close relations between our countries in various spheres, including the economic sphere. We believe that it is necessary to begin discussion of all our problems, including our future ties, as early as possible. The radical changes in South Africa are already in the air. We hope that they will happen soon. But we do not have to wait for this in order to start thinking about the strengthening of our cooperation. We would like to begin our discussions now.

Political Issues

'Text' of Yeltsin Decree on Constitutional Assembly

LD2105133593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1153 GMT 21 May 93

["Full Text of Boris Yeltsin's Decree 'On the Convening of a Constitutional Assembly and Completion of the Preparation of a Draft RF Constitution'"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 21 May (ITAR-TASS)—The Russian president's press service today issued the full text of Boris Yeltsin's decree, dated 20 May, "On the Convening of a Constitutional Assembly and Completion of the Preparation of a Draft Constitution of the Russian Federation:"

"On the convening of a Constitutional Assembly and completion of the preparation of a draft constitution of the Russian Federation;

"In order to complete the preparation of the Russian draft constitution submitted by the president of the Russian Federation, and with a view to taking into account the proposals of citizens, organs of state power of the subjects of the Russian Federation, and of local self-government, federal organs of state power, political parties, public movements, trade unions, and other public associations, I decree:

"1. A Constitutional Assembly is to be convened on 5 June 1993 in the city of Moscow.

"2. It is determined that the Constitutional Assembly includes representatives:
"of federal organs of state power of the Russian Federation;
"of organs of state power of the republics within the Russian Federation, krays, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg;
"of local self-government;
"of political parties, trade-union, youth and other public organizations, mass movements, and religious confessions;
"of manufacturers and entrepreneurs.

"3. The composition of the representatives of federal organs of state power of the Russian Federation shall be formed from People's Deputies of the Russian Federation who are members of the Constitutional Commission of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies, and a representative of each faction of the Russian People's Deputies (by arrangement), as well as 50 representatives of the president of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation.

"4. The composition of representatives from the organs of state power of Russian Federation subjects shall be formed through the delegation of two plenipotentiary representatives from a republic within the Russian Federation, kray, oblast, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and one each from a representative and executive organ of state power of a subject of the Russian Federation.

"5. The composition of the representatives of local self-government shall be formed by federal and interregional associations of organs of local self-government.

"The composition of the representatives of political parties, other public organizations, and mass movements or associations of them, shall be formed from the appropriate public organizations.

"The composition of representatives of manufacturers and entrepreneurs shall be formed by federal and interregional associations, unions, and other associations of manufacturers and entrepreneurs.

"Applications to attend the Constitutional Assembly from the organizations indicated, the statutory documents of which have been registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, are to be submitted before 25 May 1993.

"6. The Constitutional Assembly shall be attended by representatives of trade union organizations and religious confessions, as well as the Russian Academy of Sciences.

"7. The total numbers of those attending the Constitutional Assembly from the organizations indicated in points 5 and 6 are fixed at up to 250 persons.

"8. The Constitutional Assembly may be attended by representatives of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, and the Supreme Court of Arbitration of the Russian Federation, as well as representatives of the office of the Procurator General of the Russian Federation.

"9. The text of the draft constitution of the Russian Federation, prepared by the Constitutional Assembly shall be submitted to the President of the Russian Federation.

"10. The Constitutional Assembly is to be held in the Kremlin."

Democrats Urge Yeltsin To Name Gaydar, Makarov

MK2105101093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 21 May 93 p 9

[Mariya Zasurskaya report: "Democrats Comment on Results of Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin Meeting. Democrats Propose Minister Nominees"]

[Text] The results of the 17 May talks between President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin about possible reshuffles in the Cabinet of Ministers were discussed at the meeting of the Coordinating

Council of the Democratic Russia movement yesterday. Radical democrats demanded Oleg Lobov's resignation and the incorporation of Andrey Makarov and Yegor Gaydar in the government.

Even before the referendum the Public Committee of Democratic Organizations (of which Democratic Russia is a part) sent letters to Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin expressing concern over the fact that "the personnel additions to the government in the past few months have resulted in shifting the emphasis in its work and a gradual deviation from the reform course." Among "hidden anti- reformers," the names of Georgiy Khizha, Yuriy Skokov, and Oleg Lobov were mentioned. In addition, the committee insisted that the transport minister and the chairmen of the Anti-Monopoly Committee and the Defense Industries Committee be relieved of their duties, because they "demand in a firm fashion that the old methods of economic management be restored and the pace of privatization be drastically slowed down." The democrats were assured at the meeting with the president that Oleg Lobov would be removed from the post of first deputy prime minister, but would stay on as economy minister. Boris Yeltsin suggested that the committee submit its list of nominees for the position of first deputy prime minister.

The democrats have already named some of their candidates for government posts: They suggested that Mikhail Fedotov (the incumbent press minister) or lawyer Andrey Makarov should take over as justice minister. While the president, however, said that he was perfectly content with Makarov's candidacy, the prime minister proved to be less acquiescent: Chernomyrdin assured the representatives of Democratic Russia that he would himself find a candidate for the justice minister position.

Another man the democrats want to bring into the government is Yegor Gaydar, former acting prime minister. His candidacy, however, was turned down by Boris Yeltsin himself. In the president's view, his appointment would cause a division inside the government. Nonetheless, the democrats are intent on struggling to bring Gaydar back to the Cabinet of Ministers. Lev Ponomarev, cochairman of Democratic Russia, told the president that "the government is divided anyway, so maybe Gaydar's arrival would help unite them." Ponomarev assured your KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent that "Yegor Timurovich is willing to join the government, although it would give him nothing but difficulties." The talks between the Russian authorities and the democrats on personnel changes in the government will resume in the near future.

Yeltsin Said To Agree on Lobov

MK2105114493 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No 18, 21 May 93 (signed to press 20 May) p 2

[INTERFAX report: "Lobov Perhaps Will Not Be First Vice-Premier"]

[Text] "Oleg Lobov will probably be removed from the position of first vice premier of the Russian Federation, but he will stay on as minister of the economy," stated Oleg Novikov, chief of the Anti-Monopoly Administration of Moscow, at a press conference of representatives of the Public Committee of Democratic Organizations of Russia, and the Union of Cossack Troops of the Russian Federation. Making this statement, he referred to President Boris Yeltsin, who had allegedly shared his plans regarding Lobov with participants in the 17 May meeting.

Rutskoy, Centrist Forces Meet on Constitution

LD2005205293 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 20 May 93

[Report by Fateyev; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Another attempt at better consolidation of the centrist parties and movements was made today. Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy, who arrived here as leader of the People's Party of Free Russia, and representatives of more than 30 public associations and organizations of Russia of the centrist moderate orientation gathered today at the roundtable in the Moscow House of Unions. This meeting was organized by the Civic Union.

In his introductory speech, Vasiliy Lipitskiy, chairman of its executive committee, expressed hope that today's consultative conference will lay foundations for a broad coalition of centrist forces.

The subsequent discussions were held behind the closed doors. However, a general view of the level of political passions around the issue of adoption of the new constitution can be perceived from the statement adopted by the participants in the conference. The centrist forces are in favor of a systematic implementation of the constitutional process with consideration given to the work carried out by the constitutional commission and decisions made by the Congress of Peoples' Deputies.

They believe that attempts to adopt the new constitution by unconstitutional means may lead to the long-term negative consequences, such as diarchy and the disintegration of the country. They believe that the optimal way to do this will be to join forces in order to complete work on a single draft constitution.

The centrist forces have embarked on creating a wide-scale preelection coalition, which should be ready to and capable of coming to the next presidential and parliamentary elections with their own program and their own candidates.

To Form Electoral Commission

LD2105080193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0639 GMT 21 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—A conference of centrist forces was held at the Moscow House of Unions on Thursday [20 May] on the initiative of the Civic Union bloc. The main task of its organisers was the preparation of a "broad centrist electoral coalition".

According to the organisers, the conference was attended by representatives of some 30 public organisations, political parties, trade unions, youth organisations, the organisations of businessmen and industrialists, as well as intellectuals.

Chairman of the Civic Union Executive Committee Vasiliy Lipitskiy pointed out at the final press conference that they had analysed problems dealing with the formation of a broad centrist electoral coalition and their attitude to the constitutional process. According to Lipitskiy, the idea of forming the coalition was supported by all participants in the conference.

"The centrist forces oppose the attempts to include in the new constitution articles and provisions, which pave the way to personal dictatorship, the infringement on democracy and restrictions on the parliamentarian system," the statement says. They believe the political crisis can be overcome only through parliamentary and presidential elections.

Aleksandr Rutskoy pointed out in his speech that now it would be unrealistic to think about the creation of a single centrist party, as some participants in the conference suggested. A coalition is the only possibility today. The vice president suggested that all participants should decide before May 25 what form of participation in the coalition they prefer.

Yushenkov Discloses Deputies' Plan To Block Congress

LD2105133693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1230 GMT 21 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Ivanova]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—"Adoption of a new constitution by subjects of the federation, the draft of which was proposed by the president, is a very difficult, but only possible way," first deputy chief of the Federal Information Centre, People's Deputy of the Russian Federation Sergey Yushenkov told a press conference at the international press centre here today.

Yushenkov confirmed the plans of democratically-minded deputies to "knock together a group of 350-450 mps [members of parliament], who could block the work of the Congress of People's Deputies, leaving it without a quorum". However, he described this measure as an "extreme version" and expressed the hope that "a sense of realism would get the upper hand among a large group of deputies, including some in the leadership of the Supreme Soviet, and they would accept the president's scenario for the adoption of the constitution".

Yushenkov said that the correlation of forces among various parties and movements was among the main difficulties of the current political situation. He is also convinced that political parties taking part in the Constitutional Assembly "should not have any decisive vote, because they will still have to prove their right to it in the course of upcoming elections".

Turning to these elections, Yushenkov predicted that the composition of the parliament would be practically renewed if they were to be held according to the majority system. If preference is given to the proportional system, the new Supreme Soviet would be made up of very "familiar faces, which are easily distinguishable today". In his opinion, a mixed system of elections would be adopted.

Moreover, he stressed that the "leaders of such magnitude as Boris Yeltsin, could not be found today in any of the camps and the future of Russia would therefore be linked with his name in the foreseeable future". He also thinks that amendment to the presidential draft constitution would involve an "indepth juridical elaboration of the articles on the division of powers to prevent a tyranny, no matter from whom it emanates".

Speaking about possible government reshuffles Yushenkov said they would probably be linked with the nomination of a candidate to the post of security council secretary. He noted that there were many proposals and that they were linked not only with top leaders, but with the entire vertical line of power". [no opening quotation mark as received]

Skokov Dismissal Removed 'Sobering Influence'

PM2005152993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 May 93 First Edition p 2

[Vasiliy Andreyev article under the rubric "Look Who's Leaving": "Security Council Secretary Grasps Danger of One-Man Rule"]

[Text] Resignations were expected as soon as Security Council Secretary Yuriy Skokov refused to give a stamp of approval to the presidential edict introducing special rule.

Yu. Skokov was not dismissed in March. Not at his own request, or at anyone else's. The dismissal has only happened now that more than a month has passed since his show of dissent, and it has been one of the results, and perhaps one of the consequences, of the referendum.

Yuriy Skokov, a trusted Yeltsin man who supported him during the days of the August 1991 putsch and during the March 1993 Congress, has become yet another out-of-favor presidential ally who has "lost the president's confidence."

Yu. Skokov's removal from the administration is being seen by radical democrats as evidence of the president's determination to rid himself of all those who, one way or

another, disagree with his actions. In their opinion, this will promote the strengthening of presidential power, consolidate the supporters of rapid reform, and increase efficiency in administering sociopolitical and economic processes. Utilizing the referendum results, the latter are hungry for more and more resolute action.

There can hardly be anyone in Russia today who does not want the forces of consolidation, stability, and governability to finally start working. Unfortunately, many people do not like the methods which the radical democrats plan to use to consolidate our society—methods redolent of the not-so-distant totalitarian era and which completely ignore the lessons of history and the realities of the present day.

It would be naive to hope for even democratic (or, as we used to say, enlightened) one-man rule to be effective at a time when one section of the population has extremely polarized views and another section has been alienated.

The referendum results themselves point to the time bomb hidden under the vision of state rule based on the illusion of popular support for presidential absolutism. First, the 34.5 percent of voters who voted "with their feet" at the referendum are "the people" too, after all. Second, quite a lot of those who did actually turn out to vote either delivered a vote of no-confidence in the president or advocated an early presidential election: almost 27 million and around 34 million respectively. We should be particularly put on our guard by the dissatisfaction with the president expressed in many areas and former autonomous regions that are Federation components.

This time bomb, which could sooner or later explode the governability of the Russian state, was clearly seen by the Security Council secretary. For Yuriy Skokov the problem of governability—of an enterprise, sector, or country—has always been a key point. Hence the attention which he devoted to the Federation Treaty, the regionalism policy, and the Council of Heads of Republics. He advocated the inclusion in the security sphere of economic, financial, and environmental problems, as well as the problems of the nation's health.

Hence too his disagreement with the idea of special rule. Nor can we rule out the fact that the president may have seen Yu. Skokov as a possible opponent of the draft presidential rule constitution, which in a general way repeats the idea of special rule.

The radical democrats intend to make Russia governable with the help of absolute one-man rule bordering on autocracy and not allowing for any dissent—even if moderate and constructive. Yu. Skokov too advocates the stability and governability of the Russian state, but on different principles—above all, consensus. His position at the March Congress, when he called on both the Congress and the country's political leadership to display wisdom and embark on the path of constructive creation, was notable.

Many people see Yu. Skokov as a sober-minded statesman who exerted a sobering influence on the president and warned him against actions which might have led to still greater strife and exacerbated the already explosive atmosphere in the country. It is only to be regretted that such people are to the liking neither of the president nor his team.

Kostikov Comments on Khasbulatov, Rutskoy

PM2105102993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 May 93 First Edition pp 1-2

[Sergey Chugayev report: "R. Khasbulatov Seeking To Move Toward B. Yeltsin, Russian President's Press Secretary States"]

[Text] Over the past few days the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet has been actively seeking contacts with B. Yeltsin, journalists were told by the president's press secretary B. Kostikov, who had been taking part in the first session of the new international press club held 19 May at the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry Press Center.

In V. Kostikov's opinion, the president should not meet with R. Khasbulatov, since they enjoy different degrees of legitimacy. A meeting between the president and the speaker of parliament would place them on the same level in respect of their authority and powers, which, it was stressed, would be advantageous and flattering to R. Khasbulatov. B. Yeltsin's press secretary believes that the president once made a mistake in having talks with R. Khasbulatov—this allowed the speaker of parliament, "elected by a few hundred deputies, to assume the same standing as a popularly elected president." As a result of which, V. Kostikov believes, R. Khasbulatov started acting as a figure equal in greatness to the president and usurping prerogatives that were not the speaker's.

V. Kostikov expressed the view that R. Khasbulatov's recent statements and actions—the disbanding of parliamentary committees that were not to his liking, for instance—are a manifestation of the nervousness of the speaker, who is now losing the supporters he had thought of as his power base. At the same time, the president's press secretary expressed the conviction that recent events in the Russian Supreme Soviet—particularly the stance taken by N. Ryabov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, V. Sokolov, and R. Abdulatipov—show that a considerable proportion of lawmakers have drawn the correct political conclusions from the referendum results. And this political evolution should be welcomed.

During the meeting it was also stated that, following the removal of A. Rutskoy and Yu. Skokov from the president's entourage ("a deadly blow has been struck against the opposition fifth column"), we should not expect any further changes to the structure of the supreme executive authorities—including the government. "The president does not intend to rattle his personnel saber," V. Kostikov stressed. He reported that B. Yeltsin has a very good relationship with Ye. Gaydar, who is today one of

the president's main economic advisers. But bringing Ye. Gaydar into the Cabinet of Ministers today could lead to a cabinet split, which is impermissible in the context of the current constitutional crisis. The attention of those present was also drawn to the fact that there are close and fruitful relations between the president and the prime minister which it would be inexpedient to disrupt.

Answering a question about the current position of the Russian vice president, V. Kostikov expressed the view that A. Rutskoy is now operating in a political vacuum. He is to all intents and purposes acting as the "mouthpiece for the opposition." The vice president continues to have no instructions from the head of state. He was not even invited to the 19 May session of the recent Security Council Interdepartmental Commission for the Fight Against Crime, which he chairs. The president's press secretary voiced his regret at the fact that Russia's first-ever vice president "has failed to take the opportunity to use his considerable temperament for the benefit of Russia." V. Kostikov believes that A. Rutskoy has destroyed his political career and has no chance of winning the next elections.

Sergeyev Named Government Press Bureau Chief

MK2105082093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 20 May 93 p 9

[Andrey Bagrov report: "Council of Ministers Press Bureau Chief Appointed. Valentin Sergeyev Will Help Unite Information Services"]

[Text] Valentin Sergeyev has been appointed director of the Government Press Bureau, according to a directive of the Russian premier officially circulated yesterday. In this, informed sources among the staff of the Council of Ministers believe, an end has been put to a prolonged standoff between the Government Press Center and the Press Bureau. The appointment of an experienced public relations specialist who earlier held the post of a plenipotentiary representative of Russia's first democratic government as head of the Press Bureau signifies the probable unification of all governmental services responsible for the coverage and provision of information on the operation of the government.

Valentin Sergeyev, 61, is a professional journalist. Beginning in 1990, he led the Information Department of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and was a public relations representative for Prime Minister Ivan Silayev. Early in 1992, he was in charge of the Information Service of the CIS Interstate Economic Committee holding the rank of minister. Lately he has been an adviser to the head of the president's administration.

Sergeyev's appointment was preceded by a conflict, concealed inside the government apparatus, between the Government Press Center led by Gennadiy Shipitko, and the government's Press Bureau whose chief was Andrey Silantev. Enjoying the rights of a Council of Ministers staff, the Press Bureau virtually duplicated the work of the government's Press Center which, however, was better equipped as regards personnel and technical facilities. At the moment, for example, only two specialists and two technical workers are included among the Press Bureau staff in addition to its chief. The replacement of the Press Bureau chief is attributed first and foremost to the fact that the part of the government staff that ensures the shaping of a favorable image of the president and the government among the public is being strengthened.

Official on Investigations Into Rutskoy's Allegations

LD2005212193 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 20 May 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Our correspondent tried to hold his own little investigation today, and find out how the work of the procuracy on the allegations made by Vice President Rutskoy is progressing...

[Correspondent Solomatin, continuing sentence] ... with Nikolay Markov, acting first deputy procurator general, who until 28 April was procurator of Saratov Oblast, and from 28 April by a special Supreme Soviet decision was appointed leader of the Procuracy General commission for checking on instances of corruption, in connection with the report by the vice president.

[Begin recording] [Markov] We have already spoken more than once with Vice President Rutskoy on the issues raised in the report and on other material.

[Solomatin] Naturally. Who else?

[Markov] Gaydar, Poltoranin... The majority of the information which the vice president gave in his report was already the subject of investigation by the Procuracy. These affairs had already been going on for a long time. A number of responsible officials had been accused. So this was not news for the Procuracy. In accordance with the law, the decisions of our commission will lead either to criminal proceedings being instigated on the basis of this material and passed on to a Procuracy General special investigation group, or to a refusal to instigate criminal proceedings, if there is no cause to do so, or to reparations being sought from specific guilty parties in connection with illegal deals.

[Solomatin] Let us add that the commission, made up of six more procurators representing various regions of Russia, began work on 5 May, and is obliged to complete its work, according to the Supreme Soviet instruction, within two months. [end recording]

Democratic Russia Supports Constitutional Conference

LD2105094793 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0800 GMT 21 May 93

[Text] The coordinating council of the Democratic Russia movement has expressed its support for convening of a constitutional conference. A statement issued

today noted that the Congress of People's Deputies has no moral right to adopt a new constitution because of the results of the referendum in April. The Democratic Russia movement believes that a constituent assembly should adopt the constitution. The constituent assembly should be elected on the basis of the general, direct, equal, and secret ballot.

Further on 19 May Meeting of Anticrime Commission

PM2005134393 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 93 p 1

[Unattributed report citing Presidential Press Service statement under the general headline: "The President Has Put On His Parade Tunic. Watch Out, World of Crime?"]

[Text] The Presidential Press Service announced on 19 May that the conference of the Interdepartmental Commission on Combating Crime "noted that organized crime and corruption have become a general state political problem. They have become a serious destabilizing factor in the country's life. The particular danger of ethnic mafia groups was stressed. The increase in drug addiction, alcoholism, and inadequate control of the spread of weapons have had a major impact on the crime situation in the country.

"Russian President Boris Yeltsin demanded greater decisiveness from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Security regarding the struggle against crime and corruption. The commission session was unanimous about the need for tough measures to crack down on criminal elements. It was deemed advisable to formulate a state program for combating crime and submit this to the Security Council. It was stressed that the struggle against crime is made more difficult by the imperfect nature of the legislative base."

On hearing this information, is it any clearer to you how the struggle against crime is to be prosecuted at the present time? Or could it also be that there is nothing to report?

Filatov on Constitutional Conference Hopes

PM2005092793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 19 May 93 First Edition p 1

[Lyubov Tsukanova report: "As Long as There Is Joint Work, There Will Be Accord—The Presidential Team Is Working on a Mechanism for Adopting the Constitution"]

[Text] Society has become aware of the need to adopt a new Constitution, and the president has the resolve to carry the constitutional process through to the end, Presidential Administration Leader Sergey Filatov said at a briefing yesterday. Conferences and meetings with representatives of local authorities in Murmansk, Suzdal, and Ryazan confirm that the presidential draft Constitution is finding support, although there are criticisms, incomprehension, and rejection of certain provisions. Sergey Filatov is optimistic that accord will be reached in the course of discussion.

Today, work on the Constitution is in a truly active phase: According to the presidential team's original plan, the discussion of the draft with the regions must be completed by 20-22 May, after which time a number of meetings with representatives of Federation subjects in Moscow is proposed. The Constitutional Conference will convene 5 June, and the relevant presidential edict on its formation is in preparation.

What form will the Constitutional Conference take? According to S. Filatov, its structure is still being discussed but will be defined in the next few days. The presumption is that it will be a "four-chamber" organ: two representatives for each Federation subject; representatives of the president, government, and Supreme Soviet (most likely at Constitutional Commission level); a group representing sociopolitical organizations; and delegates from the organs of local self-government (probably on the basis of the Alliance of Small Cities). The aim and purpose of the Constitutional Conference is to prepare the draft Fundamental Law and present it in its final form for ratification.

Who will adopt (ratify) the Constitution? In the words of the presidential administration leader, the issue of the legitimacy of this procedure is of primary concern to the regions today. Under the existing Constitution there are two legal, absolutely legitimate ways: adoption at the Congress of People's Deputies, or approval via a referendum. As far as the first is concerned, it is made difficult by the negative attitude of most of the deputies to the president's constitutional initiatives. That aside, S. Filatov said, there are two factors casting doubt on the legitimacy of the Constitution's adoption by the Congress. The first is of a legal nature: The Congress' legitimacy was not confirmed in the referendum because the question was not raised in the appropriate form. The second resides on a moral and ethical level: A whole series of decisions by recent Congresses are directed against the socioeconomic policy of the president and the government, which actually won support in the referendum. From this viewpoint a referendum is the most favored, the "purest" procedure in every respect. However, S. Filatov announced that right now lawyers are working on yet another option: Does a positive response to the first question (on confidence in the president) give him the right to create "some kind of organ which could adopt the Constitution"? The question is, so it was said, being studied. It is difficult to say for sure right now how this will progress. Sergey Filatov believes that much will depend on the position of the people's deputies.

Commenting on recent events in the Supreme Soviet, particularly Nikolay Ryabov's proposal on reconciling the two constitutional processes and combining the drafts, the presidential administration leader suggested

that a uniting of forces inclined toward not confrontation but cooperation with the president could occur among the deputies. Support from a section of the deputies could ease the working process and the elaboration of a mechanism for adopting the fundamental law. The president is prepared for cooperation, but on two conditions: that the basis for the combined version should be the presidential draft; and that the process must not become protracted or get "bogged down."

Sergey Filatov sees no great problem with involving the Federation subjects in work on the draft Constitution.

All contradictions both among the subjects themselves and between them and the federal powers can be overcome in the process of constructive work. And the best way of adopting the Constitution of a federal state consists in the ratification of an integrated document—that is, a procedure akin to the signing of the Federation Treaty.

Filatov: Lobov View Sounds 'Alarm Signals'

PM2005134793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 May 93 First Edition pp 1,2

[Vasiliy Kononenko report: "Sergey Filatov: The Main Thing Now Is to End the Confrontation Between the Authorities"]

[Text] The latest briefing by S. Filatov, leader of the president's administration, in the Kremlin 18 May was dedicated to the theme of the preparation and adoption of the new Constitution.

It is no surprise that this theme has cropped up. For a long time the constitutional process was frozen. The soviets were created all-powerful. Attempts by the executive to resist that tendency had begun a process of emerging dyarchy or anarchy. It had to be stopped. The radical path was to adopt the new Constitution.

Our first tours of the regions—conferences on problems of the new Constitution have already been held in Murmansk, Suzdal, and Ryazan, a conference on the topic is being held today in St. Petersburg, and Sergey Shakhray is flying out to Khabarovsk, Novosibirsk, and Irkutsk—show that the leaders of the regions approve of these steps, even though there has been some misunderstanding. The most important thing now is to end the confrontation between the powers and introduce certainty into society by constitutional means for the sake of continuing the reforms.

S. Filatov cited the following example: In Tambov Oblast he visited a sovkhoz where people do not want to build a livestock unit. When asked why, they said: We have no guarantees for the future. We do not know what the future will bring. Adopt a new Constitution, then it will be clear how we are going to live, and then we will build a new livestock unit.

We intend to complete the explanatory work and expert analysis in the regions by 20-22 June, S. Filatov went on. All the proposals coming in from the localities are going to the State and Law Administration, which is working with leading lawyers on analyzing them before sending them to the Constitutional Conference. There have also been collective proposals on the draft Constitution, from Tatarstan for example.

A presidential edict is now being prepared on the organization of the Constitutional Conference and its functions. There will be two representatives per region taking part in it, the federal level of power will also be represented—representatives of the president, the government, the Supreme Soviet, and the Constitutional Commission—and clearly there will also be a group representing political associations. A proposal to create such a group has been received from the Alliance of Small Cities.

What alarms us in this constitutional process, S. Filatov went on, is the fact that we do not see a constructive attitude from the representative power. What you hear there is an aggressive tone, which translates into aggressive actions such as the scrapping of committees and commissions which traditionally supported the reforms. But the latest Supreme Soviet session showed that even in parliament there are forces which are prepared to seek paths to accord and cooperation. This is what many regional leaders are insisting on. What can I tell you about it? Such a possibility existed prior to 25 April, but the blank wall that the president ran into forced him to turn to the people. In this new situation, too, the representative power must take realistic account of the condition of society first of all and act accordingly.

When asked about the new stance of N. Ryabov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, as demonstrated at the recent Supreme Soviet session, S. Filatov said: His stance is clearly due to the contradictory processes taking place in the Supreme Soviet itself and also probably to the suggestion from a group of deputies that Ryabov head the opposition.

The crucial question, of course, is how to get the new Constitution adopted. There are two options: By the Congress or by referendum. If it is by the Congress, there are two factors here: the legal factor and the moral-political factor. The Congress has no legitimacy any more, as the results of the voting demonstrate. In addition, beginning roughly with the Sixth Congress, the majority of the deputies have opposed the president and given a negative assessment of the reforms, but the opinion in society is different. If the constitutional process were entrusted to the Congress, that would be a mark of disrespect to the people. So in my view, S. Filatov said, the most legitimate path is a referendum. However, he stressed, much will depend on the deputies and on whether they choose the path of consensus or confrontation.

The administration chief explained that so far there have been no refusals from individual regions to take part in the Constitutional Conference. Even in Tatarstan they are collecting deputies' signatures to call a special session to discuss this question. We are absolutely determined to see the constitutional process through to the end, the presidential administration chief stressed.

Answering journalists' questions, he said among other things:

With regard to the comments and actions of First Vice Premier O. Lobov, which have been non-market, to put it mildly, he confirmed that alarm signals are being sounded. He added: Clearly he is having difficulty in progressing toward the market.

In reply to a question on the appeal from the 11 republics, S. Filatov stated that it was due to concern for the legitimacy of the adoption of the fundamental law—which is natural—and we are keeping tabs on it.

Yeltsin Draft Constitution Viewed

PM2005094593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 May 93 First Edition p 3

[Report by Aleksey Vorobyev: "Constitutions Are Made With Clean Hands"]

[Text] The president's representative, Sergey Shakhray, did not appear at the session of the Constitutional Commission. According to Deputy Chairman Nikolay Ryabov, literally 10 minutes before the start information was received that the vice premier was ill. But an hour later the president's representative was taking part with the utmost calm in the work of a "roundtable" in the President Hotel and according to reports from those present hinted that he had no intention of discussing his constitutional creation with members of the commission empowered by the law to do so.

This small and let us hope involuntary lack of tact for which civilized people are accustomed to make an apology quite unexpectedly sheds light on a new facet of the Russian constitutional process.

From what moral principles should one proceed and how clean should one's hands be when creating a document so fundamental and fateful for the state? How to avoid in this process serious moral losses which could not only distort the thrust of Russia's Fundamental Law, but also transform some of its outwardly attractive humanitarian ideas into a weapon striking against the people and democracy?

Today, alongside the parallel submission of two constitutional drafts for discussion, different principles for work on them have also emerged. The Constitutional Commission believes that the new text of the Fundamental Law should embody promising ideas and long-term interests of virtually all sociopolitical and social groups and unite society and it hopes that with the collective improvement of the foundations of the constitution and their formulation the national consensus the country so needs will be achieved.

Therefore, in suggesting to the subjects of the Federation that they discuss the official version of the text, the Constitutional Commission particularly stressed that joint work on it by the representative, executive, and legislative branches of power was very desirable in order in their calm and constructive dialogue to overcome all obscurities and contradictions.

The president's team has chosen a different method for work on its version of the constitution. First, a superfast pace of debate has quite frankly been established.

Second, in practice cooperation with the Congress and parliament in adopting the new Constitution has been rejected in advance and the president's supporters advocate an illegal path and are driving themselves (and all executive power) into a perfidious trap. After all, on the crooked, false path they have chosen their only support can be those same leaders of the subjects of the Federation, many of whom, however, are displaying no delight over the president's present policy.

That means that to make them allies they will have to be promised and pledged something again, and something very real at that. The only such reality would be the redistribution of the powers of central power in favor of the regions (that includes taxes, export quotas, and the right to self management) but there are slightly less than 100 regions and each wants to get its share! As a result if the promises are to be fulfilled the president's power will largely be dissipated among the subjects of the Federation, although the zealous supporters of the president's draft are in fact fighting for a strong vertical structure of executive power. If, as is traditional in this country, what has been promised is not given, then the regional leaders will reject the new Constitution in the name of the people and it will no longer be possible to drive them into the constitution by any forcible means.

In both cases the result will be the rapid collapse of the Federation.

There is one more savory question—the leader of which power will represent his region (and the opinion of his citizens) in resolving the problems of the new Constitution. After the president's council I put this question to Sergey Alekseyev, one of the "godfathers" of the president's draft. The question obviously confused him—hurriedly averting his eyes the well known lawyer muttered that the matter was not yet clear and will probably have to be decided individually with each region.

In the Constitution "according to Alekseyev" the president acts as the only guarantor of the rights and freedoms of citizens and of subjects of the Federation. But in the opinion of the majority of specialists the role of representative and legal powers is thus reduced to nothing. The head of state is burdened with too many powers and

too much responsibility, which obviously disrupts the balance of power structures and has nothing in common with democracy.

Moreover, many experts believe that the president's draft gives him almost absolute power and in addition he becomes the arbiter in all disputes between state organs!

Let us recall how furiously the democratic radicals and members of the president's team attacked the omnipotence of the congress of People's Deputies but now, experts have noted, they are demanding from their patron powers that are many times greater.

Commission Secretary O. Rumyantsev explained that the president's draft includes within the framework of executive power what are virtually parallel structures—the presidential and government structures. The former, following the example of the politburo and the CPSU Central Committee, has been assigned the role of a shadowy but real center of power. The latter structure has been assigned the role of a powerless implementer of the policy to be formed by the president's team. The president, in addition to the right to issue edicts equal in forces to laws, is invested with the unprecedented power of suspending the operation of laws if in his opinion they contradict the Constitution. There are simply no such analogies in the constitutions of democratic countries, O. Rumyantsev noted.

Lawyers cite very many examples of the president's draft making out that dictatorial powers are the pinnacle of democracy. In a normal, legal, democratic procedure it is almost impossible to approve such as text as the Fundamental Law. For that society must be struck by collective madness. That is why the president's supports are trying to push this document through "by the back door," so to speak, by illegal and consequently immoral means.

Here is the explanation of the fuss with which this is being done: Just causes are executed far more calmly and with far greater dignity.

Shakhray, Baburin on Draft Constitution

MK2005111193 Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian 20 May 93 (signed to press 19 May) p 2

[Commentaries by Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray and opposition leader Sergey Baburin, as reported by Aleksandr Kastravets, published in the "Counterview" column: "People of the Same Age at the 'Roundtable.'"]

[Text] Sergey Shakhray, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government, and Sergey Baburin, a Russian people's deputy and an opposition leader, are undoubtedly opponents, but in some respects they are alike: men of the same age, professional jurists, members of our newspaper's editorial board. At the fifth session of the "roundtable" organized by the Supreme Soviet and the government, they expressed their personal judgments on and appraisals of the draft of the new constitution submitted by the Russian president at the end of April. It seemed that the main provisions and highlights of their statements would also be of interest for FEDERATSIYA's readers.

Sergey Shakray:

The unique character of our transitional period consists in the fact that simultaneously three process are unfolding: the replacement of the RSFSR by the Russian Federation, the replacement of a Soviet republic by a presidential-democratic republic, and the replacement of a unitary structure by a federal structure. Therefore the question about the new constitution of the Russian Federation is taking on not just a legal and political meaning—it is a question of providing a new foundation [obustroystvo] for contemporary Russia.

The draft constitution promulgated by the president and presented to the Federation's components provides the norms that make it possible to consolidate Russian statehood. Article 63 says: "Output, commodities, services, and financial resources shall freely circulate on the entire territory of the Russian Federation, without any restrictions being imposed on any person and regardless of the borders existing in the Russian Federation between the Federation's components and territories..." And here is Article 64: "The ruble shall be a single unit of currency on the entire territory of the Russian Federation. The creation and emission of other currencies in Russia shall not be allowed."

The proposed document is in fact a semi-draft since 60 percent of its content is constituted by current law and above all the Federation Treaty in full. It is obvious to me that at present it is impossible to achieve the equality of all components of the Russian Federation. We should be talking in terms of the extent to which their rights are correlated.

The president of the Russian Federation will be relieved of the functions of directing the executive branch of government. He will be placed outside the framework of all the three branches and will receive only three functions: He will act as arbiter between the federal parliament and the government in the event of a governmental crisis, ensure the unity and integrity of the Russian state, and protect human and civil rights.

The draft constitution removes dualism in two out the three branches of power. At present we have a two-headed legislative branch (the Supreme Soviet and the Congress), a two-headed executive branch (the president and the government), while the judicial branch is three-headed. It is proposed to preserve only the parliament at the federal level, abolishing the Congress, and placing the premier and the government at the head of the executive branch. The structure of the judicial branch remains complicated—the Constitutional Court, the High Court of Arbitration, and the Supreme Court. At the same time, in order to ensure the integrity of the judicial branch, a Supreme Judicial Office [prisutstviye] is being introduced (strictly speaking, this is not a body but a conference of nine judges, three of them ex-officio

members—chairmen of the Constitutional, Arbitration, and Supreme Courts, and six federal judges, elected or appointed by the Federation Council). It has the power to rule on only three questions: impeachment of the president, interpretation of the Constitution, and dismissal of federal judges, if they have committed a statutory offense. I realize that the draft constitution is far from ideal and that it will yet undergo substantial changes.

Sergey Baburin:

Up to now I have not decided which of the two draft constitutions is worse: I like neither the one drawn up under the guidance of Boris Nikolayevich during the course of the last two years, nor the one prepared on his instructions over the past few months. In my opinion, the meaning of federalism has been given an erroneous definition. The belief that today it is impossible to achieve full equality of the Federation's components will only lead to complications in relations between the Center and the regions. When we are saying that the republics will have priority over the krays and oblasts, this is a time bomb that will inevitably blow the proposed structure to pieces.

Stability can only be achieved provided unconditional equality is ensured for all the Federation's components not only in the economic but also in the political sphere. Concerning rights, the residents in the Russian Federation's constituent republics will have a different scope of civil rights and freedoms than the residents of krays and oblasts. Why, I would like to know.

Instead of one Federation treaty for all the components of the Federation, today we have three. The latest draft constitution envisions the incorporation of all these three variants into the fundamental law. This will only freeze destabilization for the time being. In my opinion, only the most valuable provisions from all three drafts should be taken—those that have really proven themselves—and incorporated into the text of the Constitution.

The president should be enabled to realize all of his plans. The majority of those who took part in the referendum have approved of the reform program. And it does not matter that no one has seen it—the decision has been made and today we must do everything possible to make sure that the president is left one to one with the economy and the people. No one must prevent the president from carrying out those promises that he made to the people prior to the referendum.

Faction Coordinators Assess Political Crisis

PM2005123193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 93 First Edition p 3

[Aleksandr Sukhoparov report comprising opinions of Supreme Soviet faction leaders Andrey Golovin, Yuriy Nesterov, Sergey Baburin, and Vladimir Isakov under the "In Parties and Movements" rubric: "Referendum Result: First- and Second-Class Citizens Have Emerged in the Country"]

[Text] Readers may, I think, be interested to find out the position of leaders of various political associations in the Supreme Soviet on three extremely topical questions:

—What is your attitude to the constitutional crisis in Russia and your assessment of the two drafts of the new Constitution?

—What is your assessment of the results of the Russian referendum held 25 April?

—How would you comment on the tragic events of 1 May in Moscow?

Andrey Golovin, Coordinator of the "Smena-New Policy" (Bloc of Creative Forces) Faction: "Laws Should Be the Same for Everyone."

1. The problem of the constitutional crisis has obviously been forced. There is a political crisis which has expressed itself in the fundamentally different approaches of the executive and legislative branches to the pace of reform and the form in which it should be implemented. With regard to the drafts of the new Constitution that are being put forward for discussion, let me remind you that one of these has already been approved by the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies last April. Subsequent work on improving the fundamental law should continue in this vein.

2. The April referendum results are extremely contradictory, and both sides can interpret them in their favor. The referendum has led to a strong polarization of political forces in society. Instead of consolidating society, the referendum is pushing it toward increased confrontation. This is a very dangerous result.

3. An analysis of what happened prompts me to think that both sides were in the mood for confrontation.

However, I cannot fail to mention that the president, who talks so much about democracy, issued an edict just before 1 May banning demonstrations on Red Square, even though a section of the square—Vasiliyevskiy Spusk—is often used by his supporters. Laws should be the same for everyone.

Yuriy Nesterov, Coordinator of the "Consensus for Progress" Faction: "One Draft Is No Better Than the Other."

1. The appeal to secure the adoption of a new Constitution immediately and by any means and methods does not suit the needs of the moment.

The presidential draft of the fundamental law is no more successful than the draft approved by the Congress of People's Deputies. The only way to resolve this issue is to discuss both drafts.

2. The most important thing about the referendum results is that people supported the president and his policy.

3. Our faction has not yet formulated an official position regarding the events of 1 May. It is absolutely clear that law-abiding citizens should follow directives issued by the authorities and the law.

Sergey Baburin, Coordinator of the "Russia" Faction ("Russian Unity" bloc): "The President Was the First Person to Violate the New Constitution."

1. There is no constitutional crisis in Russia. Both drafts were drawn up under Yeltsin's guidance. Consequently he is contradicting himself. Regarding the essence of the problem, in my view this is yet another attempt to hide from real economic difficulties behind political discussions and feuding.

2. It should be noted that a total of 37 percent of the population refused to place their trust in any politician and did not even turn up to vote. At the same time it should be stressed that the people turned out to be wiser than their rulers and came out in favor of a balance of forces, voicing their support neither for an early Russian presidential election nor for the early election of Russian people's deputies.

3. I am convinced that on 1 May the presidential structures instigated a provocation. They were simply rattled by silence, since they cannot work without enemies and confrontation in society.

Vladimir Isakov, Coordinator of the "Russian Unity" Bloc and Member of the "Agrarian Union" Faction: "Yes to Reforms, No to Revolution."

1. The constitutional crisis in Russia has been provoked artificially. It is the result of the inability and unwillingness of the president and his team to act within the framework of the fundamental law. The best option for Russia at the transition stage is a gradual transformation of the legal system by making amendments to the existing Constitution.

2. The 25 April referendum rubbed salt in all Russian society's wounds. First and foremost it demonstrated the dangerous stratification in public opinion regarding the reforms that are being pursued in the country. One section of society, comprising about one-third, is trying to foist a new social and state system on all the other citizens. At the same time it has become apparent that different regions of the country harbor a far from unambiguous attitude to the reforms.

3. It is clear to me that both sides broke the law. Each side's measure of guilt should be weighed up and determined by an investigation and a trial.

However, the political angle is no less important. The events of 1 May once again demonstrated that that first- and second-class citizens have emerged in our country. Some people are allowed to stage concerts, rallies in the Kremlin, and even individual parades on Red Square. These are the president's political supporters. Others are banned from demonstrating on Red Square even on state holidays.

Actions of this sort inevitably cause tension in society and provoke violence.

Media Issues

Court Hears Case on Congress Freedom of Speech Rule

LD2005111093 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 20 May 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The Constitutional Court is today considering a petition concerning the legality of the decision of the Ninth Congress of People's Deputies on measures to ensure freedom of speech in the mass media. I would recall that the Congress revoked the decree of the president of Russia on the Federal Television and Radio Broadcasting Service of Russia and the Federal Information Center, and announced the creation of monitoring councils to ensure freedom of speech in state television and radio broadcasting.

[Unidentified correspondent] The Constitutional Court session opened with organizational matters. The court took quite a time to satisfy the request of Mikhail Fedotov, minister of the press and information, to specify the powers of the representatives of the side which issued the decision. This meant, specifically, the legitimacy of delegating to the court deputies Astafyev, Plotnikov, and Ryabov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet. They also had to determine during the session which documents were actually present and which were not. Zorkin, chairman of the court, complained about the court's exact preparations for the case, not without regret.

Professor Mikhail Fedotov, a lawyer who is representing the side petitioning for verification of the constitutionality of the Congress decision, made a thorough legal assessment of the decision itself. He noted specifically that the aim of this document is allegedly to ensure freedom of speech on television, but according to the conclusions of the commission, headed by deputy Plotnikov—he was incidentally present at the court today, and was representing the side which issued the decision—there have been no infringements of freedom of speech on television. This means that what is primarily at issue is control over the mass media by Russia's Supreme Soviet, Mikhail Fedotov concluded.

Overall, he stressed that the decision is against the constitution and the law on the press in its content, in the way this document was adopted and from the point of view of the division of functions between the executive and legislative powers. Before the close of the morning

session, the side petitioning for verification of the constitutionality of the decision answered questions from the court and the other side.

Plotnikov Cited

LD2105120193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1059 GMT 21 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—The Russian Constitutional Court today continued examining the resolution of the 9th Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation "on measures to ensure the freedom of speech in the State Television and Broadcasting Network and in news services". It is worth recalling that an appeal to check the constitutionality of this resolution was filed by a group of Russian mps [members of parliament], as well as Minister for the Press and Information Mikhail Fedotov.

Taking the floor during today's morning sitting, Russian People's Deputy Oleg Plotnikov, representing the parliament, said that the "congress has every constitutional right to issue both normative and executive acts". He added that the congress resolution did not alter or replace the law "on the mass media", but only supplemented it. The formation of supervision councils to ensure the freedom of speech in the television and broadcasting network should be regarded from this angle, Plotnikov believes. "The supervision councils' task is to ensure pluralism and prevent the political monopolisation of the television and broadcasting network," Plotnikov stressed.

The Constitutional Court plans to hear the views of experts today. A final ruling will apparently be passed next week.

Constitutional Court Ruling on IZVESTIYA Published

PM2005133393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 May 93 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report under general heading: "Russian Constitutional Court Defends Freedom of Press and Legal Order"]

[Text] On 19 May the Russian Federation Constitutional Court passed a ruling in the case of verifying the constitutionality of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decree of 17 July 1992 "On the Newspaper IZVESTIYA" and on a personal complaint by members of the IZVESTIYA Editorial Board's journalistic collective in connection with the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decree of 17 July 1992 "On the Newspaper IZVESTIYA."

The Russian Federation Constitutional Court, consisting of Chairman V.D. Zorkin, Deputy Chairman N.V. Vitruk, Secretary Yu.D. Rudkin, and Justices E.M. Ametistov, G.A. Gadzhiyev, T.G. Morshchakova, N.V. Seleznev, and B.S. Ebzeyev,

having examined in open session the case of verifying the constitutionality of Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree No. 3333-1 of 17 July 1992 "On the Newspaper IZVESTIYA" and the personal complaint by members of the IZVESTIYA Editorial Board's journalistic collective in connection with the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decree of 17 July 1992 "On the Newspaper IZVESTIYA,"

guided by Article 165 of the Russian Federation Constitution, by Points 1 and 2 of Part 2 and by Part 4 of Article 1, by Parts 4 and 8 of Article 41, by Articles 57 and 58, by Point 2 of Part 1 of Article 64, by Part 5 of Article 65, by Article 66, by Part 1 of Article 67, and by point 10 of Part 1 and by Part 2 of Article 69 of the Law on the Russian Federation Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court has decreed:

1. Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree No. 3333-1 of 17 July 1992 "On the Newspaper IZVESTIYA" is to be regarded as not conforming with Part 1 of Article 3, Article 43, Part 1 of Article 63, Part 1 of Article 87, Articles 107 and 109, Part 5 of Article 112, Part 1 of Article 117, Articles 120 and 129, and Part 1 of Article 163 of the Russian Federation Constitution.

2. This decree is to be made retroactive, and the juridical relations formed on the basis of Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree No. 3333-1 of 17 July 1992 are to be returned to the state that existed prior to the application of this Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decree.

3. Proceedings relating to the personal complaint by members of the IZVESTIYA Editorial Board's journalistic collective in connection with Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree No. 3333-1 of 17 July 1992 "On the Newspaper IZVESTIYA" are to be dropped, since the question raised in that complaint has essentially been resolved by the Russian Federation Constitutional Court insofar as this relates to its competence.

4. On the basis of Article 55 of the Law on the Russian Federation Constitutional Court a representation is to be sent to the Russian Federation Supreme Court, drawing its attention to the need for the direct application of Article 63 of the Russian Federation Constitution guaranteeing court protection for everybody's rights and freedoms.

5. This decree is to be published in VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV I VERKHNOGO SOVETA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII no later than seven days after its exposition, as well as in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA and other press organs which published the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decree of 17 July 1992 "On the Newspaper IZVESTIYA."

Implications of Verdict Viewed

PM2005141993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 May 93 First Edition p 1

[Yuriy Feofanov article under general heading: "Russian Constitutional Court Defends Freedom of Press and Legal Order"]

[Text] The Russian Constitutional Court ruling can arouse nothing but a sense of profound satisfaction. Nonetheless, I would like to voice some thoughts which go beyond the newspaper's litigation against the parliamentary decree.

The first and extremely important point is that the Constitutional Court, by its ruling on a single newspaper, has confirmed the constitutional norm of freedom of speech and of the press; it has confirmed the natural and unshakable right of a democratic society to independence of thought, judgment, and opinion—within the framework of the law, of course. The Court ruling contains a direct reference to Article 43 of the Russian Federation Constitution, which enshrines this right. It was precisely this right that the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet tried to violate by adopting the decree on the newspaper IZVESTIYA. It is now deemed "juridically void" and invalid. It seems to me that the ruling that the Supreme Soviet decree is unconstitutional precisely under this article should cool the ardor of a certain section of the corps of deputies in its intention to lay its hands on the mass media. No matter whom they irritate and how, if their actions are within the law any encroachment on them is unlawful.

There is a second, no less important point to which attention must be drawn. I cannot know what was discussed or how in the judges' consulting room, but flagrant violations of the standing orders on adopting decisions—the procedural law of parliament—became perfectly obvious in the course of hearing the "IZVESTIYA case." At the 17 July 1992 session the deputies themselves essentially did not really know what they were voting for. Judge G. Gadzhiyev (the main speaker in this case) insistently asked Deputy V. Lisin, the Supreme Soviet's representative: Did the deputies have the text of the decree to hand? Did they vote for this text? The answers were unintelligible. But the stenographic record which was read out in court and the testimony of Deputy I. Bezrukov, one of the authors of the petition to the Constitutional Court (the other petitioners were S. Shakhray and A. Kotenkov), confirmed that the deputies voted for what R. Khasbulatov read out to them. They adopted it virtually "by ear." But the official decree "turned out" different, with very substantial amendments.

Unfortunately—and this was emphasized by experts in court—the adoption of decisions in this way is, alas, the usual practice of the Russian parliament.

A final point. Experts said that the present constitution is such that one side will cite one norm and will be right, while the other will cite another and will also be right. "What is to be done?"—this question was put to V. Danilenko, an expert and a professor of constitutional law. "It is the Constitutional Court's job to interpret the priority of conflicting norms," he replied.

This is what the Constitutional Court has done.

The editorial board collective thanks People's Deputies Shakhray, Kotenkov, and Bezrukov, who petitioned the Constitutional Court in IZVESTIYA's defense, and the experts involved in the court case—Candidate of Juridical Sciences S. Khokhlov, Prof. Danilenko, and Attorney A. Rakhmilovich.

Editor Hits Poltoranin Over Plan To Control Media

MK2005135693 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 21, 20 May 93 (signed to press 18 May 93) p A10

[Viktor Loshak article published in the "Mass Media" column: "The Slippery Pinnacle of the Fourth Estate"]

[Text] Having just accustomed themselves to ignoring the hysteria on the part of the Supreme Soviet about the press, the mass media have again found themselves alarmed: Lurking behind Mikhail Poltoranin's stated intention to close down the Press and Information Ministry is a clear threat to the press and information services themselves.

This intrigue has been dragging on for a long time, and it can well be observed in the way space is distributed. It seems as though there are two masters in the Press and Information Ministry on Strastnoy Boulevard: The minister's office is occupied by Mikhail Poltoranin, head of the Federal Information Center (that formally has no relation to the ministry), while the office of first deputy minister is occupied by Minister Mikhail Fedotov. The signs are that the period of their communal living has now come to an end: Poltoranin is insisting on closing the ministry and apparently has even coordinated his plan with the parliamentary committee. Fedotov, always extremely sensitive toward Poltoranin's political moves, gave an interview where he described the prospects in such emotional colors as "ruination" and "collapse."

It is interesting how political intrigues of the recent period are moving from the background to center stage and moreover the struggle between some political chess players is becoming a sight more important than the chess game itself. The Supreme Soviet, without giving it another thought, purged the democrats from the committee on the mass media. Poltoranin, without particularly hiding his intentions, is going to oversee the allocation of funds to media organizations and take control of their facilities.

The aim has been defined, and there are no political obstacles in the way of its implementation: Superdemocrat Poltoranin said in an interview that he has agreed with the persecutor of the democrats—Lisin,

chairman of the parliamentary committee—about the dissolution of the ministry. One can understand Lisin, as someone from among the parliament speaker's attendants: For him, Mikhail Fedotov, a jurist and author of the law on the press, is several times more dangerous than the mercurial Mikhail Poltoranin. Especially given that after the committee has been purged, the Supreme Soviet is definitely going to take a crack at the law on the press. Thus, having gotten rid of Fedotov, the executive branch itself is sounding a signal for the attack on the law to begin.

The mystery about this intrigue is that the head of the Federal Information Center made his latest revelations after first Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko had issued assurances that the government's plans do not include the dissolution or transformation of the Press and Information Ministry. The political observer will immediately begin to weigh the authority of these contradicting statements against each other.

Of course, Shumeyko is second in command in the government, but governments are prone to change, while Yeltsin remains. And within this formula lies the strength of Poltoranin the propagandist and sword bearer.

Another aspect of his confident-sounding statements is the conduct of a whole group of newspapers and the dependent Ostankino. The truth of the matter is that when it comes down to brass tacks, they all want not so much an immaculate law on the press as allocations from the budget and semi-legitimate affection from the government. In this respect Mikhail Nikiforovich is an irreplaceable man.

When one's own newspaper, magazine, or radio station is about to perish in the whirlpool of hyperinflation, it seems that many things could just be ignored. It could be ignored, for instance, that the roundtable of chief editors that the president summoned on Poltoranin's initiative actually discredited both the president and the chief editors, as well as their publications. One could overlook to what lengths Ostankino has gone in launching a head-on propaganda attack, for example, prior to the meeting between Yeltsin and Shevardnadze, by presenting a discrediting profile on the Georgian leader including footage of Brezhnev decorating him with a state order, as though people did not know that Shevardnadze—and not he alone—was in power during the Brezhnev era....

Of course, it is easier with Ostankino: One can switch over to Vesti or CNN. Yet there is no way to turn off the power seekers, no matter how sick one might be of them.

Confidentiality Order Risks Increase of Information Leaks

MK2105083493 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 20 May 93 p 3

[Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, Jr., report: "Authorities Struggle To Prevent Information Leaks. Journalists Forced To Pay for Information"]

[Text] The authorities continue their attempts to restrict newsmen's access to information. This time it was the executive branch's turn: Yesterday, department chiefs of the Presidential Administration were informed of an order restricting journalists' access to information on the operation of the Presidential Administration. Staffers allowing leaks to occur will be held personally responsible. Administration Chief Sergey Filatov signed this document slightly more than a week after the Russian Supreme Soviet Presidium attempted to close its meetings to journalists.

The order "On additional measures to ensure the security of confidential information in the Presidential Administration" was signed by Sergey Filatov and stamped "For Internal Use." Your KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent, however, managed to learn its contents. The document calls for administration staffers to be held personally responsible for internal information leaks. Filatov signed this order virtually at the same time as the Cabinet of Ministers made the decision to start issuing PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK by paid subscription (see KOMMERSANT-DAILY of 15 May).

Vladimir Solodin, deputy chief of one of the Press Ministry departments, described the actions taken by the Russian parliament as a lack of law and order, because "journalists may be denied access to presidium meetings when, for instance, state security matters are to be discussed." Apparently for this reason the decision closing the Supreme Soviet Presidium's meetings for journalists was reversed.

An official from the Presidential Administration, who asked not to be identified, said that Filatov's order was "aimed at restricting journalists' access not to general-purpose information, but to that designed for internal use." Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeyko's order on publishing PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK, however, was effectively at odds with the Law on the Press: Under the law, civil servants are obligated to provide journalists with information that does not constitute a state secret.

Journalists sense in the attempts to restrict their access to the information on goings-on in the civil service an amazing unanimity of views between the legislative and executive branches, which fall out with each other on virtually all domestic issues.

The official press services have so far been restricted in their contacts with the press. Correspondents, meanwhile, were looking for sources of information, including paid ones, among the staffers. It looks like this process will take on a new intensity, and the quantity of leaked confidential information is bound to increase. Thus, the effect of this order would be diametrically opposed to what its authors may have expected.

Rutskoy TV Appearance Request Turned Down

MK2105114093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No 18, 21 May 93 (signed to press 20 May) p 2

[POSTFACTUM report: "Rutskoy Denied Access to Television"]

[Text] On 19 May Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy asked Moscow Television Channel officials for a chance to take part in one of the evening programs. Television channel chiefs turned down the request, referring to a decision of the shareholders council.

Economic Issues

Rutskoy on Economic Developments, State Role

LD2105103893 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1445 GMT 20 May 93

[Interview with Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given; from the "RTV- Parliament" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Unidentified correspondent] How do you feel now in the situation in which you have found yourself, a situation, let's say, which is perhaps one of political and perhaps of human isolation, and what do you think has caused it?

[Rutskoy] Well, I do not think that I feel any isolation as such, of course, because there are enough people who think as I do. I have enough friends and I am continuing to do the work which I did before in the agro-industrial complex. I am trying to implement projects which have been developed, on which a great deal of time has been spent, and on whose development resources have been spent. So I have something to do and I do not feel any special isolation. However, from a purely human viewpoint, personally I quite honestly find what is happening in the Kremlin Palace these days quite hurtful. It is hurtful to watch it all because it is far from being helpful to society, it is far from being helpful to the state, and all of these intrigues have just one aim: to bring in a monarchist constitution by any means, and to create complete lawlessness under this constitution, but one which will now be based on laws. The present constitution is already out of date, of course, and needs to be amended.

A new constitution really does need to be adopted, one which is based in the first instance on the principles of democracy, but you see the situation that has developed. If we work on this constitution or accept the constitution which was considered by the Congress, then we would have lawlessness; it would be simply impossible to do anything. Then at least we would have to answer to the law. Today one can say: I have not sworn on this constitution, as the president says, although we all remember well how he swore on the Constitution. It is possible to avoid responsibility here, one way or another. However, when the new constitution is adopted it will be impossible to avoid responsibility, because it would be impossible to call the next constitution a Brezhnevite, Communist constitution.

So, everyone is now trying to keep hold of power, by any means, to avoid responsibility, responsibility before the people for what they did to the Soviet Union without taking the people's opinions into account—76 percent of them voted in favor of the preservation of the Soviet Union—and also to avoid responsibility before the peoples of Russia for the disintegration of a republic which was once great.

This disintegration can be demonstrated in facts and figures: a 30-percent slump in production, annual inflation of 2,500 percent, monthly inflation of up to 30 percent, a mortality rate which exceeds the birth rate on the territory of the Russian Federation by 1.8 times, and so on. While before the democratic, let us say, transformations—of course, democratic should be in quotation marks, because we are a long way from democracy—around 20 percent of the Russian people lived below the poverty line, on the level of poverty, as it were, at the minimum subsistence level. Now people have changed places: 80 percent are now below the poverty line and 20 percent are more or less getting by. So someone needs to bear responsibility for all this.

The military-industrial complex has been destroyed. The Army, once powerful and because of which there has been peace for 50 years, has been destroyed. It has been destroyed without wars, without anything—it was simply broken up and put into national compartments, it was robbed and sold off. Everything has been done in order to no longer have a state which the whole world would reckons with. Therefore, one should answer to the law for this. All these actions against the vice president, the chairman of the Parliament, and the parliament as a whole at present.

[Corespondent] What actions?

[Rutskoy] Open and blunt slander in order to form public opinion. For example, I have just spoken to the chief editor of VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA. First, his behavior is indecent for a state official. I have asked him to give explanations. How can one understand the subheading: "Poor Rutskoy and palaces in Razdory?" You can see here photographs of huge buildings, real castles. This is a blunt provocation. I have nothing to do with these houses. The only thing I have to do with this is the fact that I have received a quarter of a hectare in Razdory. And all I have built there so far is the foundation. It was agreed when I received the land that I would give my apartment back accordingly. I mean this is not a dacha, but a house in which to live. [passage omitted]

Everything is as it should be and the law has not been breached. But, you see, what they are doing is as follows: To discredit the vice president within the public eye, a person who obviously has taken a stance which is uncomfortable for the existing executive power because of double-dyed corruption and looting there. At long last

the public should know what has been going on in reality. And now you can see what is going on—the sub-heading poor Rutskoy and palaces in Razdory. An ordinary reader will look at this and decide: Rutskoy is not poor, look at these four-story buildings; it can drive one mad—real palaces. I told Lisin, the chief editor: Listen, why didn't you show the foundation of my house next to "poor Rutskoy" and next to it, a palace which the president has built. [passage omitted]

Specific programs and projects, hundreds of them, have been suggested to set up a federal center for land and agricultural reform. They did not give us a chance to implement any of the projects, although technical estimations, feasibility studies, and so on and so forth, were carried out for all of them. A state program for land and agricultural reform has been drawn up. It envisages a system for managing land funds and a system of land ownership for citizens of the Russian Federation. A system of land banks has also been drawn up. [passage omitted]

You know, I have arrived at the conclusion that all the things that are being done with regard to the Russian Federation whip up tendencies leading to the break up and disintegration of the state, instead of strengthening the unity of the Russian Federation and creating a normal federative state, where all subjects of the Federation would enjoy equal rights. This is the main problem, and no one wants to think about it. Please note that whenever I start saying that this is wrong that I am not alone in saying this. I am not against the president; let him be the president for the next hundred years. I am against things which are happening in the state. [passage omitted]

Chubays has a permanent grudge against me. He is always saying that I am criticizing him unjustly. Well, I do not know, but the Procuracy has already instituted approximately 7,000 criminal cases, all to do with privatization. If I were in the wrong, these 7,000 criminal cases would not have existed. If I were in the wrong-...[pauses] Those are only the registered cases of violating privatization process. There are a lot of cases which have not been noted. Wait a second. Do you think that after three years our property will sprout like mushrooms and we will privatize it again? No. This is a once only action. That is why we had to approach it thoroughly and seriously.

I suggested a scheme. I can outline it for you: We take 147.8 million citizens of the Russian Federation, list all Russia's immovable property, and divide the total price of all the immovable property by 147.8 million, which comes to 250,000 rubles [R]. In other words, we open a bank account for every citizen of the Russian Federation for R250,000. A bank account which is already protected. No one can interfere with your personal account. Now, do we still need the State Committee for Management of State Property and the State Committee for Investments and Purchases? No, we do not. Their functions are performed by the bank, since it is interested in its clients buying the most profitable shares, because the bank will earn its interest. Am I right? [passage omitted]

Now let us take the next thing—pensioners, elderly people, the disabled. They can withdraw three percent a month to use as they wish, so to speak. That was quite a good amount of money at the time, a year and one-half ago—R7,500. Those who would like to take part in some business or other, the money remains with the state, it is in fact used for privatization and investment. For example, I write an application to a building directorate; I want to build myself a house. I withdraw R100,000, transfer the money—it was possible then to build a house with R100,000. Another R150,000 can be used, for instance, to buy shares. It means a profit to the factory [as heard] because it is getting additional working capital, and to me it is an advantage because I have acquired shares. [passage omitted]

Look what they have done. If we ask people how they have used their vouchers, every fifth person will say: I don't know what to do with it. I tell you, there will yet be a big row. It is now May, but when December is near [deadline for investing privatization vouchers], when there is only a month or two left, and the people still have those vouchers in their hands and no way of disposing of them, there will then a good big row.

As you can see, there are rows already. Can you buy a bag or two of vouchers? No, nor can I, nor can the man in the street. Who can buy them? Money from shadowy deals, drug trafficking, money illegally earned is used to buy up all those vouchers, and these people can now lay claims to real estate, to the things which used to belong to the whole nation. [passage omitted]

I could take a certain stance, I could say that everything is fine, everything is perfect, and in the meantime build myself a palace far better than this one, and no one would point at me or say a word. [passage omitted

Is there any good in the fact that the military-industrial complex has been destroyed? It had technologies of the highest order, a most powerful scientific potential, a highly qualified engineering and technical staff and well-trained workers. And didn't I suggest a system? I said: Let's take the agro-industrial complex. The main aim of the reform is to supply enough products to the market and the consumers, and at accessible prices at that. How can this be done and where can they come from? Anyone can see that money is necessary in order for a reform or any action to succeed. Where can this money come from? I studied the matter carefully; I didn't invent things, just looked into archive documents and other material and saw that the losses amount to 40-60 percent. If we manage to reduce wastage of the finished product we shall have more goods; therefore, if shortages diminish, prices will stabilize, the range of goods will expand, and we get additional money.

Now, where do we channel this money? We use it to promote new economic methods in the countryside and to develop the social infrastructure. In this way we fulfill

several tasks: We provide the population with foodstuffs, reduce wastage, diminish imports which require convertible currency, and develop the social infrastructure and new economic methods in agriculture.

Also, what can we do to reduce losses? Develop and bring into operation technologies for small- and medium-scale production capacities. In order to build those small- and medium-scale capacities we use the military-industrial complex; in other words, we carry out conversion and develop the private sector. [passage omitted]

On each of these priority issues I have a program worked out, programs worked out with technical and economic grounding. They have been assessed by our own experts and by international experts.

[Correspondent] Who is looking at these programs?

[Rutskoy] Nobody wants to look at them. Take the agricultural sector reform program, for example, Russian agriculture. It lay around in the government for six months, and at the end of all that time you saw what happened: the Agriculture Ministry developed its own program: the development of agrarian reform. A program cannot be a program of development of agrarian reform. This is idiocy! Think about what is written here. Read it. Look.

[Correspondent, reading] ...Made a political decision...

[Rutskoy, interrupting] ...Worked out their own program: the development of agrarian reform. What development? Development of what? Development of the agricultural complex, that I can understand. But reform. How can you put together a program of reform development? Do you understand? Do you know why this happens? Because over there on Staraya Ploshchad, and up here, they think they hold the absolute truths, and all the rest are reds and brownshirts and opponents of reform. [passage omitted]

Again, this program must provide for action by the government, by administration, by local power bodies, if the situation develops in a different way. You have to consider how it will affect public opinion, how it will affect peoples' material circumstances. You see, before saying anything—and all the more so before issuing documents—you have to think, consider, compare, argue, prove, and study the experiences of others for a long time.

Why should one repeat one's own mistakes or the mistakes of other states? First of all, experience should be studied as to whether it is acceptable for us. Yes, it is acceptable. So we will use it. Or it is not acceptable and it does not suit us. Russia has its own mentality and historically Russia had a mixed economy before the revolution, and an entirely private sector is not yet a panacea for ending this system. The market is not the aim but a means of achieving the aim.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Vladimirovich, I am catching myself at the thought that, despite the fact that by the president's instruction you have been released from your responsibilities of drawing up a program for the agro-industrial complex, as well as from other projects you have been involved in, you are still keen on them, you are still living by them, and you have not lost hope of implementing them one day.

[Rutskoy] [passage omitted] I will finish the project, irrespective of whether I remain the vice president or not. The fact that I have been stripped of my responsibilities is natural. The point is, it was a well-considered action to put Rutskoy in charge of agriculture. By profession I am an engineer for the exploitation of aircraft and aircraft engines, and a pilot. It would seem that a pilot and an aviation engineer has nothing in common with agriculture. It was well-considered—let's see how he will ruin it from the start. But as they say, he met his match. I studied archive documents on the reform of Petr Arkadyevich Stolypin. I started with them. I studied archive documents on the reforms carried out in the Soviet period. I simply created a model which is acceptable at the present moment. I wrote out all the positive and negative points. I studied the experience of China, Holland, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, and as a result I created a clear-cut model. Naturally, for this model the program for reforming the agro-industrial complex was drawn up. Also, since it is not me who will be implementing the program, I have written a brochure, a book: "Agrarian Reform in Russia." [passage omitted]

So, again, the principle as you see is observation of logical progression. A program is developed, and I believe that at the same time explanatory work should be undertaken among the population, in order that people can understand what this program will give them and why it has taken precisely this path. Why? Because all the previous reforms have had a certain kind of declaratorial nature—you couldn't understand what was coming from where and how it was being paid for, that is, funds were allocated from the budget, but it was already impossible to ask where they went and where the accounts were. Everything disappeared into, you know, like a black hole. When people start calling agriculture a black hole, I consider it an insult. It is not the fault of those working in agriculture. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Present actions around adopting the new constitution—how do you interpret them, what do you see behind them?

[Rutskoy] I have already said that I have a drawback—I am a law-abiding person.

[Correspondent] Is that a drawback?

[Rutskoy] I think that in our times, under what is now called a law-governed, democratic state, it is a huge drawback. [passage omitted] This is what I always say. Let's put it like that. The president swore an oath of allegiance. He could have sworn it on the Bible, the

Talmud, or the Koran. But it was sworn on the Constitution, and now the same president is saying that he has not sworn allegiance to that Constitution, that it is a Brezhnev and Communist constitution. That is simply absurd, isn't it? Wait a minute, didn't we all see him swearing on it? The presidency was introduced into the Constitution—by the way, who introduced the presidency into the Constitution? When the referendum on the USSR was being held, do you remember that 48 percent of the people in Russia voted for introducing a presidency in the Russian Federation? The Congress, which is now being called the party nomenklatura, made the amendment to the Constitution about a presidency in Russia.

Now you can see what is happening: The Constitution has to be changed. It is not in line with modern principles and the state system, because if we are talking about the Federation, as far as I understand all subjects within the Federation are enjoying equal rights—it does not matter whether it is an oblast, a kray, or a republic—they are all enjoying equal rights. Why does it matter whether a citizen lives in a republic within the Russian Federation, or in the Krasnoyarsk Kray, or the Novosibirsk Oblast? Why does it matter? Subjects of the Federation must enjoy equal rights.

Let's open this constitution of a monarch—called the president's constitution—and look up what equal rights the subjects of the Federation have. There is nothing like it there. Let's have a look at the power system. If the president is not chairman of government, we are talking about a presidential republic. The United States look more or less like a presidential republic: there is a president, his administration, in other words a government, and the president is head of government. But the president does not have the right to dissolve parliament. As for us, the president is not head of government, but he has the right to dissolve parliament, to form and dissolve the government. Alright, France has a mixed power system, but the government is formed by a parliamentary majority. Out of interest, the constitution of Spain, which is a monarchy, can be compared with ours; it does not bear comparison, by a long shot. Documents must not be made to fit individuals, for they are not a one time thing to fit a specific occasion—as distinct from the old constitution, the new constitution must be a direct action document. If it is a direct action document the individual will be able to protect himself.

But let us take a look at the draft presidential constitution: How is the individual to protect himself? After all, you know, when some sort of social protection is mentioned, this concept gives me the creeps. A direct action constitution ought to guarantee the political rights and economic liberties, and ought to protect the individual. It ought to guarantee and protect, rather than merely speak of some vague social protection. That is why, well, what can I say: it is also an absurd thing, after all, I know the constitution elaborated by the Constitutional Commission. Yes, there are many amendments here which, incidentally, were voiced in the course of the Congress. It is the president who is the chairman of the Constitutional Commission, none other. Well, it would seem that a Constitutional Commission exists and that its chairman exists—the president—and now the chairman of the Constitutional Commission puts forward his own, alternative draft of the constitution; well, what on earth is this?

[Correspondent] Well, maybe it is the whim of a genius, a flash of inspiration?

[Rutskoy] I do beg your pardon, what whim of a genius? After all, some sort of elementary order must exist at the very least, an elementary order. Show me a state in the world where laws are adopted by the executive authority.

[Correspondent] I cannot think of one at the moment.

[Rutskoy] You cannot, well, it is Russia. What we currently have here is an attempt to effect the adoption of a constitution by the executive authority; we are talking of the basic law of a state, its constitution. What is this Constitutional Assembly? Can someone explain this to me? Where is this norm defined within the existing constitution? There is no such norm providing for a Constitutional Assembly.

Let us now take a look at what has been our experience to date, or let us take a look at the historical experience of other states, and let us see: how was the Constitutional Assembly formed? It was an elective body, just like the Constitutional Commission. What right does a head of administration have to make decisions regarding the constitution? He has been appointed to his post, this head of administration, by the president, for his servility, and yet represents the interests of the whole oblast or kray.

[Correspondent] [passage indistinct].

[[Rutskoy] Let us assume that the head of the Orel Oblast administration has been elected, or that the same is true of the head of administration of Chelyabinsk Oblast. Yes, such a head of administration has a right to represent these interests, because he has been elected by the people of his oblast. Once he has been elected by the oblast people, he has a right to represent the local people's interests. Or people's deputies; once they are elected by the people from a rayon, or oblast, or a national-territorial constituency, then yes, they do have a right to represent the people's interests. The Constitution is not a document for a day; it is designed to last centuries, centuries or decades. You cannot treat it arbitrarily: If I want, I will satisfy its demands, and if I do not I will break them.

Let me tell you: All the troubles our state is currently experiencing are a consequence of the fact that a concept of obeying the law is absent as far as society is concerned. There is no equality of rights within society in the face of the law, irrespective of your official function or social position in society. Everything that is taking place in our country is just this. Otherwise things would be fabulous

in this country. If we obeyed the laws and implemented them, we would have quite an agreeable life. I did give examples. Just try and break the law concerning the freedom of trade in the United States, just try to manipulate the prices, and so on and so forth. Punishment is swift and inevitable. Or else this question: Show me just one parliament in the world where a minister is asked to attend hearings concerning his activities and he refuses to go. Is there such a state in the world? The next day he would be removed from his post, but in our country it is different—feel free, do go ahead. Show me a state in the world where the parliament invites the president to give an account for the past 6-12 months, but the president simply ignores this and fails to turn up. Is there such a state in the world?

I did ask U.S. congressmen, who so fervently support us now in our economic and democratic reforms, I did ask them: Your Congress has invited the president and he did not turn up; what do you do? Well, there is no knowing where it might end. I say: Why, then, do you support what is taking place in our country in a situation in which the law is being totally ignored by the head of state, and which ends by being ignored by ministers and the executive authority, the non-fulfilment of the laws. Or I asked them this question: It would seem you support economic reforms. Do define the basic principles of economic reforms. They all just looked at me. Why do you look at me, I do not know. I say: Alright, define the main principles of democratic reforms in the Russian Federation. Again silence. I say: What is the matter? We do not know. I say: What then do you lend your support to?

[Correspondent] Perhaps the figurehead, the name, the image?

[Rutskoy] You see, all of these games end in tears. That is the truth of the matter.

[Correspondent] That is just what I wanted to ask you, about how these games might end? Newspapers of both the right and the left, without distinction—there is no need to even look at their titles—are now writing about a civil war. This in itself already demonstrates that civil war is perhaps already going on in our souls. But in reality, do you perceive this as a threat? What is your reaction to this?

[Rutskoy] When any political figure acts in such a way as to divide society into ours and not one of us—or as Gennadiy Eduardovich [Burbulis] said, whoever is not with us is against us—this is the first symptom of people and society being nudged toward civil disobedience. After civil disobedience comes the use of force, and it is from this that armed opposition arises. But let us examine the results of the referendum. I remember very well how Vladimir Fillipovich Shumeyko said: The results of the referendum are not the main thing. The main thing is how this referendum is interpreted. So let's try and interpret it. One hundred and seven million citizens have the right to vote. Sixty five percent of these go to vote, and of this 65 percent, 35 million express their support; so if we subtract 35 million from 107 million, then we arrive at a figure of 72 million.

So, what can we glean from this? I would say that of this 35 million, half of them were taken in. Do you recall the programs that were shown. Some 99.9 percent of them were simply a show in favor of saying yes, yes, and yes again.

[Correspondent] Yes, here...

[Rutskoy, interrupting] We need to look at this percentage as well. Now we have to look at the 72 million, those who did not vote or voted against. These people are opposed to reform, are they? No. They are not opposed to reform. They are in favor of a normal, human existence. Can they be simply expunged from society? No. And as this whole situation grows more tense, and in the media there are attempts at this sort of out and out provocation, this is nothing less than people being taken for fools, and an attempt to push through this constitution. If this succeeds and the principle of the majority is destroyed in the interests of a minority who want to push through this constitution, then I can give you a 100-percent guarantee that acts of civil disobedience will start. I am 100 percent sure they will start. Therefore, this must not happen.

The president, as the head of the Constitutional Commission, must be the head of this Commission. He must take both his draft and the draft of the Constitutional Commission and draw up a normal draft which corresponds to democratic principles. Then we will have some sort of order here. At the top of this, we must place the principle that the law is above all else, not that any individuals can be above the law. It was Benito Mussolini who said that someone elected by the people is above the law, and we can remember what this meant and how it ended, so this should not happen.

[Correspondent] Yes, yes.

[Rutskoy] Therefore, this should not happen. The law and democratic principles. That is all. Then we will live as we should and we will have enough of everything. We are wealthy, wealthy beyond our dreams. Then we will be able to dispose of what belongs to Russia in the interests of individuals, and in the interests of society, and taken as a whole this will be in the interests of the state.

Fedorov: Economic Policy Being Drafted for IMF

LD2005141793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0605 GMT 20 May 93

[Text] Representatives of the Russian Government and the Russian Central Bank are drafting a statement for the International Monetary Fund on economic policy in 1993. This was announced at a meeting with journalists by Boris Fedorov, Russian vice premier and finance minister. He noted that the pace of economic reform and the possibility of the International Monetary Fund's

opening a special credit facility for Russia totalling $3 billion do, on the whole, depend on the content of the statement and its possible signing by the Government and the Russian Central Bank. Fedorov explained that the credit departs from the International Monetary Fund's normal practice, in that it is to be granted without the detailed vetting of economic policy and prior to the signing of a proper agreement with Russia. According to him, there is a real possibility of obtaining the first $1.5 billion of that credit on about 1 July and the remainder in September or October.

Fedorov Denies Seeking Chairmanship of Central Bank

PM2005124393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 19 May 93 p 1

["Own Information" report under the "In the Government" rubric: "Boris Fedorov Is Not After the Central Bank Leadership"]

[Text] "I have never submitted, nor do I intend to submit in the future, an application for the post of chairman of the Central Bank," B. Fedorov, vice premier of the Russian Government and minister of finance, told a ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent.

In the vice premier's view, the differences of opinion between his department and the Central Bank leadership are connected not with specific personalities, but with the policy being conducted by the bank. This was quite clearly a reference to the direct inflationary financing of loss-making enterprises, the unjustified allocation of resources via ruble emission, and the practical subsidizing of certain CIS republics, which B. Fedorov himself has opposed on numerous occasions.

At the same time, the vice premier did not rule out the possibility of personnel reshuffles at the Central Bank, as the referendum results have shown that Russians are unhappy with the stance being taken up by the board of the Central Bank at parliament's bidding. "If the Central Bank is going to help the government implement economic reforms, then I am prepared to cooperate with whoever is in charge of it," the vice premier concluded.

Foreign Trade Turnover Examined

LD2105102393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0948 GMT 21 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow May 21 TASS—Russia's foreign trade turnover during the January-April period of 1993 is 15.6 billion U.S. dollars which is 29 per cent less than for the corresponding period of 1992. Its trade ties with the former CEMA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries were at their lowest, but the volume of trade with China has risen by 20 per cent, states an analytical review of Russia's State Statistical Committee circulated in parliament today.

Exports from Russia have gone down by one per cent during the January-April period of this year, totalling 10.6 billion dollars, but a tendency towards growth has been observed during the past two months.

In April export supplies brought a profit of 3.6 billion dollars which is 14 per cent more than in April 1992. In particular, machine-building supplies have gone up by 11 per cent with receipts amounting to over a billion dollars.

Russia's imports were cut by 52 per cent during January-April 1993 in comparison with the same period of 1992, although this is over five billion dollars. Coffee and tea purchases abroad went down over three times, as did poultry. Imports of textiles, knitwear, leather shoes, furniture and medicine have also been reduced.

Supreme Soviet

Alternative Offered to Constitutional Conference

MK2105085693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 May 93 p 1

[Unattributed NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA report under the rubric "In Brief": "Supreme Soviet Creates Own Conference"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet yesterday once and for all declined to take part in the work of the Constitutional Conference the president has set for 5 June. This idea was suggested 14 May by Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Nikolay Ryabov and supported by chairmen of both houses of parliament. Ruslan Khasbulatov objected to the idea then, and his attitude toward it did not change yesterday. The speaker, however, cautioned that "unwise decisions will not be made here," and therefore proposed to the Supreme Soviet a draft decree on setting up some sort of a constitutional-consultative structure whose powers will be limited to advising the president, the Constitutional Commission, and the Supreme Soviet. This decree is likely to be adopted today.

'Substantially' Restructuring Leadership Viewed

MK2105090093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No 18, 21 May 93 (signed to press 20 May) p 1

[Yelena Afanasyeva, Dmitriy Volkov report under the "Referendum" rubric: "Parliament Leadership: The Boss Is Asked To Give Way"]

[Text] Yesterday the Russian parliament discussed an initiative proposed by part of its own leadership. Deputy parliament chairmen Nikolay Ryabov, Ramazan Abdulatipov, and Veniamin Sokolov sought to have parliament repeat the trick it used in calling a referendum on confidence in the president. Now, as then, the masters of parliamentary tactics are trying to wrest initiative from the president and shift the struggle into the lobbies.

Nikolay Ryabov's proposal boils down to "ensuring parity" with the president when forming the constitutional conference. It seems that this nuclear missile terminology contains a fuse—Ryabov is proposing parity of representation on the part of the president and parliament, while democratically insisting that political parties—which should be "recommended by deputy factions"—should take part in the conference. It is hard to believe that more than two or three of the 14 factions would propose liberals as participants in the constitutional conference.

However, this move—so far the best of those up the Soviet's sleeve—is coming up against two obstacles. First, the presidential side is clearly stating that it intends to retain the draft prepared under Shakhray's guidance as a basis for discussion. And the administration is not going to allow parliament to have any advantage in any form during its discussion. Second, the intransigents led by Ruslan Khasbulatov are still hoping for a "decisive battle."

Meanwhile Veniamin Sokolov has called for parliament to start operating on a shift-work regime, which is necessary in order to keep it in a state of "high combat readiness." It is proposed that the deputies would not have their summer vacations at the same time, with groups of parliamentarians going on vacation, so as to ensure the requisite quorum. Sokolov and others must be hoping that Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vladimir Isakov will not miss the opportunity of taking a rest.

Sokolov urged the deputies to "salvage the idea of parliamentarism"—presumably from the effusive speaker. In all likelihood, the Supreme Soviet will soon start discussing the prospects of substantially restructuring its leadership. On 20 May the president's edict on the convocation of the constitutional conference was not published, apparently owing to the unstable mood within the parliamentary leadership.

Ruslan Khasbulatov told Arab [as published] journalists that Nikolay Ryabov in no way split the leadership of the Supreme Soviet. He reiterated, however, that he would not accept "unconstitutional methods of adopting the new constitution," rejecting the idea of calling a constitutional conference.

Anti-Yeltsin coalition leader Vladimir Isakov stated that Nikolay Ryabov "has shifted allegiance and sided with the president, whom he regards as a victor." According to Isakov, neither he nor the other deputies can assume responsibility for adopting the new constitution since they "have been discredited by the referendum results," which were predetermined by "the campaign in the press."

Decrees on Opinions on Constitution Viewed

PM2105091593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 May 93 First Edition p 2

[INTERFAX report: "Parliament Takes as Basis a Document Which Does Not Mention President's Draft Constitution"]

[Text] On 20 May the Russian parliament examined two alternative draft resolutions on the procedure for considering the proposals of the subjects of the Federation on the draft of the new Constitution.

One of these documents has been prepared by the Constitutional Commission, the other has been approved by Nikolay Ryabov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet and deputy chairman of the Constitutional Commission.

At the insistence of Ruslan Khasbulatov and Constitutional Commission Executive Secretary Oleg Rumyantsev, the Supreme Soviet has adopted as its basis the draft of its decree prepared by the Constitutional Commission. A working commission has been formed for further work on the two alternative documents,

At R. Khasbulatov's suggestion, the working commission has been joined by O. Rumyantsev, N. Ryabov, M. Chelnokov, and V. Isakov.

The decree adopted as a basis suggests that the representatives of the organs of the subjects of the Federation in conjunction with the executive organs and public associations, examine the draft of the new Constitution prepared by the Constitutional Commission and submit their comments and proposals to the Supreme Soviet.

The alternative draft decree of the Supreme Soviet, prepared by N. Ryabov, suggested that the representatives of the organs of the subjects of the Federation examine the two versions of the draft Constitution, including proposals by the president and submit their remarks and proposals to the Supreme Soviet before 1 June. The president and Supreme Soviet in conjunction with the subjects of the Federation are asked to form a constitutional conference by 5 June.

Under the draft decree of the Supreme Soviet proposed by Ryabov, the task of the Constitutional conference includes preparing a single draft of the new Constitution and elaborating recommendations to the Supreme Soviet on the procedure for adopting the Constitution. It is also proposed to instruct the Committee for Legislation in conjunction with the Constitutional Commission to submit to the Supreme Soviet by 15 June a draft decree on the procedure for the nationwide discussion of a single draft of the new Constitution.

During the discussion of this question on 20 May at the parliament session R. Khasbulatov stressed that the Supreme Soviet "has only one version of the draft

Constitution, prepared by the Constitutional Commission. All the others, whatever their provenance, can only be seen as an addition to it."

Commission Official on Draft Constitution

LD1905173193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1626 GMT 19 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow May 19 TASS—Executive Secretary of the Russian Constitutional Commission Oleg Rumyantsev told a news conference at the parliament today he has offered head of the Presidential Staff Sergey Filatov to return to the official draft Russian Constitution.

In the opinion of Rumyantsev, it is "unreal to blend incompatible" - the presidential draft fundamental law with its "disbalance of powers" and the draft prepared by the Constitutional Commission. Rumyantsev again accused draft author Sergey Shakhray of creating a constitution for "jacobinic dictatorship".

Asked by ITAR-TASS whether he thinks the Supreme Soviet's inquiry to the Constitutional Court on constitutionality of presidential actions on constitutional preparations is doomed to failure, he gave an evasive answer.

Rumyantsev recognized the president's right to convene consultation meetings, which is the constitutional conference scheduled for June 5, but expressed fears "revolutionaries will try to give the constitutional conference a status of constituent".

Leaders Close To 'Compromise' With Yeltsin

PM2105092593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 20 May 93 p 1

[Article by Feliks Babitskiy: "Revolt in the Supreme Soviet?"]

[Text] With unconcealed amazement observers state that support for the idea of a Constituent Assembly is visibly waning. Even S.A. Filatov, head of the president's administration, said the day before yesterday that the new Russian Federation Constitution can only be adopted by another referendum or by Congress.

What has happened, then, since the April referendum to make the reformers' views change so drastically?

I think there has been only one change: In contrast to the prereferendum period we are **now** directly faced with the prospect of convening a constituent assembly. **Now** it is no longer just wishful thinking. As one late politician used to say, the "process is under way." And what do we see? All efforts by Moscow politicians to convene a more representative forum than the Congress of People's Deputies encounters **gentle, but firm resistance** on the part of the majority of Federation members. But this surprises no one. Since each of them is a sovereign entity, it must have a diplomatic mission in Moscow. And since there is no provision for such things in the existing constitution, the role is temporarily performed by associations of deputies from the particular areas, often headed (at the Fifth Congress, anyway) by the top person in the region, for example: Galazov, Aushev, Stepanov, Tuleyev, Nozhikov—no room to name them all. Given this, can the body of deputies be ignored? In fact, while to us the Congress is a "communist congress," to the members of the Federation it is a "big bosses' roundtable"...

So it transpires that even a new referendum is no solution for the president, and he will very likely have to take his draft fundamental law to the Cognress. But the other question is: Will the Congress bury it?

Not necessarily. Moreover, the parliamentary leadership is now closer than ever to a compromise with the executive authority on the constitutional question. According to the Supreme Soviet Presidium, there is one barrier between it and the president, and that is Ruslan Khasbulatov. All his deputies and the speakers in both chambers have effectively united against him beneath the banner of the Supreme Soviet's participation in the work of the Constitutional Conference to be convened by the president.. Each has his own motives. To convinced communist Veniamin Sokolov the struggle against Khasbulatov is merely an extension of the struggle against the "hydra of world imperialism." Wise courtiers Nikolay Ryabov and Yuriy Voronin have had their eyes on their chief's chair for a long time. Ramazan Abdulatipov and Vladimir Ispravnikov are in fact ideological supporters of the political compromise. But put together they are possibly an even greater threat to Ruslan Imranovich than the rebel "six" were to B.N. Yeltsin.

The aforementioned Supreme Soviet leaders' sincere desire for constructive dialogue with the president's side is indicated by the following fact. Neither Yeltsin himself, nor any of his circle had officially invited the body of deputies to participate in the Constitutional Conference. They had merely expressed the idea that participation would be a reasonable option. Then our heroes, without waiting for an invitation, effectively took the initiative themselves, their reason being that time was running out and the country was already on the brink of civil war. Although, at that moment, the majority of their colleagues did not support them. But in the first place that was the majority of the Supreme Soviet, not the Congress, and in the second place: Is it as stable as some people think?

In my view, an antipresidential majority—like any other majority, actually—is created in our parliament through simple manipulation. The basic method is to deprive the deputy of information. He will not receive the working documents for a particular session, or even the agenda, which may be arbitrarily changed. Not to mention the way they play around with the six microphones. Naturally the parliamentary majority, which is not distinguished by its firm beliefs, votes like sheep in conditions

like that. It is easy to control such a parliament, and the result of the vote depends on who is doing the controlling.

In this connection, the blocking of Ruslan Khasbulatov by his own entourage up to and including the 10th Congress could turn out to be much more of an advantage for the president's side than a multichamber Constituent Assembly, let alone another expensive referendum.

Inactivity Results as Deputies 'Ponder' Future

MK2005104693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 May 93 p 1

[Ivan Rodin report under the rubric "Supreme Soviet of Russia": "To Agree or Disagree With Yeltsin's Proposal? Deputies Ponder the Future]

[Text] As is known, differences flared up 14 May among members of the Presidium and Supreme Soviet of people's deputies [as published] over Nikolay Ryabov's proposal to approve the president's idea for a constitutional conference and to take part in it. Obviously, no concord had been reached among parliament leaders by 17 May; therefore the Presidium did not sit that day. Thus, no general line was proposed for the current week, for which reason the Soviet of the Republic held a closed-door conference on organizing the work of the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium.

Veniamin Sokolov, chairman of the chamber, said that he and several other persons had been expecting a session of the Presidium on 17 May, and they still wonder why it did not take place. According to Mr. Sokolov, a "demobilization period" had started in the Supreme Soviet in the wake of the referendum, and the greater part of the deputies fell to pondering over their future.

Debates ensued at which the participants listed the transgressions of parliament, the Presidium and of its press service. Deputy Galushko declared that the problem, first and foremost, concerned the person of the top leader—in other words, Ruslan Khasbulatov—whose will, the speaker thought, deputies apparently could not resist. Yevgeniy Ambartsumov said that the Supreme Soviet's lawmaking activity did not match society's interests, and that it should devote the remaining several months of its existence to seeking concord. The speakers, however, touched both on intraparliamentary and constitutional problems. Some of them supported the idea of a Constitutional Conference (Domnina) while others (Isakov) did not. The latter stated that "we are being invited to take part in anticonstitutional cooperation." The discussion was concluded by Veniamin Sokolov, who proposed a closed-door Supreme Soviet session to be fully devoted to the problem of reforming parliament and increasing its activity.

Khasbulatov Suggests Lowering Taxes

LD2005184693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1734 GMT 20 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Filipov]

[Text] Moscow May 20 TASS—Russian Parliamentary Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov has suggested that deputies discuss and adopt two draft bills next week concerning the regulation of economic relations in the country.

According to Khasbulatov, under the first bill, all kinds of taxes, including the value added tax levied on manufacturers in Russia, are to be reduced by 50 per cent. The law is to be in effect for one year.

Another new law, banning Russian exporters from making payments in foreign currency, is to be in effect for the same period of time, Khasbulatov said.

He emphasised that "all currency should go to the state treasury." First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Parliament Yuriy Voronin and corresponding committees and commissions of the Russian Parliament have been instructed to prepare the draft bill.

Further on 19 May Parliament Session

LD2005140793

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1945 GMT on 19 May broadcasts at 25-minute recorded report on the 19 May session of the Russian Supreme Soviet held in Moscow.

The program starts with the Soviet of the Nationalities. Yevgeniy Belyayev, chairman of the Committee for Sanitary Epidemics Supervision, reports on the worsening public health difficulties and increasing occurrences of various diseases, such as tuberculosis.

Draft amendments to existing legislation on arbitration tribunals and on customs procedures are then submitted by the deputy chairman of the supreme arbitration tribunal and approved. They aim to clarify the arbitration procedure when a business goes bankrupt and to close some loopholes in the levying of customs duty.

Deputy Defense Minister Mironov reports on the Army's recruitment difficulties. He describes the staffing situation as catastrophic, citing figures to make his point.

A draft law on noncommercial organizations, for example, to prevent abuses by supposedly charitable bodies, is then submitted by Aleksey Nikolayevich Mananikov. The draft is rejected.

Aleksandr Albertovich Vishnyakov, chairman of a subcommission of the commission for transport, communications, information technology, and space, submits a draft resolution requesting price rises for communications services.

The Soviet of the Nationalities then ends its sitting for the day. The recording then goes over to the Soviet of the Republics.

Vladimir Mazayev is elected chairman of the new Economic Reform Commission and gives a speech of thanks.

Yevgeniy Belyayev goes on to report on proposed measures to bolster Russia's public health system in 1993-95. A resolution to this effect is passed.

Deputy Defense Minister Mironov reports on recruitment and then field deputies' questions.

Following the question and answer session, Aleksandr Vishnyakov submits the same draft resolution on communications as in the Soviet of the Nationalities. The resolution is passed.

Amendments to legislation on arbitration tribunals and customs procedures are then submitted—as earlier submitted to the Soviet of the Nationalities—and approved.

New Reform Board To Be Tougher on Privatization

MK2105081093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 20 May 93 p 9

[Dmitriy Kamin report: "Chairman of New Supreme Soviet Commission Appointed. Economic Reforms Will be Supervised by a Jurist"]

[Excerpts] The Committee for Issues of Economic Reform and Property has ceased to exist as a result of reform inside the Russian parliament. Its chairman, ever since a democratic Supreme Soviet began work, was Sergey Krasavchenko. The committee's corresponding rules-and-standards-setting functions have been transferred to the newly created Commission for Economic Reform under the Soviet of the Republic. Yesterday, the Soviet of the Republic elected Deputy Vladimir Mazayev chairman of this commission, thus warning of serious changes in preparing a legislative base for the reforms.

Vladimir Mazayev, 38, is a jurist by education. He graduated from Voronezh University in 1978, and defended a thesis for the degree of candidate. Prior to his election in 1990 to the Congress of People's Deputies, he taught Western public law at the Volgograd Higher School of Investigation under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Since 1991, he has fulfilled the duties of deputy chairman of the Supreme Economic Council under the Russian Supreme Soviet Presidium. [passage omitted]

The election of the chairman of one of the leading commissions of parliament began to draw heightened interest after Veniamin Sokolov openly sided with Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Vladimir Ryabov, who challenged the speaker's opinion and supported the president's proposal to call a constitutional assembly.

It is therefore not without Ruslan Khasbulatov's active participation that Vladimir Mazayev scored a confident victory in the voting during yesterday's session of the chamber. Mr. Mazayev's higher professional level and the prestige of Vladimir Ispravnikov as Supreme Soviet deputy chairman in charge of issues of economic reform also played a part in this decision. Observers predict that the new commission under Mazayev will take a tougher stance toward the government's privatization strategy owing both to its chairman's being a legal expert and the powerful newly emerging legislative lineup of Ispravnikov, Mazayev, and the Commission for Economic Reform.

More on Defense, Security Committee Press Conference

PM2005142793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 May 93 First Edition p 1

[Aleksandra Lugovskaya report: "Readiness for Compromise With President Developing Within Parliament"]

[Text] A press conference on the adoption of the Declaration of Accord in the Name of Russia's Security was held at the Russian White House 18 May. The initiative for elaborating it came from the parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security Questions.

S. Stepashin, chairman of the Committee, told journalists that the declaration is open for signing by all political, social, and other organizations and individuals except those who adhere to extreme, "Anpilovite views." The document has already been signed by several parliamentary leaders: N. Ryabov, R. Abdulatipov, V. Sokolov, V. Ispravnikov, Vice Premier Yu. Yarov, Academicians D. Likhachev and N. Laverov, and leaders of such social organizations as the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, the Defense Enterprises Aid League, the Association of Russian Cities, and the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.

The document stresses that the further destabilization of the political situation in Russia, which has a vast arms potential, could have catastrophic consequences.

It was noted at the press conference that the declaration serves as the basis not for the formation of a new centrist political bloc but for the elaboration of the rules of an honest political game. The unstable constitutional process, inflation, corruption, and crime are regarded as the main problems posing a threat to Russia's security. The Declaration contains an appeal for a moratorium on rallies and demonstrations until the end of the year.

Addressing the press conference, N. Ryabov, deputy chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, stated that in this instance we are dealing with Russian society's self-preservation, but "the fate of Russia is in Russia's own hands."

Answering IZVESTIYA's question on what prompted him to support in parliament the president's initiative on

the constitutional process, N. Ryabov talked about the need to take account of the realities of life and the results of the referendum: "I can see that the old line of the parliament and Congress needs to be adjusted." He called the continuation of parliament's course of confrontation with the president and thus with a section of the Russian population "madness which will lead to parliament's self-destruction."

N. Ryabov hopes that the question of reconciling the positions of the president and the parliament on the constitutional path will be placed on the Supreme Soviet agenda next week. He also expects initiatives from the president in the form of a statement or appeal to the Supreme Soviet and the components of the Federation because "accord cannot be achieved by means of an edict." N. Ryabov announced that on the eve of his speech in parliament he and R. Abdulatipov had a 40-minute conversation with President Yeltsin "to ascertain the president's readiness for countermoves to achieve rapprochement."

The deputy speaker said that the adoption of the new Constitution through the sequence of the "Constitutional Commission-Supreme Soviet-Congress" is not viable because we will again become bogged down in disagreements with the components of the Federation and waste time. N. Ryabov thinks that the deadlock can be resolved by, for example, all the interested sides' agreeing to set up a conference in parliament on questions of preparing the new Russian Constitution (the Constitutional Conference).

N. Ryabov hopes that after specific comments from the components of the Federation and most of the members of the Supreme Soviet R. Khasbulatov will also change his unambiguous position on the president's initiative.

Defense Official: Army on 'Survival' Footing

LD2005135193 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1945 GMT 19 May 93

[From the "At the Russian Supreme Soviet" program]

[Text] A resolution of the Russian Supreme Soviet was submitted to the Soviet of Nationalities on certain measures connected with implementation of the law of the Russian Federation on obligatory military service and military duty. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Valeriy Ivanovich Mironov reported to the Supreme Soviet.

[Begin Mironov recording] The Ministry of Defense believes that the top priority for the Russian Armed Forces in the current situation is to resolve recruitment difficulties. The situation, to be absolutely honest, is catastrophic, and I would like to cite some figures to back up my point.

As of 1 January this year, there were 1,814,000 persons of conscriptable age on the military register. Under the Law of the Russian Federation on Obligatory Military Service and Military Duty, which increased the number of categories of persons not subject to military call-up and was passed on 11 February, only 299,000 persons, or 16.5 percent of the total, can be called up to serve in the Russian armed services and the forces of other ministries and government departments during the year. This means that the military can meet less than 13 percent of its total recruitment requirement, even as deep cuts are being made to the Army and Navy. I must say that this state of affairs is unknown anywhere else in the world. Suffice it to say that the main NATO countries, even those that have alternatives to military service, can conscript from 50 to 80 percent of those available every year. Even if the spring call-up target is met, manning levels in the armed forces will be only 51.2 percent, the Interior Ministry troops 62.4 percent, the border troops 90 percent, the railway troops 31.4 percent, VOPSI [acronym as heard] units 75.5 percent, and civil defense units 31.9 percent.

This means that the shortfall of rank-and-file soldiers and sailors, sergeants and senior NCOs, and military construction troops comes to 707,000 men. The Interior Ministry troops are 77,600 men short, and border troops about 14,000 short.

This state of affairs makes an already ominous trend even worse; that is, the number of people evading the call-up to military service. Last year, a total of 30,000 dodged the draft. Of them, only 129 were convicted by the law-enforcement agencies. The response of the law-enforcement agencies to this problem is clearly not what it should be. Given the current manning levels of rank-and-file troops and NCO's, most of the combined units and units in the Armed Forces are in fact unable to carry out their normal everyday duties, even to the minimum extent required. Ships on constant duty and strategic rocket units are at the minimum level of combat readiness. The situation on these ships and in these units is actually that NCO's and men spend days at a time on guard and combat duty. The Armed Forces are on a survival, not combat, footing. [end recording]

The debate on the resolution was quite lively. The figures given in Colonel General Mironov's report were regarded by the deputies as disastrous. This spring, just 16.5 percent of young people of conscriptable age will join the ranks of the Russian Army. Many deputies said that the situation is due to the Law on Obligatory Military Service, which they passed. One deputy jokingly renamed it the law on no obligation to do military service. The resolution was passed almost unanimously, because the amendments it proposes should, the deputies think, rectify the deficiencies in the Law on Obligatory Military Service.

Defense Committee's Stepashin Interviewed

MK1905101093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 17, 18 May 93 (Signed to Press 17 May) p 11

[Interview with Sergey Stepashin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security, by

Pavel Felgengauer, published in the "Opinion" column; place and date not given: "Sergey Stepashin. The Last Centrist in the Supreme Soviet?"]

[Text] "Today a platoon commander earns more than a professor. And a surgeon (teacher) makes one-tenth what a regiment commander makes. If there is a crisis in the country, things are no better in the army either. The state's economic possibilities must determine the methods of resolving the issues."

On 30 April the Supreme Soviet passed a decree on setting up a commission of deputies to "investigate the activity of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's Committee on Defense and Security." Committee Chairman Sergey Stepashin in a TV interview declared there was a danger that the committee could be dissolved. On 14 May, however, Khasbulatov, according to Stepashin, disavowed the decree, describing it as "a mistake." Meanwhile reports appeared in the press that Stepashin may be appointed to replace Skokov as secretary of the Security Council....

Prior to being elected people's deputy, Stepashin served in the Internal Affairs Ministry troops. He taught at the Leningrad Internal Affairs Ministry Institute. In 1987-90 together with the cadets he operated in the "hot spots" (Karabakh, Fergana, Sumgait, Sukhumi). He was commandant of a district in Baku. He combined his duties with delivering lectures and giving exams. In 1990 the cadets nominated him as candidate for people's deputy.

After August 1991 he headed a state commission investigating KGB activities. When the commission finished its work, he was appointed deputy general director of the Federal Security Agency—head of the Leningrad City and Oblast Directorate. When the Russian Security Ministry was created, he became deputy minister of security. In September 1991 he was awarded the rank of major general, and a year later lieutenant general ("I wish I had not been. This is too fast for the military."). For nine months he combined his work in the Supreme Soviet committee with his duties in the Russian Ministry of Security. In September 1992 Stepashin tendered his resignation from the committee but the Supreme Soviet judged otherwise: It voted to ask President Yeltsin to assign Stepashin to work in the Supreme Soviet, relieving him of his duties as deputy minister and head of the Security Ministry directorate. "And so the president did. Now I am only the chairman of a committee."

[Felgengauer] In all of the world's stable countries, defense and security usually are not the subject of a bitter interpartisan struggle. Long-term investments in already approved defense doctrines and therefore in military development programs are too large for even the richest country to be able to afford abrupt reversals as the result of a change of government following new elections. Therefore a "nationwide consensus on defense matters" is inevitable. How much has your committee on defense and security succeeded in the search for such a "national consensus"?

[Stepashin] Our committee was formed half a year later than the other committees in the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet. Each committee member was voted on separately, by a roll call ballot. At the time the bulk of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet was made up of "centrists." Therefore our committee included professionals (representatives of the army and security bodies) and politicians of moderate political views. By the way, even now the majority of committee members are not affiliated with any of the parliamentary factions. We, just like the "power" ministries that we oversee, are outside political parties, subject only to the law and the Constitution.

Today, however, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet has been divided into a majority opposed to the president and a minority supporting Yeltsin. Increasingly the criterion for nomination to a position of authority is personal loyalty. The leadership of the Supreme Soviet has already begun "reorganizing" the structure of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet. It needs to be said, however, that in the last few days there has been somewhat less talk about it. On 13 May the Russian Supreme Soviet adopted in a first reading a major law on state secrets, which was prepared by our committee. There was only one abstention during the vote.

We have developed very good working relations with the Defense Ministry, the General Staff, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Security, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and other "power" departments. Fundamental laws have been adopted on defense, on security, on military conscription, and on military service. At present, together with experts from the Defense Ministry and the Security Council, we are devising the foundations of a military doctrine. However, following the appointment of a new secretary of the Security Council (after Skokov), presumably the Security Council apparatus will be changed. Nonetheless, by September the joint group created with the participation of our committee will, apparently, prepare Russia's military doctrine. In line with current legislation, the Russian Federation president will then need to present the doctrine to the Supreme Soviet; that is, of course, provided no serious changes occur in our supreme bodies of government.

[Felgengauer] And do you consider this possibility likely enough?

[Stepashin] I think so, yes, although the best option perhaps would be new elections in spring 1994. Should we succeed in reaching a compromise between the two draft constitutions, the congress for instance would be able to finish its work by adopting at least the basic provisions of the new constitution and a law on elections. Yet the congress may not have time to adopt anything. The constitutional assembly proposed by the president, however, may turn out to be no better either.

[Felgengauer] Ever more fine statesmen are leaving the sinking ship of the Russian parliament: Filatov, Shakhray, and others. It has been reported that you might be appointed secretary of the Security Council....

[Stepashin] This week an edict is due to be published on the appointment of a new Security Council secretary. No one has officially talked with me on this subject. I first learned that I was a "candidate" for the post of secretary from the "Vesti" program, and then from the newspapers.... The fact that my candidacy "suddenly" cropped up in the press, however, points to the efficient and professional work of our committee.

The main trouble about Russia's present political life is the gradual disappearance of centrist factions. We are now trying to restore a centrist association of sorts, having put forward a declaration on the security of the Russian Federation that has already been supported by a number of public and political associations. The position of the "centrist," however, is dangerous: One has to look out for a dirty trick on either side. It is difficult to exist in contemporary Russian politics without an orientation toward some leader.

[Felgengauer] Incidentally, let us turn to the package of military laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet. The leadership of the Armed Forces has more than once publicly expressed its extreme dissatisfaction with Article 21 of the current law on military conscription and on military service (conscription deferrals).

[Stepashin] The committee has done everything to ensure that the Supreme Soviet makes a well-considered decision on deferrals. But that did not happen in February 1993. Now, at the proposal of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, the granting of some deferrals will be postponed until 1995—in particular, deferrals for vocational and special technical school students. At the same time, undergraduates should continue their studies. I will fight for this to the end.

True, the General Staff should also revise its demands in accordance with the manpower resources available. If we have only enough conscripts to man our divisions by no more than 30 to 40 percent, then perhaps we do not need that many divisions in the first place. In an attempt to restore the central strategic group (which was "lost" following the secession of Belarus and Ukraine), undermanned units will often be set down in an "open field" [an area lacking the requisite facilities]. But these undermanned divisions will not "cover" Moscow.

First priority should be given to bringing internal affairs and border troops to full strength. The main threats to Russia's security exist in border areas inside the Federation. The internal affairs troops must be modernized. After all, the bulk of the Internal Affairs Ministry forces today are escort troops (up to 70 percent). It is not appropriate for a conscript to stand in a watch tower in a prison camp. Moreover the present-day system of corrective-labor institutions needs to be reformed. It is unprofitable and it does not correct anybody.

The core of the Internal Affairs Ministry troops should be made up by highly professional rapid reaction units for the maintenance of public order, such as the OMSDON [expansion unknown] Dzerzhinskiy Division, the "Sofrinskaya" (23d special motorized- ifle) brigade. This is where funds and resources should be channeled.

[Felgengauer] You do not seem to be particularly satisfied with the progress of military reform?

[Stepashin] Can you show me a man who is satisfied? I think that Grachev is the most dissatisfied since he knows better than others what is really going on in the Army. The problem therefore consists not so much in the erroneous decisions of the political and military leadership as in the objective difficulties that the country is going through.

As for the military, I think that they should complain less about their social status. After all, today a platoon commander earns more than a professor. And a surgeon (teacher) makes one-tenth what a regiment commander makes. As long as the country is in the grip of a crisis, the situation in the Army cannot be any better. The state's economic possibilities should determine the ways of addressing military issues.

Our committee is doing virtually everything possible within the framework of the existing legislation and the Constitution in order to oversee the military. For three weeks our committee, together with the budget commission, carefully examined the military budget for 1993. The problem here, however, is that it is not clear whether Russia has a budget at all. Prior to the referendum both the Supreme Soviet and the government issued promises worth so many trillions of rubles that the budget is now coming apart at the seams. Therefore it is very difficult to control defense spending.

Our committee also supervises matters relating to cadre policy in the "power" structures, in particular the appointments to high military posts, the conferment of the rank of general and admiral. In accordance with the law, the president is to submit to the Supreme Soviet for approval a single list of military assignments held by top officers. So far, however, it has not been presented.

We receive all the main documents relating to Army reform, and when a military doctrine has been worked out, the Supreme Soviet will need to take the most active role in elaborating a concrete concept of military reform.

[Felgengauer] What is your attitude to the possibility of Russian troops being used in Bosnia?

[Stepashin] The committee is decisively opposed to force being used in dealing with the Bosnian problem. Incidentally, I will be maintaining this position on 20 May at a NATO North Atlantic assembly in Berlin. In Bosnia, the Americans could end up with a second Vietnam. They will not succeed in accomplishing another brilliant operation in Yugoslavia like the one in Kuwait. Any

armed intervention in the Bosnian conflict will deal a direct blow to the prestige of our president, and also to Andrey Kozyrev, who is being attacked from both left and right. It is we Europeans who must be the first to decide what is to be done about Bosnia. It should not be forgotten that the Americans live on another continent.

At the same time, in order to carry out purely peacekeeping functions, Russian troops could be sent to Bosnia—but only volunteers who are willing to go and who possess the requisite qualifications.

[Felgengauer] As far as I know, however, our General Staff opposes in principle any troop contingents being sent to Yugoslavia.

[Stepashin] That is what general staffs are for. It has plenty of its own internal problems. Incidentally, they are reluctant to send troops to Tajikistan as well. Generally speaking, the way to see things is to take a more far-reaching view than the one seen from the windows of the second "white" house in Arbat Square [the Defense Ministry].

[Felgengauer] Is your committee involved in overseeing arms trade?

[Stepashin] My deputy, Piskunov, is actively collaborating with the group headed by People's Deputy Vitebskiy. It is impermissible for the situation with our troops in Georgia to be repeated, when weapons were being sold left and right—to combatants and to whoever was willing to buy them (the prosecutor's office is still investigating this case). Russian weapons must not fall into the hands of aggressive regimes. Western countries, however, are simply not allowing us into the world arms market. All discriminatory restrictions must be removed, including those imposed by Cocom. President Clinton, incidentally, promised to make an appropriate proposal in Congress. If we manage to increase the volume of our arms trade, we will be able to stabilize the situation in the military-industrial complex.

[Felgengauer] What is the situation with the ratification of the START II Treaty? Somehow it was "neglected" in the heat of our political struggles.

[Stepashin] Several hearings have been held, but for the time being we have suspended them. The political situation is such that many, indeed, do not really care about the START II Treaty. On 4 May we reached agreement with a U.S. Senate delegation headed by Senators Nunn and Lugar not to force the process of ratification. True, initially they were visibly surprised when we presented to them in writing our scenario for the possible process of ratification.

[Stepashin] In our opinion, it is necessary even at this stage in the START II ratification process to prepare an additional agreement in the form of a protocol or at least a "gentlemen's agreement" on further reductions, possibly, with the participation of the other three nuclear powers. After all, if START II is implemented in its present form, we will not only have to dismantle the existing strategic weapons systems, but also simultaneously to create new ones, and very costly ones at that—not to mention the cost of destroying the weapons.

In addition, until Ukraine has ratified the START I Treaty and the Lisbon protocol, there can be no question about the ratification of START II. We have information that Ukraine is actively involved with technical issues related to the capability of operating [ovladeniye] and retargeting nuclear weapons. In eight to nine months (possibly a year), in the opinion of experts from the Russian Defense Ministry, they will able to fully acquire the codes and systems of targeting and controlling [systemy navedeniya i upravleniya] strategic weapons. They have the specialists for the job. Meanwhile, recently Kazakhstan has, with increasing attention, been taking stock of the Ukrainian nuclear initiative. Therefore the problem is very serious.

With regard to Ukraine, incidentally, the Americans maintain a very tough line. On 12 May I met with the President's special envoy, Strobe Talbott. He had just visited Ukraine, and it seemed to me that he returned from there quite upset by the results of the talks.

The main thing is that the ratification of the START II Treaty be taken outside the field of the ongoing bitter interparty political struggle in the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and that the process of ratification be fully subordinated to Russia's national interests. Therefore we could be "ripe" for the ratification of START II by the end of 1993, depending, that is, on the development of the political situation in the country.

Regional Affairs

Chernomyrdin Arrives in Ulyanovsk on Regional Tour

LD2105081093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0716 GMT 21 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Milov]

[Text] Ulyanovsk May 21 Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomydrin arrived in Ulyanovsk today for a tour of the region. From the airport Chernomydrin went to the city's center, Lenin Square, where he viewed models of new cross-country vehicles meant for use in villages. The prime minister then went to the left bank of the Volga, where the "Aviastar" aircraft complex is located. The plant was recently turned into a joint-stock company by a decree of President Boris Yeltsin.

Visits Aircraft Plant

LD2105093093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0909 GMT 21 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Milov]

[Text] Ulyanovsk May 21 TASS—Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin examined today morning Russia's

largest aircraft building firm here, which was turned into a joint-stock society almost one and a half years ago in accordance with a decree signed by President Yeltsin. It is now known as the "Aviastar" joint-stock society.

The firm is experiencing substantial difficulties. It is suffering from a chronic ailment—ruptured traditional economic relations, which were formerly overseen by the USSR Defence Ministry. Some of its suppliers are now outside Russia. They are ready to continue cooperating with "Aviastar", but the zigzags of financial policy, the difficulties linked with mutual settlements, and the unpredictibility of the political and economic situation reduce their efforts to nought.

The aircraft builders are worried by the absence of easy credits, high prices for energy-carriers, housing and socio-cultural crisis in the "Aviastar" townlet, accommodating more than 150,000 workers of the plant.

The Russian premier studied attentively all the problems confronting the aircraft builders. This is why the agenda of his stay in Ulyanovsk became even busier than initially planned. He is to look into equally acute problems today afternoon at the construction site of a bridge over the Volga. This double-tier 10-kilometre-long bridge is important not only for the city and the region, but for all of Russia. Railwaymen, who own the old bridge linking western and eastern Russia, are pressing for the organisation of two-way train traffic over it. But this will interrupt motor traffic between the two parts of the city.

Leaders of local collective and state farms, private farm husbandries and heads of district administrations and councils are looking forward to a meeting with the Russian premier at the village of Timiryazevskaya, where the Ulyanovsk Agricultural Research Institute is located. They are concerned with such problems, which have already become traditional, as credits, material and technical supplies, price formation, and mutual settlements between urban and rural areas. The premier's agenda was expanded by a visit to the "Teplichny" state farm, affiliated to the "Sviyaga" agricultural complex, which specialises in the production, processing, storing and marketing of farm products. It supplies Ulyanovsk, a city of 750,000 people, with vegetables, fruits and potatoes at prices that are below the those in other regions of Russia.

Supports Yeltsin Constitution

LD2105153693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1448 GMT 21 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS corresponent Sergey Podyapolskiy]

[Text] Ulyanovsk (Volga region), 21 May—Viktor Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers, has spoken in support of the new presidential draft constitution. Speaking at a conference of heads of administrations and chairmen of the soviets of Ulyanovsk Oblast's rayons, he said that the government can only be efficient if there is a strong supreme power structure. "I like the presidential draft since it will give the government more freedom and the possibility of working without restraints," Viktor Chernomyrdin said.

At the same time, he said that certain points from the other draft constitution should be taken into account. "This should be done I believe, and nobody will oppose this," the prime minister said. "However, we must make decisions quickly because it is impossible to remain in this amorphous state any longer."

Officials React to Yeltsin Draft Constitution

Lobov Fails To Get Backing in Udmurtia

PM2005123593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 19 May 93 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "In the Government" rubric: "Oleg Lobov Meets With Udmurtia Construction Workers"]

[Text] During a two-day trip to Udmurtia Oleg Lobov, first deputy prime minister of Russia and Russian Federation minister of the economy, showed great interest in the situation in the republic's construction complex and visited leading enterprises of the construction industry. He met with city and rayon administration heads, the republic government, and people's deputies of Russia and Udmurtia, and conducted an exchange of views on the draft Russian Federation Constitution. Participants in this meeting, while on the whole expressing approval of the president's initiative, expressed perplexity at the fact that presidential emissaries "in various regions are trying to resolve such responsible questions with such haste." Udmurtia's newspapers, for instance, have only just published the draft Constitution, which means that the republic's inhabitants have not yet had time to make a careful study of the document.

As a result, Oleg Lobov did not manage to secure the support of participants in the regional conference in Izhevsk. They adopted a decision to hand the deputy prime minister a transcript of the debate here, which, its participants assert, contains "many rational ideas."

Shakhray Sums Up Provincial Opinions

LD2105030493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1458 GMT 20 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Khodiy]

[Text] Irkutsk, 20 May—"Russian statehood can now be saved by subjects of the Federation, if they realize their common state interests," said Sergey Shakhray, deputy prime minister of the Russian Government, answering an ITAR-TASS correspondent's questions after today's discussion of the draft Russian constitution at the regional conference in Irkutsk.

Similar conferences have already been held in the northwestern, central, and far eastern regions, and tomorrow

one will be held in the western Siberian region. This enables the deputy head of government to sum up a few preliminary results of the examination of the document in the provinces.

"The first striking thing," he noted, "is the interest shown by the participants at the discussions in working in a constructive spirit. They are increasingly demanding that the federal bodies of authority carry out constitutional reform as soon as possible. There is a growing understanding in the regions that dual authority and the resulting anarchy in the state threaten the state with disintegration and that constitutional reform is closely linked with economic reform. In any case, we have not heard anyone say: 'Put aside the constitution and look after the economy!'"

The deputy prime minister's second conclusion from his meetings in various parts of Russia is as follows: There is active support for the president's proposal to bring closer together and join the two draft constitutions—his current constitution and the one that has "become stuck" in the Constitutional Commission—and to come up with a single draft as a result.

"There is approval, too, for another of the president's initiatives—to convene a constitutional assembly at the beginning of June," Sergey Shakhray continued. "This is expected to consist of five chambers: representatives of federal bodies of authority and administration, representatives of bodies of authority and administration of Federation subjects, representatives of local government, representatives of public movements, political parties, trade unions, and religious beliefs, and representatives of goods producers and entrepreneurs."

The most discussion—and this reflects the real-life situation, the deputy prime minister believes—is prompted by the question: Who is to adopt the constitution? In his view the congress—617 deputies of which recently voted to remove the president from his post—is unlikely to be capable of doing so.

The options of a national plebiscite or a constitutuent assembly remain, Sergey Shakhray stressed.

Bashkir Parliament Criticizes Draft

MK1905093693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 93 p 3

[Unattributed report under the rubric "NEGA Reports"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet Presidium of Bashkortostan has adopted a special decree on the draft constitution of the Russian Federation proposed by the president.

Offering only "faint praise" for the draft, the Republic of Bashkortostan Supreme Soviet Presidium harshly criticizes its drawbacks. "The draft completely ignores the issue of the rights of peoples," the decree says. In the view of Bashkortostan's parliamentarians, "it takes no account of the declaration on state sovereignty of the Russian Federation" which proclaims as one of the supreme goals of Russia's sovereignty the granting to each nation of the inalienable right to self-determination "in the national-state, and national-cultural forms it selects." The first section of the draft "practically reduces to nothing the corresponding provision of the Federation Treaty that touches on the nature of the republics' state systems, their sovereignty, and territorial integrity, on guarantees of their economic rights, and the procedure for the introduction of a state of emergency and martial law, and many other issues." It also "negates the treaty-and-constitution-based nature of the development of the Russian Federation." The decree stresses that "in the future the constitutional process should be based on the drafts proposed both by the president and the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, that the procedure for the adoption of the fundamental law of the Russian Federation should be effected within the framework of Russia's current Constitution, and that any unconstitutional path is unacceptable to the Republic of Bashkortostan as a sovereign state within the Russian Federation.

Far Eastern Representatives Voice Support

LD1905162693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1534 GMT 19 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Vostokov]

[Text] Khabarovsk May 19 TASS—The presidential draft new Russian constitution was basically approved today by the majority of Far Eastern territorial representatives at a regional conference in Khabarovsk.

The conference was attended by delegations from the Amur, Kamchatka, Magadan, Sakhalin and Jewish autonomous regions, the Khabarovsk and Maritime territories and the Koryak and Chukchi autonomous districts.

Russian Vice-Premier Sergey Shakhray told the conference: "The president is facing two tasks: one to preserve the unity and integrity of the Russian state and the other to overcome the power paralysis and dyarchy.

"Each of the tasks is solved in this or that way in the presidential draft constitution, and this is its major distinguishing feature and conceptual peculiarity".

The conference voiced some remarks on essential aspects of the draft constitution. Conference speakers said powers of Federation subjects and the center should be more clearly specified, Federation subjects should be given equal possibilities, mechanisms of power restraint and counterbalance should be outlined more clearly and economic articles of the new constitution should be enhanced.

Mordovian Conference Says Draft 'Acceptable'

LD2005111593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1730 GMT 19 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksey Papeta]

[Text] Saransk, 19 May—Those attending a conference convened today at the initiative of Mordovian President Vasiliy Guslyannikov deemed the Russian president's draft constitution as acceptable for adoption, on the whole, in the near future.

Press and Information Minister Mikhail Fedotov, a member of the Presidential commission for completing the draft, who was invited to attend the meeting, noted, among other things, that the presidential draft stipulated a unified system of power in which the president is not a dictator but only head of state. Touching upon the procedure for adopting the constitution, the minister voiced the thought that, perhaps, holding a special nationwide referendum would be the best option.

Views of the need to work thoroughly on proposals related to interaction between the federal center with the federation's subjects were aired at the conference. Participants in the meeting said that they supported and approved the option of the constitution being adopted not by the congress and appealed to the population to participate actively in discussing it in order to remove shortcomings and attain consensus on vexing questions.

Regional Reaction Viewed

MK2105093693 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No 18, 21 May 93 (signed to press 20 May) p 2

[Vladimir Todres commentary under the "Regions" rubric: "Provinces Choose To Wait it Out. Local Soviets Again Suggest Yeltsin, Khasbulatov Reconcile Their Constitutions"]

[Text] The week of sessions of local representative power bodies—oblast soviets, kray soviets, and the supreme soviets of the former autonomies—have not been a source of joy either for the Yeltsin or the Khasbulatov camp. The local parliaments have gotten together for one and the same reason—the day of the constitutional conference promised by the president is drawing near. The official couriers, after taking a good rest over the long holiday, have already delivered copies of the presidential draft constitution across the regions. The players of the Kremlin team themselves have traveled up and down the motherland: Lobov went to Izhevsk and Yekaterinburg, Chubays and Volkov to Syktyvkar, Filatov to Ryazan, and the omnipresent Shakhray to Irkutsk and Novosibirsk via Ryazan and Khabarovsk. Ruslan Khasbulatov—presumably due to a shortage of trusted representatives—chose to conduct a counter-propaganda campaign by himself: In a 19 May phone conference he urged the session participants not to yield to the president's reckless, adventurous plans, but to support the Congress.

The provincial bosses, however, again refused to take either side in the barricade battles between the authorities in the capital.

The Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan on 17 May refused to include the discussion on draft constitutions in the agenda altogether, although, according to Tatarstan parliament speaker Farid Mukhametshin, prior to the session the faction leaders had agreed to "briefly discuss this question."

In Izhevsk, the Udmurtiya leaders discussed the constitutional conflict with Oleg Lobov, but flatly refused to approve the presidential draft, agreeing merely to send the minutes of the meeting to Yeltsin.

The position of the majority of the regional authorities was again articulated most clearly by the main "mavericks"—Yakutia, Karelia, Komi, and Buryatia: None of the present drafts answers the republics' needs since they "fail to correspond to the basic provisions of the Federation Treaty." Yakutiya President Mikhail Nikolayev said that both of them are good as "documents for abolishing the existing state, but neither of them can serve as foundations for genuine freedom." The conflicting sides in Moscow must merge the two drafts into one and have it adopted by constitutional method (in other words, at a Congress session).

The kray and oblast authorities are not particularly enthusiastic over the Kremlin's appeals. In Ryazan, Shakhray managed to talk the regional conference of 13 oblasts in Central Russia into supporting the president's efforts: The "Rumyantsev" draft was deemed "too bulky," while Yeltsin's draft was seen as "constructive and concrete," noting that "in the current political situation the making of constitutional decisions may not be the sole prerogative of the Congress." Nevertheless, in the next place Shakhray visited—Novosibirsk—the deputy prime minister was not accorded a very cordial welcome: Oblast Soviet Chairman Sychev judged, quite reasonably, that "the question is not about the drafts but about the personalities standing behind them," while the deputies again demanded that Moscow come up with a single draft and a legitimate method of adopting it.

Sychev's Irkutsk counterpart, Viktor Ignatenko, believes that "no constitution will be a full-fledged document until it has first been initialed and then ratified by all Federation components."

Nonetheless, the chances are that the constitutional conference scheduled by Yeltsin will be summoned after all: Despite being noncommittal about the idea as such, kray and oblast leaders nonetheless are receiving from their deputies the power "to represent their oblasts at all conferences on constitutional matters," which is not at all surprising. This is an auspicious opportunity to squeeze another portion of independence from the center. Incidentally, the Vologda authorities have already presented Moscow with a fait accompli by deciding at the end of last week to expand the powers of their oblast to those of a republic. Next, apparently, will be the Sverdlovsk deputies—during the 25 April referendum oblast residents authorized them to do that with 80 percent of the votes.

So far, though, it is not clear whether Boris Yeltsin will be able, even if he comes up with crucial concessions, to

obtain the oblasts' blessing at the conference. Not that the provinces have a particular affection for the Congress and personally for Ruslan Imranovich: It is simply that in getting involved in a risky fight and even ensuring the victory for one of the sides, the provinces will in any case get less than what they have now—standing on the sidelines and getting dividends from each opponent in turn.

The provinces, just like everybody else, understand that this cannot go on too long. But as long as the situation continues, they are not complaining.

Chechen President Attends Islamic Meeting in Beirut

LD2005104093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1002 GMT 20 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[Text] Groznyy, 20 May—Dzhokhar Dudayev, president of the Chechen Republic, was in Beirut from 16 to 18 May, and "attended a meeting of religious figures in the Islamic world." An ITAR-TASS correspondent was told this today by a well-informed source in Groznyy.

It has already become a tradition that Dzhokhar Dudayev takes foreign trips under conditions of strict secrecy, while people in Groznyy, including high-ranking officials on the presidential staff, only find out about it after his return home. It is still a mystery to many how the head of the totally unrecognized Chechnya flies unimpeded in his personal aircraft to foreign countries near and far.

Dudayev's unexpected trip to a meeting with Islamic fundamentalists obliges one to turn once more to the rumors that have surfaced in Groznyy, to the effect that he is about to declare Chechnya an Islamic republic with himself as the imam. This is obviously being done with the purely political objective of recruiting the fanatically religious section of the republic's population to his side in the stand-off against the opposition.

Islamic Youth 'Terrorist' Organization Formed in Chechnya

MK2105083093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 21, 23 May 93 (signed to press 18 May) p A5

[Lyudmila Leonteva report under the rubric "Terrorism": "We Will Blow up Everything But We Will Secure Justice"]

[Text] **An Islamic youth terrorist organization, Yozhal, has announced its formation in Chechnya.**

"We, young Muslim brothers, have resolved to the extent of our abilities to help our people," says the appeal widely circulated by the organization's leaders. "Thousands of new people who have already tasted the easy life are involved in the various structures of the new government. And the spiritual structures, having gathered their relatives around themselves and having inserted their old folk into the Mekhk-kkhel [as transliterated], have proceeded to rob the republic and are prepared to die or to ruin the entire people of the Chechen Republic, but to uphold Dudayev's cause."

The appeal goes on to say: "We declare today gazavat [holy war] on those who are robbing their people using the green banner as a cover, the Koran in their hands and the name of God on their lips—and on those who have caused half the population to don the uniforms of the militia, police, Special Purpose Militia Detachments, Spetsnaz, and guards, and have created bandit formations."

Members of the organization promise to carry out a number of terrorist acts at Chechnya oil refineries, or against oil and gas pipelines, unless all back wages, pensions, and relief money have been paid in the near future to all categories of Chechen citizens. The new terrorist organization demands that the authorities register the owners of foreign-made cars and large homes until sources of their incomes have been established, that an inventory of available housing space in cities and rayon centers be compiled, and that the housing then be redistributed among those who need it.

Yeltsin Believed To Have Recognized Tatar Sovereignty

MK2005105693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 May 93 p 1

[Radik Batyrshin report under the "Theory" rubric: "Kazan To Participate in Drafting Russian Federation Constitution. Moscow Recognizes Association Status in Relations With Tatarstan?"]

[Text] The sharp reversal in Tatarstan's attitude to the "constitutional race" is simply amazing. On 17 May, the deputies did not include the discussion of the Russian Federation constitution in the agenda of the Supreme Soviet session. On 19 May, however, this question comfortably found its way into the agenda with the blessing of Mintimer Shaymiyev. The Tatar president said in an interview with ITAR-TASS: "You cannot make big-time politics by sitting on your hands; we will participate in all the processes that affect the interests of Tatarstan." In Shaymiyev's view, participating in the drafting of a Russian Federation Constitution is in line with the Supreme Soviet's decision and "stems from the law on putting our Constitution into effect" (this law speaks about the need to ask the Russian Supreme Soviet for treaty-based, constitutional relations between Russia and Tatarstan to be laid down in the Russian Federation fundamental law). "Since we have chosen a two-way street, we should take a very active part in the drafting of the fundamental law of the Federation," Shaymiyev believes. Speaking about his being included in a working group charged with drawing up a Russian Federation constitution (Yeltsin's draft), the Tatar president said that he would "consistently defend the viewpoints of

Tatarstan and other republics with regard to the Federation's state structure and the constitutional basis of relations between Tatarstan and Russia." In the ITAR-TASS interview, he did not show his preference for either draft Constitution, but the very fact of his participation in "Yeltsin's working group" is very revealing. What could have occurred within the past two days?

It should be recalled that the status of Tatarstan has been the main snag in signing a treaty between the Russian Federation and the republic. Under Tatarstan's new Constitution, it is a subject of international law, a sovereign state associated with the Russian Federation on the basis of the treaty on the mutual delegation of powers and areas of jurisdiction. This provision of the Tatar Constitution did not suit Moscow, so Tatarstan's special status was not included in any draft of the Russian constitution. This evoked a sharp reaction from Tatarstan Supreme Soviet Chairman Farid Mukhametshin, who said that Tatarstan would not consider any draft Russian constitution until bilateral relations are straightened out. Tatarstan was still sticking to that viewpoint on 17 May—had Shaymiyev urged the Supreme Soviet deputies at that time to include this matter in the session agenda, they would have supported the president. On that same day, Kazan turned down an invitation extended to Shaymiyev to attend a conference of the working groups formed by the official delegations of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan, citing as the reason the need to be present at the Supreme Soviet session that had just begun. But as early as 18 May, Sergey Filatov, chief of the Russian president's administration, said that Tatarstan would consider a draft of the Russian fundamental law. Conferring with Bashkir leaders in Ufa that day, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Yarov said that the last (!) round of talks between Russia and Tatarstan would be held on 28 May. All these facts give reason to presume that on 17 or 18 May Boris Yeltsin agreed to recognize Tatarstan's status as a sovereign state associated with Russia. There is simply no other reason for Kazan's reversal; Shaymiyev cannot back away from the republic's status laid down in the Tatar Constitution.

Tatarstan Signs Agreements With St. Petersburg

LD2005130493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1207 GMT 20 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Sorokin]

[Text] Kazan May 20 TASS—The Republic of Tatarstan has signed a general agreement on trade, economic, social, cultural and legal cooperation with the city of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region in northwestern Russia.

The extension of horizontal links is a call of the times, President Mintimer Shaymiyev of Tatarstan said at a reception in honour of the visitors.

The new document provides for regular mutual supplies of consumer goods, participation in the development and implementation of joint programs and projects, exchange of economic information and cooperation in the field of health services, ecology, education and tourism.

National Affairs

Deputies Vote Against Kuchma Resignation

LD2105103093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1001 GMT 21 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Gordeyev]

[Text] Kiev May 21 TASS—The Ukrainian parliament voted today morning against the resignation of Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma.

Most deputies, who took the floor during the deliberations, described President Leonid Kravchuk's Thursday proposal to alter the existing system of executive government as an "attempt to sidestep proposals intended to overcome the economic crisis". In light of this, several speakers moved to restore the status of the president, the Cabinet of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet, which existed before the current cabinet was vested with additional powers.

The Ukrainian parliament voted today for the restoration of the article of the constitution which gave the Ukrainian president the right to issue decrees on economic problems, not covered by the existing legislation. Such decrees shall remain in force until the parliament adopts a law on the matters in question.

Kravckuk Addresses Parliament 20 May

LD2005210193 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0700 GMT 20 May 93

[Address by President Leonid Kravchuk to parliament in Kiev—live]

[Excerpts] Esteemed people's deputies. The issues forwarded today for consideration in the annual report are far from being new to the Supreme Council. They have more than once been thoroughly discussed in this hall, especially in recent months. For two days—the 18th and 19th of May this year—the report of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the social, economic, and political situation that emerged in Ukraine and ways out of it had been discussed. Earlier, the draft indicative plan and budget for 1993, and also the guidelines of Ukraine's foreign policy, military doctrine, and other important issues of our state's life had been discussed. I had to express my opinion on all these matters of principle, including at the Supreme Council session.

Proceeding precisely from this, I consider it necessary to concentrate in this report on key issues only. First of all, on the assessment of the situation as a whole, on a political plane. Ukraine was establishing itself as a state, its state institutions were being formed and improved.

On the international plane. The world is becoming ever more aware of the fact that a new state of a European scale appeared on the political map, that is to be taken into consideration, whose interests and policy are to be respected.

On the economic plane. Only the first steps have been made toward an economy structured in conformity with the requirements of the people, toward the creation of a new economic system. We were tackling all these tasks of a history-making nature for the first time. We were making mistakes, we were arguing, we were underestimating our work, sometimes, but we were moving forward. Now, more details about these and other issues.

The economic situation. As was emphasized in the report of the Cabinet of Ministers, in reports by people's deputies, a threatening social and economic situation emerged in Ukraine. One cannot but agree with such assessments. But this is not enough, of course. The way out of the situation must be found at any cost. For this it is necessary, first and foremost, to analyze in depth the cause of such a situation. The following can be added to what had already been said from this rostrum, both in the report and the speeches by the people's deputies. While working out the economic strategy we obviously overestimated the potentials of Ukraine's economy, we did not take into account the fact that it was structurally built on the principle of incompleteness, deprived of integrity, harmony, and complexity. The huge dependence on the economy of other states of the former union was not realized, too. Hence the energy and the payments crises that today are the most dangerous factors.

We also delayed assessing the danger of the dependence of Ukraine's monetary system on a single currency within the CIS Limits Emission Bank and, therefore, on the price and monetary policies of Russia. We seceded from the ruble zone formally, worked out the system of settling accounts at all levels in an unskillful manner. The fact that the banking, finance, and credit systems were lagging behind the requirements of the day significantly aggravated the destabilization processes. No matter how sad this may be, during this year we also failed to cure this serious disease, even within the limits of our own economy. Let us be frank, all the laws of the ruble circulation are functioning in Ukraine today. Karbovanets continues to be in its [ruble's] shade, but even a more distorted one. This, actually, led to the crisis of the credit, finance, and monetary systems of our state.

The next thing. Our analytical services, experts, and scientists, have unfortunately turned out to be incapable of elaborating an economic reform program, that would be suited to specific historical conditions of Ukraine, its real possibilities, and finally the mentality of our people. There are many ideas, and even more criticism, but there is still no integral concept regarding Ukraine.

We can say frankly, that we are experiencing an extremely acute shortage of personnel all of the time. We allow serious personnel mistakes.

The fact that when elaborating economic programs the main priorities were devoted to liberalizing the economy immediately, this was also a mistake. The role of the

state in carrying out reforms was plainly underestimated—namely reforms, and not a return to regulation, especially administrative regulation.

This mistake is being corrected now, but a tendency to the other extreme is being observed—strengthening centralization where this is now impossible, and even harmful. The proper support for this aspect of the private and lease sectors is absent.

The majority of economic decisions are adopted in extreme conditions. So they are not being deeply thought out. As is well- known, over the course of the last two years the government elaborated seven programs for getting the economy out of the crisis situation. Practically all of them were approved by the Supreme Council. However, because of their isolation from life, the conflict of ideological forces, the indefiniteness of the functions and powers of administrative power structures, and the absence of responsibility in nearly all sections of the economic mechanism, they were implemented unsatisfactorily. Even one's own bureaucracy was not checked.

Finally, control over implementation of programs was extremely inefficient, especially at a regional level. One ought to add to this the poor professional training of some officials in all spheres of power, mistakes, and even an unwillingness to act appropriately in new circumstances. Now it is even difficult to determine exactly what there was more of—inability or unwillingness.

All of this together with imperfect legislation, and the struggle between laws and decrees, led to paralysis of action by legislative structures and a further deepening of the crisis.

The mistakes need to be corrected now, because not only the economy has come under threat, but also the state's national security. The most important issue is how, by what means, to correct the mistakes—whether to increase market reforms, or by some other means, or whether to simply continue to hold debates on the choice of path, that in practice means to stand still and to contrive how to put the blame and responsibility on someone.

In my opinion, an organic combination of radical reforms with evolutionary transformations should be the basis of the new approach, especially in basic industries and the military-industrial complex, with the support of, and deputies have stressed this, those industries and enterprises that determine the fate of the state and are capable of becoming the link that can resolve the whole problem.

Normative, organizational, and management obstacles in the path of reforms need to be immediately removed, and responsibility in all links of the state and management mechanism need to be resolutely increased. Otherwise a paradox could occur. We would not be able to interact with other countries, especially the CIS, because of objective reasons. Market mechanisms would not connect with directive ones.

I want to stress this, because Russia and other states, have gone considerably further along the path of reform. We could lag behind considerably. Then, I repeat, a market economy would not be able to interact with a nonmarket economy. There would then be, I repeat, a new economy and new production relations there, and we would have old ones.

Now I would like to present some considerations in relation to practical steps on the way to overcoming the economic crisis. Firstly, I have issued an instruction to create a scientifically based model of the future Ukrainian economy and to calculate an optimum strategic course of movement toward this model, relying on Ukraine's potential, taking into account those mistakes that we have already made, and developing effective partnership ties with the states of the former Union, while integrating ourselves into the European and world economy.

The model of the Ukrainian economy, in our opinion, should be a market one and socially oriented, aimed at satisfying the needs of our own people, and should rely, first of all, on our own possibilities. It should take into account the economic ties that have arisen objectively within the borders of the CIS, and the possibilities of Western capital being invested in Ukraine's economy.

I have already stressed several times that Ukraine wishes to follow the way of coming closer to the normal, natural economies of other states. But the final fulfillment of this route requires the presence here of exactly this kind of normal, natural economy in accordance with Western standards. This is impossible if we lose the existing sources of raw materials and sales markets in the states of the former socialist camp and if we destroy ties with the CIS countries. That is why the reorientation of external economic ties should not be built on the basis of emotions and ambitions but should follow a normal course, taking account of objective realities.

This course, apart from anything else, envisages the continuity of legal and economic foundations in these spheres, including the one of foreign economic activity. Our laws on foreign investment guarantees and on foreign investments are well received by business circles of all countries, both in the East and in the West, and we cannot allow them to be ruined. This would fundamentally change the investment climate in Ukraine. That is why I believe that the Cabinet of Ministers was right to review the other day its own decrees on these questions, that had been issued earlier, to which it made a number of amendments aimed at the liberalization of foreign economic activity and the foreign investment regime.

The fact that this is true, is demonstrated by, for instance, these observations made in Ukraine by sociologists, including foreign ones. Fourteen questions were put to these investors. What prevents them from investing capital into Ukraine? 73.1 percent answered: the constantly changing laws and instructions, 59.6—the

unsuitable banking system, and 46.2—confusing investment legislation. For example, the abilities of our management personnel and workers ranked at only around 17 percent. That is, legislation and the normative acts, come first.

If we do not do this, it may happen that either important changes will continue to be made to laws and the normative acts that have already been passed, or foreign economic activity could come to a halt. Everybody knows that the touchstone of market economy is the rule: The fewer goods that are exported out of the country, the fewer goods are left in its domestic market. It is a paradox, but it is true. Because now we can buy everything we would like to buy, but we simply have nothing to pay with. We have nothing to pay with because we sell too little, or we are cutting down the sale of goods all the time.

Unfortunately it is this truism that is hard for us to absorb. The tragedy of the situation is also that the movement is taking place in the conditions of the fall in production. What can happen is something as yet unknown in world economic history: An overproduction crisis in the conditions of the fall of production. Yesterday examples were given of our goods no longer wanted for purchase. The market is shrinking. All of these are serious matters, and I especially emphasized this and gave examples because, in our view, the foreign economic sphere is today extremely important from the standpoint of a way of making money and a way of payment for goods, including energy carriers.

Secondly, we should determine clearly our position on the fundamental issue, i.e. that of property and of its master.

In spite of the fact that the basic law on ownership has long since been adopted, with numerous changes introduced, we have not yet got an integral vision of its being implemented. By the end of the year, state enterprises have to be auctioned off, i.e. transferred to a market system. There has to be a resolute shift to the functional and state management of the economy. If necessary, we must even take compulsory demonopolizing measures.

My opinion is that complex decisions on a mechanism of ownership control, and on structurally rebuilding production, are of decisive significance not only to the privatization of state property, but also and undoubtedly to the creation of a civilized market economy in Ukraine.

The state and the government under these conditions must ensure an unmistakable taxation, credit, financial, and banking policy, as well as strengthen the role of the National Bank.

Finally, the central issue of privatization and a primeval Ukrainian issue of land. I am deeply convinced that land should belong to him who cultivates it. I can see that many deputies are also growing ever more convinced of this. The owner of land will himself best determine a form of organizing production, acceptable to him. Diverse cooperation in the process of production and sale of agricultural produce, characteristic of agriculture in all developed countries, will unconditionally remain, but will then acquire a natural character. We have the knowledge and ability to act accordingly, with all forms of ownership established as possessing equal rights. At the same time, we have to confirm the position of those engaging in economic activities and make them interested. They have to have an interest in production, regardless of who they are, a proprietor, a leaseholder, or a collective farm.

The most important task is to contain uncontrolled price rises and stop hyperinflation. Radical measures are required here. They are being prepared and in the near future will be submitted for consideration by the Supreme Council, first of all at its commissions.

Thirdly, developing a well-considered structural strategy is one of the priorities. Indeed, the fall in production today has acquired an uncontrolled character, rather than a structural one subject to conscious regulation. That makes it clear that the economic crisis and the financial and monetary one cannot be restrained without an adequate state structural policy. Nor can an independent economy be built. The main objective of a structural strategy in Ukraine is to lower conclusively the level of dependence in energy and other resources upon external factors and, thus, strengthen the economic security of the state.

Apart from that, this is a realistic way for the economy of Ukraine to enter the world market and for currency earnings to increase considerably.

We must take such measures that would increase the Ukrainian economy's adaptation capabilities in respect of the situation in the international, and first of all European division of labor, and its ability to undergo rapid structural transformation on its own basis.

The monetary and credit policy has to be adjusted too. What is meant here? Relinquishing unrealistic aspirations to rid ourselves in a short time of the state budget deficit, and revising the credit policy, and the approach to loan interest, taking account of the fact that, when the payment for credit is covered by way of increasing the producer's price, the credit itself becomes an inflationary factor. Everybody has already understood this.

Developing a comprehensive monetary reform should be completed. It may be on an everyday basis that you hear information about its own currency being introduced in some CIS country or other. It means that we have a realistic opportunity to carry out a comprehensive monetary reform, disregarding differing points of view, which is needed. By the way, these Cabinet of Ministers' commissions have been formed and are working. This will be one of the decisive factors for stabilizing the economy.

Inheriting all the shortcomings of the coupon, the Ukrainian karbovanets has exhausted its capabilities as a transitional currency, and cannot become a means of accumulation, or financial backing of investment policy and foreign trade. Its further depreciation can result in complete ruination of the financial and monetary system.

Now, the most important issue, probably the most important of all that has been discussed for two days and what we shall discuss further on. Who is to carry out all these measures? Who is to assume responsibility for the reform, for the preservation of the state? Today this is not a rhetorical issue but a major step that is awaited by our people. These issues were touched upon in deputies' speeches. There were proposals. I would like to express my stand on this issue. We build a state and look for ways of improving all elements of authority, and this is normal. Of late, this search has been carried out along two main trends. The first one: Delegation of powers from one body of authority to another one. The second one: Partial stripping of one body of authority of its powers by another one. We followed not the road of improving every branch of authority, I repeat this, but the road of delegating powers. This is why the situation has become ever more aggravated, the opposition has grown stronger. It could not be otherwise. If we further follow this road, the opposition will become ever more aggravated, it will transfer to all elements of authority and to the provinces.

The time has come to define our stance, and for everybody to define their stance: The president, the Supreme Council, and the Cabinet of Ministers. Because it is they, especially the Supreme Council and the president, who bear direct responsibility before the people.

My position is this: the President undertakes direct leadership of the Cabinet, that is he becomes its head. The Supreme Council makes respective changes to the Constitution. They are not significant ones—in essence we are talking about changing two or three articles. The Supreme Council elects a vice president. The President forms a government and assumes executive powers. [applause] The Supreme Council deals with passing laws and resolutions and fulfills all the powers envisaged by the Constitution. That is, we are in fact not talking at all about any kind of stripping the Supreme Council of its powers.

Moreover, the President is not raising the issue of additional powers. The President is putting the question this way: the Supreme Council would give him one power; he would pass decrees on undefined, unsettled economic issues which would lose effect after the Supreme Council passes a law on this issue. [applause] There is no need to go to the Supreme Council to cancel decrees, or to cancel laws by means of decrees or orders. This will not get us anywhere. Life has already proven that. When we do this, then until the adoption of a new Constitution and new elections, there will be no more changes made about delegating powers or transferring power structures.

We shall adopt a new constitution, and I hope that we shall adopt it. It has already been prepared and will be submitted to the Supreme Council. The Constitutional Commission has already made its decision. Then it will be up to the Supreme Council. Therefore, the Supreme Council has and extremely large amount of work to do. The constitution. Why is another variant unnecessary, or why is it difficult to find it? I will tell you why. For example, the Supreme Council grants plenary powers to the government with certain limitations. The government issues decrees and the Supreme Council issues laws. The government abrogates laws and the Supreme Council puts a veto on decrees. It is a total muddle. But it is the Supreme Council, not the government that bears responsibility for the legal and normative basis before the people. I do not want anyone to take offense at me, but a legitimate practice, legitimate norm exists throughout the world: the Supreme Council, elected by the people, and the president, elected on a nationwide scale, bear responsibility before the people. The government bears responsibility before the Supreme Council and the president only.

This is why everything here must be put in its proper place. Because, do you understand what has happened? We passed our work over to the government, as far as decrees are concerned, but we want it to do this work the way we like it to be done, to our order. But this is impossible. This is why I propose to do it this way. I expressed my stand. I want the Supreme Council to express its stand, and in this connection I have a request: Now every single day matters. Now it is not a year, a month, but every single day. This must be solved, today or tomorrow, but this must be solved. We are not to leave this hall until the issue is solved. It will be the way you decide, but it is necessary to decide this issue. If the issue on granting extension of plenary powers to the government is solved, this is also possible, but a decision must be taken. In other words, there cannot be such an uncertainty. [passage omitted]

This issue must be solved today or tomorrow, I repeat this. Here is the next question I would like to dwell on briefly. I will not repeat what has already been said. There was much talk here, and it was correct talk, about submitting some comprehensive program, yet another one, to the Supreme Council. I believe, and on the basis of our experience, let us think together quietly, that this issue is, probably, unrealistic.

As for submitting separate programs, say, the program of social protection, the program of the monetary reform, the program of privatization, for example, and approve it, etc. In other words, programs on separate trends and issues could be discussed together with the deputies and commissions and submitted. This is realistic. But these...[changes thought] This is simply unrealistic. This is why I would like to tell you that relevant groups and

commissions do have such a task on the elaboration of such programs according to trends. I know that the people's deputies and commissions also have them. When I had been listening to speeches by people's deputies over the past two days, and not only these two days, I arrived at such a conclusion: if we seated a certain group of people and analyzed everything that had been said by the people's deputies...various things were said. There were, say, four minutes of platitudes out of five minutes, but there were always specific proposals.

If these proposals are extracted and written requests of the deputies to the government and the president are added to them, many useful ideas could be selected so as to create such programs according to trends. This is a realistic matter. But this must be done immediately. Probably, we must respond to the most acute problems, not only programs, that cannot wait for the programs to be adopted. This is the protection of invalids, pensioners, families with many children, children, separately, etc. [sentence as heard] We must respond to the provision of housing to servicemen, workers of other, especially legal [pravovyy] ministries, or force [sylovyy] ministries, as they say here.

I would like to inform you that such a program of provision of housing to servicemen has already been worked out and this year its implementation will get under way. Crisis phenomena in society are connected not only with the miscalculations in reforming Ukraine's economy. They are also the result of a slow-down in the solution of the state formation problems. This is inherent both in the nationwide and regional policies. It should be admitted that to date no state mechanism has been set up that would work effectively. Probably, there are no such people among us who would be satisfied with the results of the work done by the structures of all elements of authority—local, central, state, and other bodies of authority for cooperation between the bodies of state authority and the bodies of self-government.

Our state legal system is unregulated and has quite a few contradictions and gaps. The judicial reform is just making its first steps. The status and rules of activity of many state institutions have not been determined. State and municipal employees are socially unprotected. In addition, corresponding mentality and education contribute to the spread of such a distorted phenomenon as corruption. Discussions around constitutional issues, political system, election system, forms of state government system, and structure of local authorities never cease to continue. I want to say it again that there is nothing wrong about this. It is only necessary to remember that we have limited time for the discussion of these issues. Precisely, political survival of our state will depend on the timely solution of the issues of state formation. The choice here is not very vast—either we shall continue to move forward or we shall argue again where to go, how to go and what to build. At the same time, it is important that such a reformation has a conceptual basis, and we must carry out legal reformation, that is determined in the declaration on Ukraine's state sovereignty. Work is continuing on the concept of foreign economic activities of Ukraine. It has already been considered in its first reading. The guidelines of the foreign policy of Ukraine and Ukraine's military doctrine are being updated at the Supreme Council. They had also been considered and, I repeat it, there are corresponding possibilities to adopt them, I believe so. The setting up of a proper system of ensuring national security of Ukraine has an exceptionally great importance for the state formation. In other words, the setting up of a constitutional body that would coordinate the activities in this sphere. Also, there are relevant presentations and there is relevant work done by the Supreme Council Commission. For this purpose the Supreme Council is to determine the status of the National Security Council of Ukraine as a state body with relevant plenary powers, and introduce necessary changes in the constitution.

Once again, corresponding proposals will be submitted. Experience shows that many people, and not only in Ukraine, would like to adopt, rather to solve constitutional problems, somehow, with certain pressure, not by universally accepted ways. The constitution in force must, undoubtedly, be abided by, if we want to build a law-governed state. Whether we like it or not, we must abide by it as long as it exists. Although, this is also a fact, if you have a look at our constitution, you will see how many times we were patching it up, how many changes and amendments were introduced, how many uncoordinated provisions in this. Is there a constitution in the world whose text contains an indication that the validity of three chapters is suspended? Just suspended and that is it...and did not replace them by anything. I think, everyone can find in this document whatever he needs according to his personal or corporate interests.

God forbid us from beginning constitutional games and constitutional wars. There is only one end to this—political and state opposition followed by suicide.

We have to determine our stance on the three main issues of nation building. These are the form of state government at the center, the territorial system in Ukraine, and the organization of authority locally. These are the main issues. They have been discussed at the constitutional commission and, I repeat, will be submitted for the Supreme Council's consideration. After that, laws on elections can be adopted and elections can be held normally and properly. [applause]

I would like to stress once again that, if we really care about the state, about Ukraine and its development, we do not have time to delay this issue any longer.

I have already said this at the Constitutional Commission, and I would once again like to say that we can adopt the constitution here. But if we cannot, it does not mean that we have to stop in adopting the constitution. Other ways have to be found, such as directly appealing to the people. But, I repeat, we cannot and do not have the right

to stop. Nor shall we be able to live under this current constitution and build the state in accordance with all the norms.

Esteemed People's Deputies!

Recently we have in detail examined a document on the main directions of our state's foreign policy, approved at its first reading. During the discussion, you were able to get a considerable number of answers to questions on this topic from the minister of foreign affairs. That is why, at this stage of the report I will speak on the main aspects of the state's and the president's activity in foreign policy.

Ukraine has been independently determining and carrying out its course in foreign policy for only just over a year. The direction of this course is to ensure the international recognition of Ukraine as an independent state; to set it up as an international legal entity; and to establish relations possessing equal rights with other states of the world.

Up to date, 139 countries of the world have already recognized Ukraine as an independent state. One can say that the process of gaining international recognition and entering the world community on the basis of possessing equal rights has chiefly been completed.

Operating foreign policy, we have been paying primary attention to creating external conditions for the security of the state, with priority national interests being taken into consideration. We have sought to operate a flexible and balanced policy toward developing and strengthening friendly partnership bilateral relations with other states of the world, and in the first place with our neighbors.

We have been participating more widely in multilateral regional and versatile international structures, the activity of which is directed toward maintaining international peace and security and preventing and settling conflicts.

Ukraine was among the initiators of creating the CIS. I am convinced that it is owing to this that we managed to avoid the developments under the Yugoslav scenario.

I am often being accused in newspapers of having gone there, they say, the three of us, and made the Soviet Union disintegrate without people's authorization to do that. So, I would like to give an answer to this question to all of you and the people listening to us.

In this hall on 24 August 1991, the state independence act was adopted by us, by an overwhelming majority of the deputies. The act says that Ukraine is a sovereign, independent, and law-governed state, that the constitution and laws of Ukraine alone are valid on its territory.

Well, one may say that what we adopted is not enough. The following question was put at the referendum: Do you support the state independence act? A yes vote was given by 92 percent of those who had come, and by 75 percent of all voters in Ukraine, i.e. by a constitutional majority. That is why, I do not know about the others, but going there I had a people's mandate. [applause] That is why here it was no longer about whether to go, but there was a specific and clear position.

Ukraine's participation in the CIS, apart from the fact that it opened up the opportunity to settle the issue of succession to the USSR and form relations with the Commonwealth's participants on international legal principles, also became a factor in stabilizing our political security. Very important changes are now taking place in the CIS. Integrating processes are taking place. We support the economic ones, and I stress this, and this was Ukraine's initiative in Minsk, that economic integration processes should develop within the CIS framework on the widest possible scale. I have addressed the Supreme Council with a presentation on these matters of principle. The legislative body needs to define its stance on this.

I would like to repeat that I am not shifting responsibility to the Supreme Council. I am very often being accused of, they say, doing something somewhere and not informing them. It is so. I handed a note to the Supreme Council. The thing is that the document that you approved, i.e. the agreement on the CIS at the time of it being ratified, contained some stipulations, and I act in accordance with these stipulations. There is no need to blame me. Another matter is if you remove these stipulations.

Now the matter no longer concerns my position only, not only my position. The point is that it is envisaged there, and I want you to know this, because some are talking of an economic union, some of something else, so, in a gradual transition to an economic union important changes are envisaged in national legislation. It is said unambiguously there that the state transfers some legislative sovereignty. Oh! [noise from the floor] Oh!, they say.

So, I cannot distribute the document, because there is not one. This document is now being drawn up. As soon as it is ready, I shall hand it out to you. But I want this to be known: the thing is that to give away sovereignty in the sphere of legislation is no longer a matter within my competence. That is it. [noise from the floor]

We are proceeding from the policy approved by our people earlier toward work being carried out within the CIS framework aimed at ensuring the free development of ties between enterprises, manufacturers, and consumers of products, removing all obstacles on the path to their interaction, and forming a market of goods and services that would lead to normal links but would not create supranational structures and would not limit Ukraine's sovereignty. This is my position. You should now state yours.

Due to the fact that the response to this document is vast, I would like to say that after it is worked out I shall

submit it for the Supreme Council's consideration, which is exactly for what you have been asking.

So what did we sign in Moscow? This simply has to be known too, because there are various interpretations.

They say an agreement on an economic union has already been signed. Nothing of the sort. A document was signed, whereby instructions were given for that document [the agreement on an economic union] to be drawn up. In this document, I wrote it down in accordance with the Supreme Council position and those stipulations, that Ukraine does not support the terminology, category [as heard], notions, or anything that follows from here. We support integration and all integrating processes.

A declaration and a decision on forming an economic union were also signed, but this was signed as a supplement in order to provide directions for the main body of work.

Well, some other documents were signed, on a consultative and advisory council, but this is no longer any sort of fresh problem in the president's and our government's actions. This follows from the documents that we have already signed earlier.

Such is the situation that has developed in the CIS. Here, our position is clear and straightforward. We are in favor of the existence of the CIS. We are in favor of economic relations developing within the framework of the CIS. But we cannot support political integration, military-political integration and all the institutions that will be created, because it threatens, and you know this well, the sovereignty, or it is a surrender of sovereignty.

Ukraine is a fully fledged member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It has signed the CSCE Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. As a consequence of this, its entry to a Europe-wide process was ensured. Together with the UN membership, at the present stage this can be considered one of the main international political guarantees of national security and independence.

However, one cannot not notice those cardinal changes, which have taken place in recent years in connection with the breakup of the old system and the appearance of new independent states in the European region. The time has probably come for the world community, as this was done, for example, after both World Wars, to assemble and creatively reinterpret these events, and possibly make adjustments to those structures of security and cooperation, and division of work, which are currently in existence.

The President, the government, the Supreme Council and its commissions have carried out an extensive amount of work in respect to ratification of the START-I Treaty, as well as accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to adopt decisions that will reflect all the existing realities most fully and which would correspond to both the short and long-term interests of our national security. I am convinced, that while being guided by the higher interests of the state and professing consistency in policy, the Supreme Council will examine these documents and adopt sensible decisions.

Naturally, as analysis and calculation show, Ukraine is capable of fulfilling the conditions of the treaties if appropriate guarantees of its security, financial and technical assistance, and compensation for capital investment are given. Work on ensuring the implementation of clauses of these documents is being carried out intensively on our part. I want to say that there is some movement forward, both on the part of Western states, and on the part of and in clearing up these problems with Russia.

Now on the development of bilateral relations with other states. Here a special place undoubtedly belongs to Ukrainian-Russian relations. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the fate of the democratic development both of Ukraine and of Russia, as well as stability not only on the Eurasian continent, but in the whole world, depend on the nature of their relations to a considerable extent.

After protracted talks and meetings it seems to me that a new stage of relations between Ukraine and Russia has come, or will come—I believe this. Both the Ukrainian side and the Russian side understand this.

Incidentally, Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin was to come here with a delegation today in order to sign agreements and documents, but unfortunately in connection with the fact that we are carrying out important work here this visit has been postponed, although he did give his word, well, that he will visit. I repeat, this is important for Ukraine.

In spite of periodical aggravation, which arose as a consequence of the actions of certain political circles, these relations did still develop in a stable way. Direct meetings of higher state leaders of the two countries, support for an active dialogue, and the beginning of a proper contractual, legal basis for bilateral relations, have contributed to this.

I want to say that Russia is carrying out, simply so that it is clear to everyone, a policy of defending its interests. This policy is a civilized one. There is no need to blame Russia. If someone here says that Russia is selling to some at lower prices, and to others at higher prices, do not believe this. Russia is selling and will be selling to all—at the same price. It cannot be otherwise.

This is a normal phenomenon; it is their affair, not ours. We should also purchase and sell in a normal way. This is now our affair. We should defend our interests in a normal way too. We should not think that if we go down, excuse my language, on our knees, then someone will give everything away to us. Well, this is simply not serious.

We will continue to do everything in order to assist all political structures of both sides to understand the hopelessness and ruinousness of a course toward confrontation in Ukrainian- Russian relations. Both sides understand the importance of friendly relations; we are ready to take them onto a qualitatively new stage.

As far as our relations with other countries, the former Republics of the USSR, are concerned, then they are mutually advantageous partnership ones. Diplomatic relations have been established with all of them, and treaties on friendship and cooperation have been concluded with all of them, with all of them.

Great importance was attached to establishing good-neighborly and mutually advantageous relations with countries of Central Eastern Europe and to consolidating them with the appropriate contractual base. I believe that in the interests of states of this sub-region, without resorting to renewing some kind of bloc-type structures, one should cooperate more vigorously, not only in establishing economic cooperation, but with the aim of filling that security vacuum, which has been created here. These are our foreign policy initiatives. They are being discussed, and many states are studying and supporting them.

Naturally, such efforts could be carried out within the general framework of the CSCE. The strategic aims of Ukraine's European policy are to consolidate it as a fully fledged European state and a stabilizing factor in Europe. So, considerable efforts have been directed at establishing qualitatively new bilateral relations with states of the Western region, Western Europe.

The establishment of interstate relations with the United States of America proceeded fairly vigorously. Ukraine will in future implement a policy of deepening mutual understanding, not restricted to one subject, but multifaceted cooperation with this leading world country. We do not want our relations with the United States to be measured only by ratification of a treaty. I can say to you, that it seems to me, after certain contacts, that the United States of America has now understood this too.

Certain steps have been taken toward establishing fruitful cooperation with Asian and Latin American states, above all those, which have a noticeable influence on regional and world policy.

In this way, the main tasks that were before Ukraine's foreign policy—establishment as a sovereign state at the initial stage and a fully fledged member of the international community—should be considered as fulfilled. The most important task of foreign policy in the next stage is to establish Ukraine as an influential European state. This is an extremely important and an extremely complex task. A concept and specific approaches for resolving it should be determined and approved as quickly as possible, so that all bodies of state power and officials could implement them—this is the first thing—and so that Ukraine finally speaks in the international arena with one voice, and not with various voices, when it is hard to understand who wants what.

Esteemed People's Deputies. Serious trials are awaiting us in practically all spheres of life. And it is natural that these trials extinguish euphoria, return many to the world of realities, and bring others out of a state of drowsiness and indifference. There are even those who have gone to pieces, lost faith, and would like to stop. Various political forces are endeavoring to make use of this circumstance, wishing to destabilize society and to upset the foundations of the young Ukrainian state. Historical experience should be a warning to us. For more than once Ukraine was subjugated by our very hands. I am convinced that this time our people will break free from the vicious circle, and the task of all political forces is to help it to fulfil this historical mission. This is a historical task. Thank you for your attention. [applause]

'Trenchant' Kuchma Speech Goes Unheeded

PM2005130793 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 93 p 1

[Viktor Drozd report: "Who Should Be Called to Account?"]

[Text] Kiev—"A flag, coat of arms, and anthem are not all it takes to be a state." It seems that deputies paid little attention to this phrase in Prime Minister L. Kuchma's trenchant and detailed report at the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session, just as they paid little attention to his convincing argument for a "minimum program" for Ukraine's survival. The evident dissatisfaction shown by certain people's representatives earned a rebuke from the prime minister—first and foremost, we need to decide what kind of state we are building, and only then call the government to account if it deviates from that course. Without those bearings any government will be left to the mercy of political currents. In order to ensure a "smooth passage," L. Kuchma proposed that we think together about how to chart the course for our sovereign vessel and make it stable. But, as the hail of questions and the subsequent debate showed, this appeal was a voice crying in the wilderness...

Yes, Ukraine is today reaping the benefits of its hasty "divorce," experiencing for itself a slump in production, a surge in prices, shortages of basic necessities, everyday services that are beyond the reach of millions, terrible poverty, and corruption. Who benefits from sovereignty in these circumstances—the rich or those whom Ukraine is barely managing to feed? Having asked themselves these questions, a number of deputies pinned responsibility in a perhaps old-fashioned but very emotional way on the "communist majority," others gave vent to their feelings in eloquence and a display of their own erudition, while others were inclined to blame everything on the government and the president, who, they claimed, is engaging in political populism and ducks personal responsibility when the chips are down.

Crimean Supreme Soviet Appoints New Prime Minister

LD2005174193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1620 GMT 20 May 93

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Lev Ryabchikov for TASS]

[Text] Simferopol, 20 May—The new head of the government was appointed at the session of the Crimean Supreme Soviet that resumed its work today. The parliament accepted the resignation of Vitaliy Kurashik who asked to be relieved from his post in connection with his transfer to another job. Boris Samsonov, whose candidacy was supported by the majority of deputies, was appointed his successor.

The new chairman of the Crimean Supreme Soviet has until recently worked as pro-rector of the University of Agriculture and before this was the acting first deputy prime minister in charge of agriculture.

Belarus

Shushkevich, Kravchanka Meet Lord Owen, Stoltenberg

WS2105080693 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0300 GMT 21 May 93

[Text] Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich has met Lord Owen, cochairman of the Conference on Peace Regulation of the Yugoslav Crisis and Norwegian Foreign Minister T. Stoltenberg. In the course of their short visit to the Republic, Lord Owen and T. Stoltenberg held negotiations with the Foreign Minister Petr Kravchanka. They discussed issues connected with the regulation of the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

Immediately after the visit to the Foreign Ministry, Lord Owen and T. Stoltenberg left for the airport and flew to Kiev.

Supreme Soviet Discusses Citizenship, National Language

WS2005135693 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1200 GMT 20 May 93

[Report by Mikhail Rudkovskiy]

[Text] Today's session began as usual with a discussion of miscellaneous issues. Various questions were raised. It is amazing how some deputies talk about problems, others create them, while the lives of the majority of people does not become happier. Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich is also being attacked. It is not easy for him to carry out his policy, that of sovereignty and independence of our beloved Belarus, and to pursue the course of reforms, so far being very sluggishly implemented.

The first 30 minutes elapsed, and the chairman suggested that the discussion of the draft constitution of the Republic of Belarus, interrupted yesterday, be resumed. The first article discussed today, in particular, read: The state grants Belarusian citizens its protection both on the Belarusian territory and abroad. Nobody can be devoid of Belarusian citizenship acquired by birth, or denied a right to change citizenship. The deputies voted for this. Thus, we are Belarusian citizens forever, and let us be proud of this. The second part of the article was recommended for completion.

The 11th article determining the rights of foreign citizens permanently residing in Belarus and possessing no citizenship was accepted without amendments. Discussion of the new draft constitution of Belarus is proceeding step by step.

In my opinion, Article 17 of the constitution is of great importance to all the Belarusian citizens. It reads: Belarusian is the national language of the Republic of Belarus. The status of other languages will be determined by the law. The last clause of the article evoked debates of the lawmakers. People's Deputy Ivan Banbiza presented his recommendations. I am inviting him to tell us about this.

[Banbiza] My recent meetings with electors have persuaded me that we must speak in favor of Belarusian being the national language in the Republic.

[Rudkovskiy] What is the essence of your proposal?

[Banbiza] I have suggested that we confirm our tolerant attitude toward all the languages spoken by Belarusian citizens, and state that Belarusian is our national language. At the same time, the state guarantees all citizens free use of their native language. I think that this will satisfy all the constituency.

[Rudkovskiy] Excuse me, but this has been stated by Article 50 of the Constitution.

[Banbiza] This is what evoked arguments. My point is that while determining the national language, we must express our attitude toward other languages in this very article.

[Rudkovskiy] However, those who speak Russian represent a deviation when two languages are granted equal rights by the law. What is your stance on this issue?

[Banbiza] Belarusian independence is being revived today. We must create conditions for all Belarusian citizens to be able to master Belarusian. We cannot force them. They must learn to love the language of the state where they reside.

Moldova

Snegur Calls For Compromise With Gagauz, Dniester Regions

LD2005121693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1112 GMT 20 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[Text] Chisinau, 20 May—Moldova's President Mircea Snegur said today that the republican leadership should agree to a compromise with Gagauzia and Dniester regions. In an interview to the 'DELOVAYA GAZETA' weekly published in Chisinau, he stressed that Moldova will otherwise not see reforms, modernization of the economy, or foreign investments because of political instability. Also, without solving the issue of the Dniester region's special status, the withdrawal of the 14th Russian Army from the republic could be brought to a standstill under pressure from Tiraspol.

The president criticized the ultra-patriots from the opposition who accuse him of capitulation. "We have quite a few hotheads who wish to turn many other towns and villages into battlefields. However, the advisers usually give advice and wash their hands, while the president has to bear responsibility," Mircea Snegur said. He also notes that he fears provocations from those supporting military actions, and therefore calls on the "strong-arm" ministers to be vigilant.

Parliament Head Accuses Legislative Power of 'Apathy'

AU2105081493 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1931 GMT 19 May 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS, 19/5/1993—The talks concerning the strong necessity for creating special economic zones in Moldova have been flying around for two years but practically nothing was done, specified Petru Luchinschi, the President of Legislative Power in Chisinau, during yesterday's parliamentary debates. Luchinschi affirmed that parliament is in a phase of apathy and manifested no interest in the burning problems of the Republic. Referring to the very tense situation in industry exaggerated custom taxes and other flagrant political and economic gaps which lead to the blocking of commerce and overstocking of deposits, the chief of the legislative power declared that "by experiencing such a difficult stage of the economy we cannot realize anything". In this context Luchinschi insisted on examinations by parliament and parliamentary commissions and in general by all deputies holding functions of control. In the course of current session of parliament Luchinschi expressed that the actual legislative body possesses an adequate potential and its reelection is unnecessary. According to the speaker, political forces which plea for reelection on the basis of pluralism must first of all test their forces on a local scale.

Kazakhstan

Work Starts on Kazakh-U.S. Mutual Security Agreement

LD1905171093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1520 GMT 19 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Kulagin]

[Text] Almaty May 19 TASS—Representatives from the United States and the newly independent Republic of Kazakhstan held their first joint meeting in Almaty today at a seminar entitled "Defense, Peace and Security Policy".

This seminar has been established with the explicit purpose of building closer ties with regard to matters of defense and security between the United States and this nuclear power in Central Asia.

The conference is organized by the Center for Strategic Studies at the Kazakh Institute of Management. The forum is being attended by presidential, parliament and government staff officials, diplomats, researchers and specialists.

Experts from the U.S. have come to exhibit their deep concern for the need to develop a closer international relationship of mutual understanding and joint security. Additionally, they wish to share these concerns with their Kazakistani colleagues. Even though the "Cold War" has ended, they stated that the world is fraught with a whole host of new threats and risks.

Specialists from both nations are to discuss various political, economic and ecological aspects of security, as well as disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, confidence building, preventive diplomacy and peace-making operations.

The seminar will last until the 28th of May.

Delegation Leader to CIS Talks Holds News Conference

LD2005144893 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh 2300 GMT 19 May 93

[Text] Yesterday, a press conference was held at the republic Defense Ministry. It was chaired by Armed Forces Chief of Staff Alybek Kasymov, the first deputy defense minister, who led the Kazakhstani delegation at the conference of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers. He told the journalists about the outcome of the council's conference. The principled provisions of integration were discussed in a particularly heated way. The representatives of the Russian Federation defended the idea of the strategic nuclear forces belonging to the nation and put forward a proposal to create a united Armed Forces within the CIS framework.

The Kazakhstani delegation indicated a different approach. In its opinion, the united Armed Forces should be built on the basis of national armies, which will delegate the authority to localize inner and border conflicts to the united commanding officers. Tackling the problem in this way, as the delegation of the republic believes, will be the basis for integration of the Armed Forces and a sign of increasing cooperation. Major General Alibek Kasymov underlined the fact that the search for the mechanism of guaranteeing collective security will continue at working meetings and consultations of the representatives of the Defense Ministries of the sovereign republics.

Kyrgyzstan

Akayev Meets With Clinton, Gore During U.S. Visit

LD2105015393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2345 GMT 20 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Igor Barsukov and Pavel Vanichkin]

[Text] Washington, 21 May—U.S. President Bill Clinton received Askar Akayev, president of Kyrgyzstan, at the White House on 20 May. Akayev is here at the invitation of the human rights committee of the U.S. National Academy of Science. Vice President Al Gore also took part in the conversation.

"The President welcomed the Kyrgyzstan president, having noted his courageous support for human rights, democracy, and market reforms in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan," says a White House statement. "During the conversation the President and Vice President discussed a wide range of issues of mutual interest with President Akayev. They welcomed the expansion of bilateral ties between the two countries."

As before, the United States plans to assist the Republic of Kyrgyzstan in its difficult transition to a democratic market system, the statement stresses. The President and Vice President congratulated the Kyrgyzstan leader on the fact that his country is the first of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union to have worked out a program of reform that corresponds to the conditions for granting "a standard credit" by the IMF. The American leaders "have singled out Kyrgyzstan as an example for the other newly independent states, welcoming the decisive actions by the government of President Akayev to implement macroeconomic stabilization and democratic reforms."

Meets With Lloyd Bentsen

LD2005205493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1923 GMT 20 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Vanichkin]

[Text] Washington May 20 TASS—Visiting Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev, who arrived in Washington at the invitation of the Committee for Human Rights of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, has met with U.S. Finance Minister [as received] Lloyd Bentsen on Thursday [20 May].

A spokesman for the U.S. finance minister told ITAR-TASS that during the meeting the president and the finance minister discussed a programme of reforms being carried out in Kyrgystan.

Particular attention was paid to anti-inflationary and stabilising economic policy of the republic. The U.S. minister congratulated President Akayev on the fact that Kyrgystan had become the first country out of former Soviet republics which conforms to the terms of granting a standard credit by the IMF. Kyrgystan became the first republic of the former Soviet Union which received the right to a credit from the recently established IMF foundation for system transformations.

Upon completion of the meeting, the U.S. minister said that President Akayev was pursuing a bold programme of economic reforms which should set an example to other states of the former Soviet Union. The U.S. minister said that one of the most important elements of transformations conducted by the Kyrgyz president was the introduction of Kyrgyz national currency which would help efficiently combat inflation and stabilise the economy.

Chingyshev Settles Gas Dispute With Uzbekistan

LD1905122393 Bishkek KYRGYZKABAR News Agency in Russian 0800 GMT 19 May 93

[Text] Bishkek, 18 May—Prime Minister Tursunbek Chingyshev has sorted out by telephone all the problems with the supply of gas from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan. Following the introduction of a national currency in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan decided to stop the supply of fuel and suspended payments on non-cash transactions. It's just interesting what channels of communication the prime minister used to talk to the Uzbek president: telephone links with Tashkent—and from there to other states—were cut off yesterday on the same grounds.

Tajikistan

Abdullodzhanov on Efforts To Overcome Economic Crisis

LD2105110693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1032 GMT 21 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe May 21 TASS—Head of the Tajik Government Abdumalik Abdullodzhanov believes that the republic could overcome the economic crisis within the next five or six years, if it focused its policy on the development of the economy's priority sectors, primarily the processing industry and hydraulic power generation.

Interviewed by ITAR-TASS, the Tajik premier said that the republic possessed rich raw material resources and sufficient manpower to set up, for instance, an extensive network of processing enterprises. As to money, scores of large private and state-run firms in several CIS countries, including Belarus and Russia, as well as many foreign businessmen, are ready to make substantial investments in this sector of the economy already today.

The national hydraulic power industry could be a source of hard currency for the republic. After completing the construction of the Rogun hydraulic power plant and the string of Pamir stations, Tajikistan will be able not only to meet its own requirements in electric power, but may become its major exporter to neighbouring countries.

The third "mainstay" of the republic's economic revival, Abdullodzhanov believes, are its extremely rich deposits of precious metals, including gold. He said that already next year the republic would produce several tonnes of gold bars and about 60 tonnes of silver.

Abdullodzhanov stressed the republic's adherence to a market economy and to the development of small and medium-size businesses. He said that the future of Tajikistan depended on entrepreneurs and businessmen. "For this purpose," he added, "the government, jointly with economic experts, is drawing up several legislations to promote the development and improve the social protection of the emerging class of private owners."

At the same time, the premier believes that the state sector should play the leading role during the transitional period, when the Tajik economy is on the verge of collapse. "We cannot switch over to a market economy overnight. Our people will not be able to endure a shock therapy, because most of them are on the verge of poverty due to the consequences of the civil war, aggravated by natural calamities," he stated.

Uzbekistan

Government Lifts Sanctions Against Kyrgyzstan

LD1905181993 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1600 GMT 19 May 93

[Text] Uzbekistan has lifted the economic sanctions against Kyrgyzstan, that were imposed earlier in retaliation to Kyrgyzstan's switch to a national currency. As INTERFAX has reported, the Uzbek side expressed readiness to sign a corresponding trade and economic agreement, taking into consideration the changing currency and finance relations with Kyrgyzstan.

At the same time, the Kyrgyz Government has prepared as a matter of urgency, a package of interstate treaties and agreements that will be offered for signing to the governments of the Central Asian states in connection with the republic's transition to its own currency.

European Bank To Grant Loan of 100 Billion ECU

PM1905143193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 18 May 93 p 2

[INTERFAX report under the "CIS News" rubric: "Uzbekistan To Get 100 Billion ECU Loan"]

[Text] With the participation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD], a credit line worth 100 billion ECU [European currency units] has been opened to Uzbekistan with a view to developing private enterprise. This was announced to INTERFAX at a news conference held by the National Bank for Foreign Economic Activity. The bank stressed that Rustam Azimov, EBRD director from Uzbekistan and chairman of the board of the National Bank for Foreign Economic Activity, represented the republic for the first time as a full-fledged member at the annual session of EBRD directors held in London.

At its London conference, the EBRD showed an interest in financing sectors of the Uzbek economy such as cotton processing, textiles, the oil and gas extraction industries, and the environment.

Armenia

Turkey's Role in Tripartite Plan Criticized

NC2105110393 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1830 GMT 20 May 93

[Station commentary: "Kelbadzhar: At Turkey's Bidding"]

[Text] The Turkish axiom that the Turkish diplomat will achieve at the negotiating table what the Turkish soldier cannot achieve on the battlefield is again being put into practice. But the axiom is now slightly altered: The Turkish diplomat will achieve at the negotiating table what the Azerbaijani soldier cannot achieve on the battlefield.

The initiative of the United States, Turkey, and Russia produced a document that has virtually been formulated at Turkey's bidding and that was presented to Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh for their signature almost as an ultimatum. The document again proves that Turkey cannot be a fair judge in any issue relating to Armenians. Examples abound, ranging from its traditional relations with Armenia through the supply of arms to Azerbaijan to its categorical anti- Armenian statements. Then, there's the baring of its teeth and staging of threatening military maneuvers on the Armenian border.

Turkey must be forced out of the Karabakh game, especially as Turkey is supported on the one hand by the United States and on the other by Russia, which pursues an incomprehensible policy. The first provision of the ultimatum-document reveals Turkey's absolute anti-Armenian stance.

What will be the implications of a complete withdrawal of the detachments of Karabakh's self-defense army from Kelbadzharskiy Rayon? Don't the other two authors of the document know that the Azerbaijani Army has occupied Nagorno-Karabakh Republic's Shaumyanovskiy Rayon and part of Mardakertskiy Rayon? If the sides are just and detached, these regions must be considered to be one problem along with Kelbadzharskiy Rayon.

If the Karabakh forces leave Kelbadzharskiy, it is obvious that the Azerbaijani forces will immediately deploy there. From there it is only 45 to 50 km to Metsshen and Magavuz, where the rest of the usurping Azerbaijani Army is located. The 16 Armenian villages liberated recently are found in that region. In such a case, the Azerbaijani Army will effectively encircle these settlements, then occupy them, along with the Tartar River from one end to the other and the entire Sarsang Dam. This is only one of the points of that infamous plan [words indistinct].

Iranian Delegation Visits, Stresses Closer Ties

NC2105032693 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1700 GMT 20 May 93

[Text] The Armenian Vice President Gagik Arutyunyan today received a delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran led by Bahram Qasemi, the head of the CIS and Caucasus Department at the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

The talks centered on Armenian-Iranian relations which of late have become more active. Arutyunyan underlined the positive role being played by the state commission for coordination of Armenian- Iranian ties in forging closer and tangible relations between the two countries. The almost weekly meetings of this commission and the constant contact with the Iranian charge d'affaires in Armenia Ahmad Sobhani is helping solve the problems.

In turn, Bahram Qasemi said that during the current visit to Armenia the members of the delegation—Makhsut Sarraf, deputy minister of roads and transportation; Mustafa Kialbani, head of the International Department at the Economy and Finance Ministry; and 'Abdollah Kashani, head of the Foreign Relations Department at the Industry Ministry—will hold contacts at the Armenian ministries to examine and find ways to render the cooperation more productive. Stressing that Iran expects the assistance of the Armenian vice president in this regard, Bahram Qasemi said that Iran is ready to launch new and closer political and economic cooperation with Armenia.

Presidential Aide on Hopes for CIS Development

PM2005125993 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 93 p 2

[Armen Khanbabyan report: "Russian Loan to Armenia"]

[Text] Yerevan—"The recent desire for economic integration shown by the CIS states is seen in Yerevan as a very positive phenomenon," Armenian Presidential Press Secretary A. Abrahamyan has stated. As he put it, the republic intends to actively promote all constructive integration processes in the hope that the CIS will in time turn into a community like the EC, with Russia continuing to be Armenia's main economic and political partner.

And these are not just words. We have learned that during the 14 May Moscow summit agreement was reached on granting Armenia a $30-million Russian loan for seven years at just 2.5 percent. At the same time, the sides agreed that Russian nuclear engineers would take part in work to restore Armenia's nuclear power station.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Addresses Parliament on Cease-Fire, Security

LD2005184293 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1300 GMT 20 May 93

[Speech by Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze to parliament in Tbilisi—live, broadcast in progress]

[Excerpts] Today, Pastukhov is in Sukhumi. He held the first meeting, the first round with Mr. Nadareishvili and others. Sandro Kavsadze is participating in these meetings alongside our other representatives. They are in Sukhumi now, if I am not mistaken. They will have meetings with the population, and at the end of the day, they will have a conclusive dialogue. Perhaps two or three steps will follow today's agreement on a cease-fire in order to guarantee the reliability of the cease-fire, in order to guarantee it. It is early to say for the time being what they will be, until the Sukhumi dialogue is over.

It is important that the special mission is arriving today; maybe it has already arrived or else will arrive shortly. We have talked a lot about this mission from the United Nations and the personal representative to Mr. Butrus Ghali, a special representative for this conflict. It is quite a strong team. Today, they will meet people in different establishments and familiarize themselves with the situation. I will meet them tomorrow, and we will try to fly them to Sukhumi tomorrow. It is very crucial and desirable that they be in Sukhumi at the moment.

Before I came into the Parliament, I made a small statement about the cease-fire and stressed the responsibility of both parties. I said that I had issued an order that Georgian armed forces should begin a cease-fire on this day, provided the second party follows suit. [passage omitted]

As I have told you during my previous meetings, I do not want to cherish illusions; it will not be easy to see this task through to the end. As you know, the wounds are still sore, and the wounds are always painful, but we must do what we can, we must manage to do it. I am ready to report at every Parliament session how our talks on settling this conflict are going with the Abkhazians, Russians, other parties, and the United Nations.

Now, the next thing. You must have paid attention to my small decree. Let us try to mark 26 May, 75th anniversary of Georgia's independence properly. I would like to reiterate that it is difficult under these circumstances to be talking about big celebrations and great joy, but we cannot afford not to celebrate this anniversary and not to celebrate it properly. It would not be right.

Probably each one of you is interested in what happened then, under what circumstances Georgia got its independence, how building democracy started, followed by its positive results or mistakes. All that is experience that we must take on board. Therefore, I think, we must try to mark this date as an important event in our people's lives. A military parade is to be held. Of course, it will not be a grandiose parade, but probably Georgia will see the first result of what started in our country—creation of the unified armed forces. [passage omitted]

There is some, perhaps not very significant, information, signals, that certain destructive forces want to cast a shadow on this day, as if they are preparing for something. I do not want to take it seriously. I believe that a national holiday, a state holiday, stresses the responsibilities of all—every party, every movement, and every citizen before their national state. In order to exclude intolerable actions—you know there are certain irresponsible and brazen elements—I gave instructions to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the intelligence service, the procurator's office, and other bodies to be on the alert and to secure the right of Georgian citizens to celebrate their national holiday under normal conditions. [passage omitted]

During talks in Moscow, Mr. Sigua and I asked the Russian president and the prime minister to allot a certain quantity of grain at the expense of future credits. Some 150,000 tonnes are meant. The paperwork took a little longer than expected. This morning I had a talk with the Russian prime minister, reminding him of their promise. Today, having received confirmation from President Yeltsin, he made a decision to meet our request. Now we will receive what is necessary to emerge from the crisis. As for the remainder, it will be supplied partly before the new harvest and partly after the harvest. [passage omitted]

Shevardnadze Snubs Critics, Favors Closer Russian Ties

MK2005122693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 May 93 p 3

[Nodar Broladze report published under "Georgia" rubric: "A Hard Day in Parliament. Shevardnadze Sticks to His Guns"]

[Text] A Georgian delegation led by Eduard Shevardnadze went to Armenia's capital the morning of 19 May after a very hard day in parliament.

First the parliament chairman reported on the delegation's working visit to Moscow and his talks with Russian President Boris Yeltsin: "The time has come to put an end to confrontation between Georgia and Russia and start new relations," Shevardnadze said. "The 3 September decisions have only remained on paper—this is a fact, but since then the correlation of forces inside Russia has changed. After the referendum Mr. Yeltsin visibly consolidated his positions, and I think that he will use his influence to resume the effects of the 3 September agreements." The head of state specially stressed that he attaches particular importance to the talks held in Moscow between military representatives; concerning the dialogue between the defense ministers, he said the meeting between Giya Karkarashvili and Pavel Grachev

was interesting in many respects: The young minister "has risen to the occasion, providing substantial arguments to maintain the interests of the Georgian side." Shevardnadze urged the deputies also to appreciate the importance of the beginning of the Georgian-Abkhaz dialogue in Moscow and to note the fact that Western leaders and ambassadors had expressed their approval and hopes in that connection. The parliament chairman said that everything would now hinge on the actions of the Russian president, the Gudauta politicians and the military after 20 May, when the cease-fire agreement is to take effect. "Yeltsin is in a position to control the situation along all lines. This is especially important with respect to the conflict in Abkhazia," Shevardnadze believes. From his point of view, there can be no great hopes for a speedy settlement, but the situation today is obviously better than it was only recently.

The members of parliament, who had had enough time to familiarize themselves with the results of the negotiations and to form their own opinion, did not display any particular enthusiasm. Deputy Tamara Chkheidze, on behalf of the Ilya Chavchavadze Society that she heads, said it was not clear how the cease-fire could be ensured, given that over half of Abkhazia was controlled by the other side. A draft resolution worked out by Nodar Natadze, chairman of the parliamentary commission on defense and national security, called for that territory to be proclaimed occupied and then annexed. Deputies from Sukhumi believe that the pullout of Georgian heavy weapons would mean the loss of the Abkhaz capital and that it was a mistake to dismiss Defense Minister Tengiz Kitovani. Irakliy Tsereteli, chairman of the National Independence Party, and Tedo Paatashvili, leader of Charter-91, were not slow in making their views known. The former reiterated the need for pressing for a complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Abkhazia, whereupon Georgia would restore its jurisdiction over the area with its troops controlling the Russian-Georgian border. "In line with a parliamentary resolution, Shevardnadze was instructed to meet Yeltsin and make sure in the process of negotiations that Russian troops are withdrawn from the zone of conflict; should he fail to do that, the territory should be proclaimed occupied," Paatashvili stated. Saarishvili, a deputy from the National Democratic Party, believes that even if the opponents of the parliament chairman were right in some respect, at that stage their statements were not justified. "This is the beginning of a movement toward overcoming the crisis, and this must be understood," she said.

"Either I am not expressing my ideas clearly enough, or the microphone is out of order, or you have not learned to listen to me," said a piqued Shevardnadze. The gist of his explanation was that first, wishes and possibilities do not always or immediately coincide, while exacerbation of the confrontation with Russia could result in famine and much suffering; second, it is not only the Russian factor that is dominant, since on 20 May a UN mission will arrive in Georgia—the UN secretary general is sending his personal envoy, and in addition, at a new stage, European structures will join in the process; third, should such a need arise, Ukrainian peacekeeping forces will enter Abkhazia under UN auspices, which should also become a stabilizing factor. There was yet another option left—in the form of a tough and uncompromising policy with respect to Russia, but, Shevardnadze said, it could be applied only if we lived in a trouble-free and thriving country.

Nadareishvili, Russia's Pastukhov Hold Talks

LD2105081393 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0200 GMT 21 May 93

[Text] An IBERIA news agency correspondent was notified from Sukhumi by Tamaz Nadareishvili, chairman of the Defense Council of the autonomous republic of Abkhazia, that talks between him and Russian presidential special envoy Boris Pastukhov ended yesterday.

Nadareishvili said it was the first tentative meeting where the parties familiarized themselves with each other's stance. I told him what the Georgian party demanded and what was unacceptable for us, said Nadareishvili.

Then Boris Pastukhov met the members of the National Salvation Committee. Boris Pastukhov went into the streets of Sukhumi and surveyed the buildings which had been destroyed as a result of bombing.

In the evening, Pastukhov met the National Committee of Abkhazia. Tamaz Nadareishvili also said that the Georgian party took a strict and principled stance during negotiatins with Boris Pastukhov. The Russian party, compared with last time, behaved in a reserved manner.

As for the prospects, Nadareishvili said that he views the future with hope, though not without some doubt.

Later, a second meeting between Tamaz Nadareishvili and Boris Pastukhov took place, where the negotiations results were summed up.

UN Envoy Arrives for Abkhazia Talks

LD2105021193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1907 GMT 20 May 93

[By GIA correspondents for TASS]

[Text] Tbilisi May 20 TASS—A personal envoy of the United Nations Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, Edward Brunner arrived in Georgia on Thursday [20 May]. He was welcomed at Tbilisi airport by Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksandr Chikvaidze and other officials.

The Georgian minister told GIA news agency he attached great significance to the fact that the United Nations represented by a personal envoy of its secretary general would take part in the settlement of the conflict around Abkhazia.

"It is also important that the delegation from the United Nations which has arrived in Georgia is endowed with considerable authority and its participation in peace making efforts will contribute a new element to the situation", Chikvaidze said.

Treaties Signed With Armenia Detailed

MK2005113093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 May 93 p 3

[Armen Khanbabyan report under the general heading: "Armenia, Georgia Agree on Many Things, Including Mutual Security"]

[Text] At 1100 on 19 May, Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze began his special six-hour visit to Yerevan. His delegation included Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua, Foreign Minister Aleksandr Chikvaidze, and also leaders of the Georgian parliament and chiefs of more than 20 Georgian ministries and departments. The reason for so impressive a lineup was that a bilateral treaty on friendship, cooperation, and mutual security plus a number of agreements and declarations on specific areas of cooperation, such as parliamentary relations, economic ties, transit of shipments, and cultural, scientific, and humanitarian contacts, were signed in Yerevan.

According to Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the friendship of the two neighboring peoples is so strong, deep-rooted, and traditional that it does not require legal formalization. The Armenian president said at a brief news conference that this was the most important thing discussed during the talks, because both states are doing their utmost to stabilize their domestic and international positions.

Eduard Shevardnadze agreed with the assessments of the Armenian leader, adding that the dialogue was not only very frank, but also very fruitful. He said that resolving the current conflicts was the main task facing both young states at this stage of their efforts to strengthen their independence.

It was agreed that such meetings would be held regularly. Eduard Shevardnadze acknowledged that the continuing operation of transport and power links via Georgian territory was of vital importance for Armenia. He said in that context that he did not rule out the possibility of joint patrols of bridges, roads, and gas pipelines by Georgian and Armenian guards. He emphasized once again that Georgia does not intend to join the CIS.

Prospects for Georgian-Armenian Relations Viewed

MK2005113693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 May 93 p 3

[Liana Minasyan report under the general heading: "Armenia, Georgia Agree On Many Things, Including Mutual Security"]

[Text] A visit by the Georgian leader to Armenia had been expected for a long time and repeatedly postponed at a time when domestic tensions were testing the strength of both countries' fragile statehood. An attempt to create a more or less stable alliance in the Caucasus may prove to be not without hope—the existing problems in bilateral relations are solvable; furthermore, these relations are not so much burdened with conflicting contradictions as those between Armenia and Azerbaijan or between Georgia and the North Caucasus. Both Shevardnadze and Ter-Petrosyan are pragmatic leaders who will try to retain this balance, maybe even despite outside pressure.

For Armenia, which gives foreign policy priorities to its immediate, next-door neighbors, a Georgia torn apart by "internecine disorder" is, objectively speaking, less attractive than a stable Georgia. If Yerevan is to get any chance of breaking the blockade, it needs communications and access to the outside world, Russia in particular. As long as power is unstable in Georgia, there can hardly be any hope that the highway robberies and pipeline explosions will stop. Local clashes between civilians and widespread looting on highways—these are the problems the Georgian authorities have to cope with to prove their own viability.

The international context of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations is also very complex. Shevardnadze, contrary to the official viewpoint that has taken hold in Russia, appears to be the only (and last) politician in Georgia who can save Russian-Georgian relations from the excesses of radical nationalism. The opposition to Levon Ter-Petrosyan, on the contrary, is inclined to use the slogan "With Russia Forever" and to play a game of giveaway with the Russian "patriots." In order to overcome stereotypes in the public consciousness in both countries, some spontaneously emerging analogies [as published] have to be gotten rid of so that the problems of Armenia and Karabakh or Georgia and Abkhazia will not affect the bilateral ties. The civil rights of the Armenian population in Georgia can only be protected if the incumbent regime and the national movement in Georgia do not fall back on the ideology of aggressive ethnic dominance. This is yet another reason for the Armenian authorities to be interested in the stability of the incumbent Georgian government. Some time ago, at the beginning of the Abkhazian conflict, preoccupied with domestic problems, they could not deter the local Armenian population from taking part in the confrontation. At present, both countries are interested in seeing ethnic Armenians in Georgia retain their local self-government and preserve their place and their neutrality in Georgian society.

Estonia

Velliste Says Russia Continues To Violate Sovereignty

WS2105114893 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1647 GMT 20 May 93

[Text] Tallinn, May 20—Estonia's Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste once again stressed the importance of Russian troop pullout from the Baltics to its European partners at the West European Union Consultation Forum in Rome.

"Challenges faced by one country or region are challenges which affect us all. Most recently, this has clearly been manifested by the challenges released as de facto independent state, Estonia's sovereignty continues to be infringed through the presence of Russian troops on our soil," Velliste said and added that negotiations with Russia have been varied, particularly with regard to issues concerning the withdrawal of the Russian military as Russian authorities continue to place additional demands on Estonia and Latvia by trying to tie supplementary conditions to troop pullout.

"This is in complete contradiction with Article 15 of the 1992 CSCE Summit Declaration which calls fro the early, orderly and complete withdrawal of foreign military forces from the territories of the Baltic states," Velliste said.

The Baltic states fully comprehend the complexity of the challenges which Russia currently faces, both at home and abroad, but still hope that Russian authorities would base their policies and action on democratic principles and international law, Velliste added.

"However... there are political circles in Russia which advocate outdated and undemocratic spheres of influence policies, particularly in regard to the Baltic countries. These are policies which Estonia cannot accept. These are policies which, for the sake of European stability and security, the rest of the world must not accept either," Velliste concluded.

Diplomatic Relations Established With Syria

LD1905173593 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1400 GMT 19 May 93

[Text] This afternoon in Moscow, Juri Kahn, Estonia's ambassador to Moscow, and 'Isam al-Na'ib, Syrian ambassador to Moscow, signed an agreement establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. This is reported by the Estonian embassy in Moscow.

According to Ambassador Juri Kahn, this is another step for the Republic of Estonia on the international arena. Kahn added that Estonia is aiming to establish diplomatic relations with all countries, and this will form a foundation for a better mutual understanding and smooth the path for the development of trade, cultural exchanges and tourism.

Defense Minister Replaces Defense Ministry Chancellor

WS2005115793 Tallinn BNS in English 1504 GMT 18 May 93

[Text] Tallinn, May 18, BNS—Estonian Defense Minister Hain Rebas discharged the chancellor of the ministry, Priit Heinsalu, Monday [17 May]. The minister appointed Hannes Walter, an adviser at the ministry, as the new chancellor.

The change in the leadership of the defense ministry was based on political reasons, sources told BNS. But government and defense ministry officials say they have seen no written order on sacking Heinsalu so far.

"We admit that such rumours exist, but we have seen no paper (confirming this)," officials at the ministry's press office said.

State Secretary Ulo Kaevats told BNS that the process of discharging a ministry chancellor is not regulated by the law, but added that, as the head of the state chancery, he had approved the replacement.

The head of the parliament's ruling Pro Patria faction, Illar Hallaste, told BNS that Heinsalu had failed to manage his job. Hallaste said he was sure that the new chancellor would manage better.

Neither defense minister Rebas nor Heinsalu or Walter were available for comment.

Heinsalu, before his appointment to the office of the defense ministry chancellor, worked as an aide to the rector of Tartu University.

Latvia

Talks on Russian Troop Withdrawal Continue in Jurmala

LD1905163093 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1300 GMT 19 May 93

[Text] We begin with a report on the Latvian-Russian interstate talks in Jurmala. Karlis Grinbergs, a correspondent for the government's information service, is here in the studio.

[Grinbergs] Today is the third day of the talks. A housing problem was first on the agenda for discussion at Melluzi. Sergey Zotov, head of the Russian delegation, expressed the wish to learn about the legislative acts of the Republic of Latvia which lay down the use of housing, residence registration, and rights for citizens and foreigners concerning housing.

Janis Dinevics, head of the Latvian delegation, pointed out that the Russian delegation asked such privileges for ex-Soviet Army pensioners living in Latvia, which none of our own pensioners have. Latvian and Russian experts have worked out a proposal how to settle the rather

painful issue of the future use of an oil pipeline. It is possible that this document will be accepted at this round of talks.

The name Parfenov was again mentioned at today's talks. The Russian side would like to see him in Russia.

According to Mr. Zotov, the presence of counterintelligence services in Latvia should be perfectly acceptable because the army cannot operate without such a department.

Answering Mr. Dinevics' question about moving the army headquarters from Riga, Mr. Zotov said that this time such an issue is not on the agenda of the Russian delegation. Mr. Zotov also asked permission to bring into Latvia more soldiers to guard military facilities and prepare military cargoes for the withdrawal.

The talks will continue tomorrow. At the moment, experts are working and both delegations will again sit down at the negotiating table at noon tomorrow. Today's talks were rather brief, lasting only 2 hours.

Troops Could Leave in 5-10 Years

WS2005122893 Tallinn BNS in English 1936 GMT 18 May 93

[Text] Riga, May 18, BNS—Latvian and Russian military officials met for another round of talks in Jurmala May 18 to discuss further possibilities of pulling out Russian troops from Latvia.

During the negotiations the Russian delegation proposed the group consider the vacating terms for several military installations separately. The bases in question included the Skrunda radar station, the Zvaigznite air space reconnaissance center at Ventspils and the Liepaja navy base. Head of the Russian delegation Sergey Zotov said that Russia could complete its move from these sites within 5-10 years.

The Russian Baltic Fleet Command has already submitted a schedule for the fleet's withdrawal, setting the deadline for 1994. In addition, the air-space reconnaissance center and the radar station could be disbanded within shorter period than Zotov suggests, said Ilgonis Upmalis, head of the Latvian bureau controlling the Russian army withdrawal. In his view, Russia is self-importantly and unilaterally deciding on the pullout deadline.

Janis Dinevich, head of the Latvian delegation, said that Latvia will stand its ground and demand the complete Russian army withdrawal by the end of 1993.

Speaking about the general deadlines of the troop pullout, Russia says it's ready to draft a schedule provided the army stay in Latvia is extended to 1994 and Latvia secures social welfare for militaries and retired officers.

Due to slow relocation process the Cekule and Garkalne ammunition depot sites can be vacated not earlier than 1994, said a Russian representative. Ilgonis Upmalis confirmed this information.

Latvia suggested that the majority of troops be redeployed by August 1994 and the ammunition depots be vacated later.

In an interview to journalists Sergey Zotov said he had expected that Latvians would be more forthcoming to suggest the deadline for the army withdrawal and would come up with social welfare proposals for militaries and retired officers.

'Minor Disagreements' on Strategic Facilities

WS2005114693 Tallinn BNS in English 1504 GMT 18 May 93

[Text] Riga, May 18, BNS—Latvia and Russia opened their most recent round of talks Monday with a constructive day of sessions, say both countries' delegations.

The leaders of the delegations, Sergey Zotov (Russia) and Janis Dinevics (Latvia), told BNS that the two delegations drafted five agreements that will step into force pending the completion of the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Latvia. The pacts include border crossing procedures for Russian servicemen and members of their families; the procedure of using the Latvian air space by the Russian air force and the procedure of entering Latvia's territorial waters by Russian ships.

For the first time in many rounds of talks, the two groups plan to discuss the schedule of the Russian troops' complete withdrawal from Latvia. Russia has pushed for a withdrawal deadline in 1994 without stating any specific date. Latvia wants the troops out by the end of the year, but Russia argues that it is technically impossible to do so.

Minor disagreements arose over the preservation of the Russian army's strategic installations, including the radar station in Skrunda. Russia wants to preserve the installations in Latvia for another ten years.

Latvia's State Minister Dinevics told BNS that if the discussion of the complete withdrawal of the Russian troops in 1994 proceeds in a constructive spirit, the Latvian delegation would ask the Latvian parliament to approve the schedule.

IAEA Experts Arrive To Inspect Salaspils Nuclear Reactor

WS2005123493 Tallinn BNS in English 1936 GMT 18 May 93

[Text] Riga, May 18, BNS—The International Atomic Energy Agency Experts arrived in Latvia this week to examine the Salaspils nuclear reactor and draft a non-proliferation treaty, said Andrejs Salmins, a radiation expert at the Environment Protection Committee.

Atomic energy experts are scheduled to meet with officials from the Latvian foreign relations ministry May 18

and discuss procedural issues for drafting the non-proliferation treaty. Latvia joined the IAEA last year. According to agency regulations, each member is obliged to sign the treaty within 18 months.

The experts will visit the Salaspils nuclear reactor May 18 and examine the possibilities of installing control equipment there.

The guests will hold a press conference May 19 to provide information about the international organization.

Germany's Suessmuth Says Riga To Enter European Council

WS2105070693 Riga LETA in English 1046 GMT 19 May 93

[Text] Riga, May 19 (LETA)—Professor Rita Suessmuth, president of the German Bundestag, on Tuesday met with the head of the Latvian state Anatolijs Gorbunovs. The chairman of the Supreme Council pointed out that the visit will strengthen political, economic and cultural ties between Latvia and Germany. Anatolijs Gorbunovs expressed hope the that Germany would support Latvia in its application to join the European Council. President of the German Bundestag reassured him about this. She said: "You will enter the European Council very soon. There are no more obstacles to achieve this. The way to the European Community is to be a little longer, and it provides broad opportunities for political and diplomatic activities."

The issue of Latvia becoming a member of the European Council was discussed also during the meeting in the Foreign Ministry where Rita Suessmuth met with Latvian Foreign Minister Georgs Andrejevs. President of Bundestag pledged German support for Latvia which is seeking to join the European Council, according to the press centre of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Latvian part called for German pressure on Russia in order to hasten withdrawal of the Russian troops from Latvia. Frau Suessmuth pointed out that Latvia could act on bases of the Helsinki Declaration of the Conference of Security and Cooperation of Europe, as well as connect the issue with that of Russian aid programmes drafted up by Group 7.

During the meeting the German delegation expressed hope that Latvia would not change its foreign policy after the forthcoming elections. Rita Suessmuth pointed out that the present foreign policy of Latvia had ensured its rapid integration into activities of international organizations of western Europe. German politicians pledged German support for Latvia in the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization and other international bodies.

Parliament Accepts Finance, Justice Ministers Resignations

WS2105113993 Tallinn BNS in English 1102 GMT 19 May 93

[Text] Riga, May 19, BNS—The Latvian parliament accepted the resignations of Finance Minister Elmars Silins and Justice Minister Victors Skudra Tuesday [18 May].

Local observers say the resignations were not politically motivated.

The parliament decided against a draft bill to dismiss the Minister of Agriculture Dainis Gegers since parliamentarians have already shown their attitude to him in a non-confidence vote last month.

Deputies Einars Cilinskis and Guntis Grube accused the government of violating laws which stipulate that new ministers of minister substitutes should be appointed directly after the resignation of ministers.

Lithuania

Brazauskas Outlines Foreign Policy Aims

LD1805082493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0604 GMT 19 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladas Burbulis]

[Text] Vilnius May 18 TASS—"The essence of Lithuania's foreign policy is further broadening democratic processes and protecting human rights, securing its independence, territorial integrity and national security," president of the republic Algirdas Brazauskas said here on Monday.

Brazauskas was addressing participants in a symposium devoted to questions of Lithuania's foreign policy which was held in the Vilnius University. Among those present were members of the government, ambassadors of foreign countries, representatives of international organizations and scholars.

Speaking on principles of Lithuania's relations with CIS countries, the president emphasised "Lithuania should orientate towards trust and act in the spirit of european partnership, supporting mutually beneficial, bilateral economic ties, but without integrating itself in economic structures of the Commonwealth of Independent States."

Brazauskas Hails Induction Into Council of Europe

WS2005143393 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1504 GMT 18 May 93

[Speech by President Algirdas Brazauskas on the occasion of Lithuania's initiation into the Council of Europe; place and date not given; from ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 245]

[Text] 18 May 1993—Allow me to take this opportunity to share my thoughts on Lithuania's foreign policy. I would phrase the main objective of our foreign policy as the further promotion of democracy and human rights, the secural of the integrity of state territory, the assurance of national security, and the satisfaction of national interests. It is no less important to guarantee a country's internal development by joining European collective security and cultural, economic and political spaces, while simultaneously broadening and deepening cooperation with Eastern states. Two different but closely related directions of the realisation of Lithuania's foreign policy with regard to Western Europe ensue from here: 1. Promotion of Lithuania's integration into European structures. 2. Management of the political, economic and military influences of foreign states in Lithuania. The "bridge" principle between the East and the West. Guided by this principle, we will try to create particularly favourable conditions for investment, trade, tourism, and transit, as well as auspicious systems for taxes and customs. The principle of non-use force and stability in relations with neighbours. The principle of inviolability of borders, as it is provided in the documents of the CSCE. Lithuania has no territorial claims to its neighbours. Lithuania's membership in the Council of Europe is one more step in joining the economic and political space of Europe. Membership obliges up not only to help others, but also to coordinate our laws with European principles. The Council of Europe has adopted nearly 150 Conventions which oblige the countries which have ratified them to observe their stipulations. With the ratification of each convention we will become more and more integrated into Europe. Our membership in the Council of Europe can be seen as one of the safeguards of our stability and security. Our full membership in the Council of Europe is both responsibility before other states and new opportunities. It is one of the instruments to turn our currently fragile democracy into a strong foundation for our country. I would like to take this opportunity to clearly express Lithuania's intentions to sign an Associate Treaty with the European Community, and to become a member of the European Community in future. The Associate Treaty, which is not called the European Agreement by the coincidence, would be a clear sign of the European Communtie's support for our reforms. I would like to emphasize that Lithuania satisfies the conditions which are necessary for developing relations with the European Community—a democratic system is functioning in Lithuania and reforms are being implemented;—the process of the reforms is of irreversable nature;—human rights are respected;—we have no territorial claims; and—Lithuania is a member of the Council of Europe. I would particularly like to accentuate the importance of cooperation between the three Baltic States. I firmly believe that close cooperation based on common interests is not only possible but necessary. In its relations with the CIS countries Lithuania will orient itself to confidence and a European type of partnership, while maintaining mutually beneficial economic relations without integrating into economic structures of the CIS. Another link, connecting our country with Europe and the world, is our million-strong Lithuanian emigration. The strength of minds and hands of our countrymen would be especially valuable to the reviving Lithuania. We all know that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy in other forms and other space. Our policy should make life easier for every citizen of Lithuania.

Lithuanian-Russian Talks End Without 'Desired Results'

LD1905212393 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 1900 GMT 19 May 93

[Text] The heads of the Lithuanian and Russian negotiating delegations said that the two-day round of talks did not bring the desired results. The Lithuanian delegation led by MP Virgilijus Bulovas and the Russian negotiating team headed by Ambasador (?for a) [word indistinct] (?mission) Viktor Isakov met in Vilnius after seven months' break. The Russian delegation was pressing for an early coordination and signing of a political agreement [words indistinct] It failed to be signed last autumn when representatives of the two states approved the troop withdrawal schedule.

Member of the Lithuanian delegation Nikolajus Medvedevas said that at the present round of talks there were differences of position on how the (?1930) events in Lithuania should be defined: aggression against Lithuania or Lithuania's annexation. Mr. Medvedevas observed that the Lithuanian delegation did not seek to put the blame on the present Russian leadership; yet Russia, as it accepted all the rights and commitments of the former Soviet Union, should also take all the responsibility for the Soviet Union's actions in the past.

Defense Minister on Talks With Russia, Prospects

LD2005102893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1000 GMT 20 May 93

[By ITAR-TASS military analyst Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Vilnius May 20 TASS—"Lithuania is not adhering to a neutral policy. It is an active participant of all the European processes, which may turn it into a bridge between the east and the west, may ensure our stability and national security," Lithuanian Defence Minister Audrius Butkevicius told ITAR-TASS here today.

Commenting on the results of his talks with the Russian defence minister on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania, which ended on Wednesday, Butkevicius noted: "Both Grachev and I still have many problems ahead, but we have found a method to settle them on a mutually beneficial basis. I think that the prospects of our relations after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuanian territory should be regarded in the context of the all-European political situation." Butkevicius said that security on the continent and in Lithuania was obviously impossible without Russia's participation

in the solution of general political problems. Lithuania would like to facilitate this process, to help Russia overcome isolation, "Which is sometimes engendered by old problems and confrontations, to draw Russia and other CIS countries into the solution of European problems. "Only in this case we shall be able to get down to the creation of the architecture of Europe's real security," Bukevicius stressed.

Is this to be understood as proof that in solving problems of its national security Lithuania will rely primarily on European military-political structures? In reply to this ITAR-TASS question, Butkevicius said: "If Russia is a part of Europe, then the answer is yes."

The defence minister reaffirmed Lithuania's desire to cooperate with Russia in the military-technical sphere. "We know the former soviet weapons and hardware better than the western military technologies. Many of our plants manufacture goods on orders received from the Russian military-industrial complex. I see many opportunities for cooperation in this sphere. I think the continuation of talks will yield fruits in this domain."

Grachev Says Russia Withdrawing Troops on Schedule

WS2005142693 Tallinn BNS in English 1820 GMT 19 May 93

[Text] Vilnius, May 19, BNS—Russia is withdrawing its troops from Lithuania in strict compliance with a timetable signed last year, Russia's Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said at a meeting with Seimas Chairman Ceslovas Jursenas.

Grachev said he discussed 18 points during his talks with Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius and President Algirdas Brazauskas. "On practically all of them compromise decisions were made that are acceptable to the two sides," he said.

The minister noted that an agreement on the sales of military hardware to Lithuania has been drafted for governmental delegations to sign. Some of the hardware, he said, will be handed over free, as will some of the bases "since Lithuania withdraws its claims of damage for environmental pollution."

The two sides also agreed to set up joint businesses in the tank and helicopter repair works in Kaunas, Lithuania's second largest city.

Landsbergis Elected Chairman of New Conservative Party

WS1905134993 Vilnius LIETUVOS AIDAS in Lithuanian 4 May 93 No. 83 p 5

[Article by newspaper correspondent Gintaras Miksiunas: "Conservatism Means Standing Firm on Ancestral Grounds"]

[Text] On Saturday, 1 May, Vilnius witnessed the constituent conference of the Fatherland Union. The preparatory work for creating a new, right-wing, party in Lithuania was completed during the constituent conference held at the Academic Drama Theater and attended by about 1,000 founding members from all over the country.

The name caused a heated debate. There were proposals to call the new party the Union for Lithuania's Revival. However, the theater hall was already decorated with the emblem that symbolized the party's character: "Fatherland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives)."

The first speaker was Professor Vytautas Landsbergis, opposition leader and member of the founding group. He said that the party was established at a difficult time, characterized by persecution for holding opposing views, and the return of toadyism, fear, and disillusionment. The speaker congratulated Lithuania's workers, who have been deceived for so long, on the day of their revival.

Vytautas Landsbergis was elected the chairman of the Fatherland Union. A. Katkus, M. Laurinkus, and A. Stasiskis were chosen as his deputies, and Gediminas Vagnorius was elected chairman of the Executive Council. The conference adopted resolutions on the violations of freedom in Lithuanian state television; on Lithuania's liberation; on the threat to democracy; on land restoration; and on civil indifference at schools. The Fatherland Union also issued an appeal to the political organizations that constitute the Fatherland Coalition. It urged them "to remain a joint front in the struggle for preserving independence and against the restoration of socialism."

We asked some of the founders to share their opinions on the founding conference:

[Vytautas Kubilius] I see this party as a countermeasure to the revival of "proletarian dictatorship." I liked Laurinkus' conference statement that there is still hope. It is this hope that unites the people. Lithuania will continue along the road of European democratization. This party is one of the guarantors for the implementation of democracy in Lithuania.

[Gediminas Vagnorius] This conference is a typical meeting of people who have never seen each other before but who are united by the same idea. I believe that this an important move in strengthening Lithuania's political life.

[Antanas Stasiskis] We are happy that we had more delegates than expected. The constituent group was presented with 898 questionnaires. Some people may not have arrived due to certain private problems. The beginning is constructive, and there are no unnecessary conflicts.

All heated debates must have ended before the conference, because there were no pointed remarks during the meeting.

The discussions will continue. This is natural. It is good that there have already been some critical debates. The key thing is to make them fruitful. Their goal should be to find the truth rather than to disrupt.

[Saulius Saltenis] It is my secret hope that the Fatherland Union will not turn out to be a one-day butterfly. I believe that this union of honorable and bright Lithuanian men and women is ready to work for democracy, and the independence and prosperity of their Fatherland. I hope that it will become a source of long-standing support for the Lithuanian state and people. So far, we have been successful in transforming, although with pain, from the Sajudis chaos into a serious union. We have abandoned confusion caused by some sharp-tongued people who found no approval. It is good that this party is being set up by people who are prone to think and to doubt. When one believes in something, there is no need to shout about this at every crossroad and to discredit one's compatriots. We must learn from our mistakes. The real road is painful. We have had enough pain, disillusion, and depression. I believe that not only the Fatherland Union, but also other parties will be moving along this political road into the democratic future of Lithuania.

[Mecys Laurinkus] I think that people are ready to set up a party on the foundations of Sajudis. However, all are not yet aware of its principal values. The word conservatism has a dual meaning in Lithuania. It can mean backwardness and stubbornness. At the same time, following the West European concept, conservative parties can integrate tradition with liberal ideas. Such parties try to synthesize a free society based on the most liberal principles with traditional ideas of nationhood. This simple synthesis is successful, because a large number of people in every state wish to stand on a firm foundation. Such people are not dogmatic reactionaries or seek out new horizons. I suppose that such mixture is typical of Lithuania, and the union is being created by those individuals who began the Sajudis movement. It is difficult to predict how things will develop, because there may be so many current political moments that the implementation of the program may be eclipsed. For example, one of the key blunders of all previous governments was that they proclaimed liberal programs but executed social democratic or quasi-socialist programs. Their statements did not match their actions. Logic forces us to resort to semi social- democratic solutions. However, we should have a definite method of accomplishing this task.

Prior to the congress, it was said that conservatism has no roots in Lithuania. Why create a new party when there are Christian Democrats and nationalists? Is conservatism not clear to everyone?

I imagine that people will not understand it for a long time. This is why I stressed in my speech that the fundamental values serve as our base. I suppose that conservatism as a philosophy will develop from standing firm on ancestoral grounds.